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Abstract 
 
The empirical motivation of this dissertation is the increasing importance of financial 
market’s regulation pursuant of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). There is currently 
incomplete knowledge on the relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management on the one hand and earnings management and firm performance on the other 
in light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Moreover, the relevance of political 
regulation of financial markets has not yet been thoroughly investigated.  
 
The research aims of the dissertation are: 1) To evaluate the effectiveness of financial 
market regulation (SOX) on Insider trading and Earnings management 2) To empirically 
examine how the different techniques used to manage earnings influence firm performance 
in light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Both tests suggest ways in which 
investors can examine and unravel a comprehensive set of earnings management signals 
and their impact on either insider trading or future firm performance.  
 
The thesis is divided into two main empirical chapters: The first main empirical chapter 
(chapter 4) discusses insider trading and earnings management in light of the recent 
regulatory intervention mandated by the SOX. The second main empirical chapter (Chapter 
5) discuss changes in earnings management and firm performance relationship in light of 
the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by SOX. In an attempt to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of several conceptual issues, the different techniques used to 
manage earnings are employed including, discretionary accruals techniques, real earnings 
management and the probability of financial statements distortion as measured by the 
Beneish M-Score. Overall, the focus is on managers of S&P 500 companies, holders of 
private information about the firm’s prospects, preparers and senders of financial reports 
and investors and analysts as receivers and users of these financial statements.  
 
Findings on the relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light of 
the recent regulatory intervention suggest that after the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 
managers are less likely to time their trade and boast earnings to benefit at the expense of 
outside investors. Furthermore, under stricter regulations, market participants detect and 
react to insider trading and earnings management practices.  
 
Findings on the relationship between a comprehensive set of earnings management signals 
and firm performance suggest that there have been greater monitoring of financial 
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statements in the Post SOX era. When firms attempt to manage earnings during periods of 
intense market regulation, investors discount this through disappointing stock returns. 
Overall, the results suggest that there should be broad based approach in analysing 
financial statements.  
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1.0: Introduction of the Dissertation. 
In the first part of chapter 1, the main issues addressed in the thesis and the motivations 
behind them are discussed. The second section presents the research questions to be 
answered and the third section specifies the overall structure of the thesis. The fourth 
section analyses the research results. Section five discusses the contributions of the thesis. 
This chapter ends with a final section that present an outline of the thesis.  
  
1.1: Issues Addressed in the Thesis and Motivation. 
This first part of the thesis discusses the relationship between managers’ insider 
transactions and their strategic earnings management behaviour. The second part of the 
thesis evaluates the strategic behaviour of earnings management by managers and their 
impact on future firm performance1. In both cases, the thesis extends the capital market 
literature using a regulatory approach. It does so by investigating these constructs in light 
of the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
(hereafter SOX).  
 
As earnings management is a generic term that is customarily used to define all issues 
relating to financial statements distortions, to investigate changes in earnings management 
during the Pre and Post Sarbanes Oxley period, the thesis utilize two proxies to 
operationalise the notion of earnings management. The two main dimensions of earnings 
management discussed in the thesis are: 
 
1) The discretionary accruals model, which is a benchmarking model that separates 
accruals into its normal and discretionary component. The normal portion is the 
portion that can be explained by the firm’s business activities and past accounting 
transactions and the discretionary component is the component that is driven by 
managers’ intention to manage earnings2 or is at least an apparent deviation from 
the implied benchmark level. As discussed in prior literature (e.g. Dechow et al., 
1996, Becker et al., 1998, Balsam et al., 2003), researchers have often used the 
                                                 
1 In this Thesis, a firm is equivalent to the term group and/or corporation, and refers to firms listed in the 
S&P 500 companies at any one time of the study period. 
2 The overall component of accruals is normally observable, while the discretionary component is 
unobservable and reflects the manipulated component of earnings. 
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magnitude of discretionary accruals to indicate the flexibility in reporting earnings 
from business transactions.  
2) Earnings management through real operating decisions that customarily involve 
practices that are legal and most often viewed as being within business rules but 
dubious, e.g. asset sales to book gains in bad years, changes in R&D expenditures, 
sales pull forwards through quantity discounts, fraudulent recognition of accounts 
receivables and payables, overproduction to spread unit production costs etc (e.g., 
Gunny, 2006 and Roychowdhury, 2006). It is important to note that, strategic 
changes in accounting policy e.g. LIFO/FIFO switch, goodwill write-ups can be 
used to boast/depress earnings over time. 
 
The tendencies of both real and discretionary earnings management have always been to 
influence reported earnings, where financial reports reflects the hopes and desires of 
management as opposed to the company’s underlying financial performance (Healy and 
Whalen, 1999). The rationale for differentiating the two techniques is to provide clarity as 
to which combination of techniques management employ to manage earnings during 
periods of strict market regulations. 
 
There have been many definitions of earnings management as discussed in section 2.3. 
However, this research employs the Healy and Wahlen, (1999, p. 368) definition that has 
become popular in the literature and defines earnings management as: 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”  
 
According to Ronen and Yaari (2009, p. 27), this definition captures both the costly-
contracting approach (suggesting that earnings management is used to influence 
contractual outcomes) and the informational approach (which suggest that earnings 
management is used to mislead investors). The precision is that the prerequisite for 
earnings management is to mislead external stakeholders; however whether this is 
opportunistic is not totally clear. The Thesis employs this definition because the sample 
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does not include only firms that are being accused for having managed earnings according 
to the Security and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases. As in Dechow and Skinner (2000), the focus is on earnings management 
activities that falls within GAAP. Firms that are accused of outright fraud fall under the 
classification of earnings manipulation (Beneish, 1997, 1999).  
 
Both real and discretionary earnings management involve changing accounting methods, 
deferring expenses or accelerating revenues, and recognizing one-time items (e.g. asset 
sales/purchases and R&D expenditures or cuts). Nevertheless, firms differ as to the extent 
to which they manage earnings. It is important to recognise that all firms do manage 
earnings influenced by different motivations. However, the extent of earnings management 
is what has guided the contrasting definitions. Beneish (1997, 1997) categorised firms 
going through enforcement releases by the Securities and Exchange Commission as having 
manipulated (not managed) earnings. These are normally firms that have managed earnings 
to an egregious level (e.g. Enron and WorldCom), the type customarily described as 
accounting fraud that caught the attention of policy makers, investors and other 
stakeholders. Considering the steep decline in share prices when earnings manipulation is 
unravelled, one can safely argue that investors do consider the extent of earnings 
management when making investment decisions (Spohr, 2005).  
 
 
The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act defines insiders as Officers, Directors, 
corporation’s Vice Presidents and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporation’s 
stock3. There has been no shortage of evidence that top-level executives have the ability to 
influence reported earnings as they are directly involved in the day-to-day management of 
the company and its earnings (Ke et al., 2003). Recent empirical research (Ke et al., 2003 
and Beneish and Vargus, 2004) has investigated ways in which corporate insiders (salaried 
by the firm), trade with information that is price sensitive and has not yet been put into the 
public domain (Insider trading) and their strategic Earnings Management behaviour. This 
is especially so since the introduction of Regulation FD (“Fair Disclosure”) in the United 
                                                 
3 Though the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act defined a top level executive as officers, directors, 
corporation’s vice presidents and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporation’s stock, extant research 
on insider trading and earnings management eliminates the 10 percent owners as they are not directly 
involved in the day to day management of the company. 
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States enacted in October 2000. Although researchers have often attributed trading profits 
to insiders’ informational advantage through their ability to understand market mispricing 
as well as their superior knowledge of future earnings outcomes (See for example: Jaffe 
(1974), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishney 
(1994) and Rozeff and Zaman, (1998) Ke et al, (2003)), the predominance of insider 
trading informational advantage has been linked to their ability to influence reported 
earnings (e.g., Bolton et al., 2002, Beneish et al., 2004, Weber, 2005).  
 
In the popular market based accounting and finance literature, the evidence indicates that 
insiders’ purchases (sales) on current (future) bad (good) news is habitually linked to 
upward (downward) earnings management (Beneish and Vargus, 2004). These suggest that 
insiders are not passive traders in that they often appear to use their informational 
advantage to influence market prices (through real and accruals accounting techniques). In 
recent times, there has been increased attention on the extent to which firms employ a 
combination of real and accrual-based earning management strategies (e.g., Gunny 2006 
and Roychowdhury 2006). Accruals earnings management is accomplished through the 
choice of accounting methods used while real earnings management is customarily 
accomplished through changes in the firm’s underlying operations (Gunny, 2006). Total 
accruals (which is the difference between net income and cash flow from operations) are 
observable like non-discretionary accruals and usually, are not exposed to earnings 
management techniques. The discretionary accruals, which are not observable, are 
employed as an instrument to manage or manipulate earnings (Beneish, 1998)4. Recent 
techniques in selecting earnings based on survey evidence suggest that managers habitually 
employ but the use real earnings management techniques that seem costly, especially with 
regards to its effect on the financial operations of the firm in the long run (Graham et al., 
2004, Cohen et al., 2007). While investigating the impact of real earnings management 
techniques, Roychowdhury (2006) suggested that managers provide price discounts to 
temporarily boost sales, reduce discretionary expenditures in order to improve profit 
margins and overproduce to lower the cost of goods sold.  
 
                                                 
4 In this thesis, earnings management is defined as the management of earnings possibly within GAAP and 
fall within the white and gray classification according to Ronen and Yaari (2007, p. 25), while earnings 
manipulation is aspects of financial management fraud involving cases like the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals and fall within the black classification according to Ronen and Yaari (2007, p. 25). This is clearly 
differentiated in section 2.4.  
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The impact of financial reporting regulations to improve earnings quality has also been 
investigated in the academic literature. After the accounting scandals at Enron and 
WorldCom and the certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 
managers’ preferences for the mix between accruals accounting versus real actions to 
manage earnings may have changed (Graham et al., 2005). The basis for the Act was 
fuelled by concerns relating to the integrity of financial statements, which caught the 
attention of investors and policy makers charged with protecting the investment 
community (Jenkins et al., 2006). Since real earnings management activities are often 
difficult to interpret, when managers are faced with stricter financial reporting regulations 
like the SOX of 2002, they are more likely to substitute accruals with real earnings 
management. Quite recently, a host of research papers have provided evidence that is 
consistent with the expectation that SOX has made accrual-based earnings management 
more costly, with managers substituting from accrual to real earnings management (Cohen 
et al., (2007), Cohen and Zarowin (2008)). The arguments above suggest that, under 
stricter regulations and with managers exposed to different techniques that can be 
substituted under competing circumstances, the ability of investors to unravel earnings 
management is questionable. To provide additional evidence, this study also looks at the 
different techniques used to manage earnings. 
 
In the US, the SEC has the mandate to regulate information motivated trading by insiders 
(not necessarily illegal trades) and aspects of earnings management. Specifically, the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act and their subsequent amendments have consistently imposed 
different restrictions on insider trading and earnings management relationship. After 
several consultative meetings, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in October 2002, 
aimed at improving the integrity of financial statements and to suppress insider trading 
based upon foreknowledge of price sensitive information. Section 302 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 requires insiders to accept responsibility for the integrity of financial 
statements and they are obliged to certify that financial statements are not misleading and 
fairly represent the company’s operations. Additionally, section 16b of the Securities and 
Exchange Act requires all insiders to return to their corporation any capital gains made 
from a purchase or sale of their company’s stock if both transactions occur within a six-
month period (habitually termed short swings profits). The short swing rule was 
implemented to prevent insiders, who have greater access to material non-public 
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information, from taking advantage of such information for the purpose of making short-
term profits. Apart from institutional regulations by the SEC, a significant number of US 
firms do impose extra legal (company policy) trading restrictions on insiders (Bettis et al., 
2000). In general, the restrictions on the US system on insider trading surrounds the fact 
that, insiders must either abstain from trading on undisclosed information or release this 
information to the public before they execute their trades (Hu and Noe, 1997).  
 
As discussed above, firms subject to regulatory scrutiny might employ measures that 
cannot be easily interpreted by regulators. In contrast to accrual earnings management, 
earnings manipulation through real operating decisions, such as reductions in discretionary 
expenses (primarily R&D, advertisement, selling, general and administrative expenses), 
asset sales, price discounts to improve sales, mostly occur during the course of the year 
(Roychowdhury, (2006)). Such strategic choices regarding allocation of corporate cash-
flows are not easily challenged in the Court’s since the “Business Judgement Rule5” means 
a regulator or Judge cannot just assume control of the company’s competitive strategy 
themselves. Moreover, accruals customarily mean-revert and overstatements in the current 
period must be matched by an understatement in the future.  
 
The often easily detectable nature of accruals subject firms that report high accruals more 
likely to SEC enforcement actions (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996, Bradshaw et al., 2001) than 
those that directly employ real earnings management. SEC enforcements and prior year 
accruals might thus limit a firm’s ability to manage earnings. Since regulators habitually 
focus on the easy to detect discretionary accruals technique, not real earning management, 
accrual based earnings management is expected to reduce as a result of the passage of 
regulations aimed at improving earnings quality. Moreover, the business judgement rule 
(discussed in the paragraph above) makes it very hard for legislators/investigators to say 
they know better than the manager who make real investment decisions. In light of this, it 
might be difficult to evaluate insider trading that are linked to future earnings disclosure, 
especially when real earnings management have been used to boost earnings. As 
                                                 
5 The business judgement rule (An American case law) is a judicial acknowledgement that directors manage 
the company. It’s a presumption that in making a business decision the directors normally act on an informed 
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief their action is for the best interest of the company. The rule 
acknowledges that the daily operation of a business can be risky and controversial. The directors should 
therefore be allowed to make decisions without fear of being prosecuted. The business judgment rule further 
assumes that it is unfair to expect those managing a company to make perfect decisions all the time. 
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highlighted above, the use of accruals to temporarily boast or reduce income is one 
mechanism for earnings management. Accruals are components of earnings that are 
customarily not reflected in current cash flows, making it susceptible to managerial 
discretion in its construction (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2004) 
 
The theoretical implications that have originated from the discussions above suggests that 
with strict regulations on earnings management and under different circumstances, 
managers might even switch and mix and match techniques to make it harder for investors 
and regulators to be able to differentiate manipulated from non-manipulated earnings. This 
even makes the relationship between insider trading and earnings management using these 
different techniques even harder to assess.  
 
This research includes studies of stock market performance and financial markets 
regulations and therefore has potential relevance on the field of financial economics and 
financial markets regulations. Broadly, finance theories are used in this research in three 
ways 1) the statistical studies investigating price performance after private information 
(proxy by insider trades), 2) the theoretical framework that evaluates how private 
information motivates earnings management and how in light of the recent regulatory 
intervention, this relationship can be assessed and 3) the attempt to develop models for 
investigating the different empirical anomalies in light of the regulation of financial 
markets. Unlike in Ball and Brown (1968), the research does not imply that investors can 
earn abnormal returns from exploiting financial markets anomalies. Rather it concludes 
that while some stakeholders can exploit public and private information to generate profits 
at the expense of other stakeholders as documented in prior research, in light of recent 
regulatory intervention, the circumstances under which this is possible need to be 
evaluated differently.  
 
1.2: Research Questions. 
In this section, the research questions are discussed and the gaps in the theory that 
motivates this research are pointed out. However, since this is motivated in relation to 
previous research and their implications for the regulation of financial markets as required 
by Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, they are outlined only briefly here. A more comprehensive 
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summary of the essays, their scope, aims and contributions are provided at the end of the 
thesis in the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations chapter.  
 
1.2.1: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Insider Trading and Earnings Management. 
A commonly held belief postulates that directors, who are more familiar with the day-to-day 
operation of the company they manage trade on valuable information that is not incorporated 
into security prices at the time of their trade (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). In summary, their trade is 
frequently based on forecasts of earnings reflecting the private information that they have a 
fiduciary duty not to exploit for private gain. Such changes in earnings might be influenced 
by a specific event6 that is reflected later in security prices. Though investors often focus 
upon changes in earnings in predicting future share price movements (Ball and Brown 1968), 
firms customarily release other types of information that relate to future earnings outcomes 
like changes in sales, research and development expenditures, inventories, capital 
expenditures, etc. The commonly held believe is that insider trading signals future price 
changes and their trades might act as an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings to 
either benefit themselves at the expense of outside investors or alternatively, distance 
themselves from prior insider trading (Beneish and Vargus, 2004). Nonetheless, there is 
conflicting evidence on the relationship between insider trading and company earnings. The 
evidence we have can be summarised as follows: 
 
A: The earliest reported evidence suggest that, there is no clear relationship between insider 
trading and future earnings (Elliot et al., (1994)) or there is no correlation between insider 
trading with foreknowledge of any price-relevant information (see Penman (1992), Givoly 
and Palmon (1985), Sivakumar and Waymire (1994), Noe (1999)) 
 
B: The second group of studies argue that earnings news and stock price changes are 
positively correlated (Ball and Brown, 1968).  Insiders buying (selling) frequently follow 
stock price increases (decreases) (Seyhun (1988), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Ke et al., 
(2003), managers who sell shares following the announcement of an earnings surprise are 
able to earn abnormal profits (Markarian, 2005); insiders sell shares after managing earnings 
(pump and dump), implying a negative correlation between insider trading and this year’s 
                                                 
6 Significant price-relevant events that insiders frequently use may include, Takeover bids, Seasoned Equity 
Offerings, Dividend, Stock Repurchase, Bankruptcy, Mergers and Acquisitions, Initial Public Offerings, etc. 
This relate to what is frequently viewed for litigation purposes directly as a major corporate event that have a 
direct effect on prices (Seyhun, 1992). 
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earnings surprise (Beneish (1999), Hamill et al., (2002), Bolton et al., (2003)), or trade with 
information pertaining to a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases (Ke et al., 
(2003)). Of course the profitability of insider trading, based on foreknowledge of earnings 
may depend on whether earnings are “selected” as the term is used by Daniel et al (1998). 
When earnings are “selected” as a fore-shadow of the difference between price and value, 
then and only then will we expect some price response according to this view.    
 
C: A third group of studies reject some of the suggestions above and suggest an apparently 
different hypothesis that is contrary to standard economic theory. Their argument originates 
from the fact that, since securities law forbids trades whose incentive might be based on 
private information, an insider trade that follows potentially value-relevant earnings 
disclosures gives the impression that the trade is based on foreknowledge of soon-to-be 
disclosed earnings information (Weber, 2005). Following this, Beneish and Vargus (2004) 
suggested the litigation avoidance hypothesis, where insiders sell shares and manage 
earnings to distance themselves from the trade. Additionally, Weber (2005) suggested that, 
insiders manage earnings in order to distance their trades from negative earnings news, 
consistent with the avoidance of the appearance of illegal insider trades. 
 
Following the three sets of conflicting findings above, certain conclusions pertaining to the 
relationship between insider trading and company earnings might be misleading and should 
be re-evaluated. Changes in securities laws and earnings management regulations may have 
an impact on the way insiders disguise their trading history. Quite recently, SOX legislation 
was enacted to improve investor’s confidence in the market.  
 
As earnings news and stock prices are positively related (Ball and Brown, 1968), insiders 
ought in the absence of regulatory or institutional constraints; buy (sell) more shares in 
periods where they expect to influence reported earnings through the use of positive 
(negative) discretionary accruals. However, strict insider trading rules may have an impact 
on the way managers exercise their knowledge of private information about future 
prospects. The fact that they might employ discretionary accounting techniques to 
influence reported earnings after prior insider trading may raise serious concerns about 
their firm’s earnings quality. A string of recent articles have examined the impact of the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on earnings management7, but to the best of my knowledge, 
none of these articles have linked earnings management to open market insider trading8.  
 
To accommodate the influence of strict regulatory regimes as a result of recent corporate 
insider trading scandals on the earnings management process, managers might change the 
timing of their trades relative to the use of discretionary accrual techniques. This can be 
investigated empirically by examining the relationship between discretionary accruals (a 
discretionary decision by management) and net insider trades, to regulatory changes (a 
public event that is not discretionary by management).  
 
The main research question posed in part 1 of the thesis is: how can we explain the 
relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light of the recent 
regulatory intervention as prescribed by the SOX of 2002? How has the relationship 
changed since SOX was introduced?  In other words, the thesis aims to investigate if: The 
regulatory intervention (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) has provided the desired effect; which is: 
      1-To suppress earnings manipulation thereby improving the quality of earnings. 
2-To suppress earnings manipulation conditional on prior insider trades. 
 
Suppression here means reducing overall earnings management. Owing to substantial 
evidence, the incentive to either buy or sell shares may be remote and not necessarily 
related to earnings management incentives. Apart from liquidity concerns that are often 
regarded as incentives behind sell trades (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), the signalling 
literature occasionally addresses the valuation implication of insider trading. Such authors 
(e.g. Givoly & Palmon, 1985, Rozeff & Zaman, 1988, Seyhun, 1998) argue that if an 
insider believes that their shares have been overvalued, they would sell them. If they 
believe that their shares have been undervalued and are risk averse, they will choose not to 
                                                 
7 Cohen et al. (2004) find evidence that there is a decrease of earnings management after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. 
8 Indeed, insiders can trade either stock options or in the open market and manage earnings too. For example, 
executives at firms like Xerox, Tyco, Enron appear to have manipulated reported income during the 1990s, 
while trading in the open market or exercising large amounts of stock options. In April 2002 the SEC sued 
Xerox for manipulating reported earnings and revenues, and as part of the settlement with the SEC Xerox 
was forced to restate reported revenues for the period 1997 to 2001. The forced restatement reduced reported 
revenue by $2.1 billion and reducing reported net income by $1.4 billion (Bergstressera and Philippon, 
2004). 
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sell their shares and instead acquire more shares, since they may expect the share price to 
rise in the future.  
 
If trading by corporate insiders is informative about future earnings (e.g. on firms growth and 
future prospects), there should be no association between discretionary accruals and insider 
trading (Park and Park, 2004). Insiders might have superior knowledge relative to other 
market participants; and their buying (selling) will be based on the expectations of a positive 
(negative) earnings outcome without usage of discretionary accruals. This has been 
supported by recent research by Ke et al. (2003), who reported that insider trading is 
associated with post transaction stock returns. The thesis examine if insider transactions 
influence post transactions performance as measured by the firm’s stock returns. The thesis 
therefore tests the third research question of Essay 1 that links insider trading to future 
earnings performance as follows: 
       3-Are managerial dealings informative about future earnings performance? 
 
1.2.2: Earnings Quality and Firm Performance: Examining the Changes in the 
Post Sarbanes- Oxley Era. 
Some events like regulatory changes that are not determined by the discretion of 
management might influence the relationship between earnings management and future firm 
performance. Since investors and other stakeholders normally fixate on earnings 
management through discretionary accruals and discount their impact in the valuation of 
companies (Rajgopal et al., 2007), managers might still be cutting the corners using other 
less detectable techniques. Some techniques like real earnings management9 that is not easily 
detected by auditors and regulators might become more popular, especially after the recent 
corporate scandals. As predicted by Zhang (2003), when firms manage earnings to an 
egregious level in the prior periods, they are more likely to engage in real earnings 
management relative to accruals in the future. Under normal circumstances, stakeholders 
might fixate on some forms of earnings management than others.  
 
The self-reversing nature of accruals makes it impossible to sometimes manage its shortfall 
and if they have to rely on discretionary techniques alone, they might sometimes be forced to 
                                                 
9 Real Earnings management techniques involving asset sales, changes research and development 
expenditures, sales pulls forward, price discounts, etc is introduced and defined in section 2.3.1.2 and the 
methodology used to estimate it is discussed in section 3.3.2.6 and 3.3.2.7. 
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miss earnings target. Thus it is possible that managers might focus attention on real earnings 
management to cover the residual shortfall in cases where they are limited by their inability 
to utilize accruals techniques. Legislative actions might thus have an influence on the 
techniques they apply. Cohen et al. (2006) find support for these arguments by documenting 
that after the passage of the SOX, accruals earnings management has been reduced and 
replaced by an increase in earnings management via real operating decisions. 
 
Current literature is replete with articles that suggest that investors normally fixate on 
reported accounting earnings to evaluate future performance. Recent arguments have 
suggested that a majority of investors can unravel earnings management especially earnings 
managed to an egregious level leaving potential damages to shareholder value through share 
price declines (Rajgopal et al., 2007). Operating performance has been associated with 
aspects of real earnings management like discretionary changes in R&D, selling, general and 
administrative expense, overproduction to improve sales through improved credit terms, 
selling of fixed assets and firms with high accruals in the current period customarily 
experiences future earnings problems (Gunny, 2006). Investors are however not customarily 
fooled by earnings management practices (Rajgopal et al., 2007). They look for warning 
signs from the financial statements and discount the stocks of firms that manage earnings. If 
more firms manage earnings, there might be market-wide effects through a decline in the 
value of many companies. Regulatory control leading to higher earnings quality would 
therefore be a rational response to investor’s demands for favourable financial reporting. One 
reason for examining the benefit of legislative control on firm performance is to investigate 
stock price responses following the SOX. If the Act actually improves earnings quality, the 
information might be more certain and investors can respond to it by trading on the stocks of 
those companies with greater confidence regarding the value relevance of information 
contained in their set of financial accounts. 
 
Although the above arguments have suggested that the capital market can unravel the extent 
of earnings management, the predictive ability of the different techniques on firm’s 
performance has not been thoroughly investigated. The various components of accruals 
(notably accounts receivables, accounts payable and changes in inventory) have different 
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predictive powers10 and investors might discount their impact on future returns differently 
(Chan et al., 2006). These components of accruals are the most popular tools that can be 
improperly used to fraudulently improve the company’s revenues and earnings. Many re-
statements arise from misinterpretation of rules on recognition since revenue are such a huge 
number in financial statements and accounts to start with.  Most forced restatements and 
enforcement actions have been directed against impropriety connected to revenue 
recognition (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
 
Accounts receivable is one component of accruals that is customarily employed to overstate 
the earnings of most corporations. But firms might genuinely offer sales discounts leading to 
sales growth in a bid to avoid product obsolence in periods where they might have 
mistakenly overproduced. Customers can also be genuinely experiencing financial distress 
leading to rising accounts receivables. Increases in accounts payable too can be associated 
with managerial intent to lower current accruals, thereby shifting current earnings to the 
future. Investors can either interpret it as current shock in earnings (bad news) or recognize 
its impact on future earnings. In this case, despite a reduction in earnings through accounts 
payable increases, future stock price performance can still be better. Another accounting 
component whose predictive power is uncertain is changes in inventory. Managers might 
manage earnings through the reporting of inventory changes by not writing off obsolete 
items completely or they might be allocating more overhead expenses to inventory than to 
cost of goods sold. Overproduction can also reflect an intention to improve sales through the 
provision of favourable credit terms and/or to reduce cost of goods sold. When companies 
overproduce, they might technically spread fixed overhead cost leading to an overall 
reduction in per unit production costs as long as inventory holding costs are not increased 
over the period (Gunny, 2006; Thomas and Zhang 2002).  
 
As supported by Chan et al. (2006), some items might be more susceptible to earnings 
manipulation than others and their changes might influence future returns in diverse ways. 
This is because investors would have competing interpretations of their effect. Stock return 
evidence also suggests that investors discount “abnormal” accruals relative to “normal” 
accruals, which suggests that they view abnormal accruals as more likely to reflect earnings 
                                                 
10 The presumed differences in predictive powers are because some techniques can easily be used than the 
others. Abnormal receivables for example, that influences sales income is a technique that is customarily 
used to manage revenues and is very popular in the earnings management literature (e.g Dechow et al. 1995). 
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management (Healy and Whalen, 1999). There is further evidence of significant negative 
stock market responses to allegations of earnings management by the financial press or the 
SEC, which is an indication that investors do not always investigate financial reporting 
impropriety. According to Dechow et al. (1996), firms subject to SEC investigation for 
earnings management showed an average stock price decline of 9% at the day of the 
announcement of the earnings management.  Assuming there was a large decline in earnings 
quality before the enactment of the SOX, one significant question might relate to how SOX 
can constrain earnings management practices and how investors can avoid huge loses if 
earnings management is discovered and must be unravelled.  
 
In light of the discussions above, the research question to be addressed in the second part 
of the thesis relates to how we can explain the relationship between earnings quality and 
firm performance in light of the recent regulatory intervention. Specifically, the research 
model categorises firms into suspect versus non-suspect firms (See 5.4.7) and investigates 
if: After the Sarbanes Oxley legislation, stocks of suspect firms (firms with low earnings 
quality as measured by the Probability of manipulation, abnormal changes in the 
various accruals and real earnings management items) exhibit negative stock price 
performance while those of non-suspect firms (firms with high earnings quality) exhibit 
positive stock price performance. 
 
1.3: Basic Structure of The Thesis And Research Objectives. 
Overall, the thesis consists of two parts. One part encompasses the introduction, literature 
review and the methodology. The other consists of the core of the thesis: the two 
independent but related empirical chapters. Both relate to the relationship between insider 
trading and earnings management and earnings quality and firm performance in light of 
SOX regulations. Each empirical chapter provides an overview of the thesis around several 
characteristics that includes 1) aim 2) dependent and independent variables 3) control 
variables 4) statistical method employed 4) sample of firms in the study and time period 
covered by study and 5) main empirical findings and finally 6) conclusion. Both are 
summarised below. The summary and conclusions chapter summarises the two 
independent empirical chapters, it discusses the results, presents their contribution and 
limitations, highlights main implications and notes suggestions for future research. 
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Summarising the empirical findings and the overall thesis in this way helps structure the 
overall thesis and provides an overview of its contribution.  
 
This first empirical chapter of this thesis evaluates the changes of the insider trading 
relationship to earnings management post the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Specifically, the 
chapter tests if the regulatory intervention (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002) provided the 
desired effect? The stated aim of the regulation was to suppress earnings manipulation 
thereby improving the quality of earnings, and to suppress earnings manipulation conditional 
on prior insider trading.  To further test the informativeness of earnings following prior 
insider trading and the impact of discretionary accruals on earnings changes, the chapter 
additionally tests if insider trades are informative regarding future earnings (regardless of 
earnings manipulation) and finally, if analyst’s earnings forecast errors are associated with 
earnings management. That is, I ask if earnings expectations can be adjusted to control for 
earnings management or simply magnify the initial distortion.  
 
The second empirical chapter of this thesis looks at the relationship between firm 
performance and earnings management practices in light of SOX regulations. Given that 
SOX was designed to improve the quality of financial reporting, investors and analysts need 
to be more vigilant and recognise material weaknesses in financial reports. SOX need to 
provide more credibility to financial reporting and provide investors with more confidence. 
If companies still manage their earnings, analysts and investors need to be more cautious and 
should be able to factor out their perceived cost of remediation through adjustment of the 
stock prices of suspect firms. The market response (stock returns) and managerial earnings 
management should be a measure of how analysts and managers respond to disclosure 
practices. The purpose of the chapter is to empirically assess the relationship between a 
comprehensive set of earnings management signals and future firm performance. Its prime 
purpose is to verify whether there have been substantial benefits to investors from recent 
legislation enacted as a response to the corporate scandals through (i) improvements in 
earnings quality as a result of the SOX (ii) if investors are able to discount the level of 
earnings management in the financial statements. 
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1.4: Scope of the Analysis. 
Following the formulation and specifications of research issues and aims, this section covers 
the scope of the analysis. The scope of the thesis can be explained around the theoretical 
constructs underlying the research objectives and gaps in current research and the research 
design choices adopted to provide answers to the research questions. Firstly, with respect to 
the main objective of the research, the study builds the theory on existing literature in the 
area. In evaluating the various theoretical constructs, the researcher found that there was an 
absence of consistency in the findings of prior research, though the sample is of different 
time periods. This in itself alerts us to the presence of a shallow theorisation of the topic 
being discussed.  
 
From the standpoint of the policy implications, the researcher therefore employs the 
approach of implementing a “truth race” in evaluating different relationships. This performs 
best with my dataset of S&P 500 firms in the last decade or so. From the testing approach, 
the thesis tested several existing theories to reconcile gaps in the literature. The study further 
uses gaps in the existing literature review to identify relevant factors that cause variations in 
research results in the area. Secondly, the analyses are limited to S&P 500 firms listed in the 
US stock exchange. Though in most cases a cross sectional time series analysis is done, 
reported results are aggregated for the overall S&P 500 companies and the unique 
characteristics of individual firms and industry classification are not evaluated. Quantitative 
methods using regression and descriptive statistics are employed to analyse the panel data 
set. From the arguments presented in the theory, the relationship between insider trading and 
earnings management are assumed to be jointly determined, with insider trading influencing 
earnings management and vice versa. This suggests a simultaneous equation problem. The 
Hausman specification error test is therefore employed to test for this problem. Based on 
results confirming the joint determination between insider trading and earnings management, 
a two-stage least square estimation method is employed to confirm the robust nature of the 
primary results. 
 
The choices above set the scope for the thesis and the empirical analysis and results that can 
be drawn. Collectively, the results provide an overall approach to different market based 
relationships for US listed firms. Nonetheless, the results can only be attributed to the S&P 
500 firms and not more widely across smaller firms in the US or other (EU or G7 countries). 
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It can therefore not be applicable to unlisted firms and firms in other countries without 
similar regulatory restrictions.   
 
1.5: Contribution of the Thesis. 
The Thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it investigates whether firm’s 
trade-off accrual-based against real earnings management around insider transactions. 
Second, consistent with the expectation that the SOX has made accrual-based earnings 
management more costly, the thesis investigates whether managers substitute techniques in 
their bid to mislead regulators and other users of firm information after the enactment of 
SOX of 2002. Third, the research investigates the tendency for firms to trade-off real versus 
accrual-based earnings management activities and whether investors discount high levels of 
earnings management (using both real and accruals based earnings management) post SOX. 
Finally, the research employs the 2 stage least squares approach to evaluate the joint 
determination between insider trading and earnings management in the light of the 
regulatory intervention11. Prior research has failed to clearly address this causality issue. 
Details of the contributions of this research are discussed in section 6.3.1 as a sub-section of 
the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendation chapter.  
 
1.6: Outline of the Thesis. 
In this section, an outline of the remainder of the dissertation is provided. Overall, the 
thesis is organised as follows: Chapter Two provides some of the theories of insider trading 
and earnings management; Chapter Three presents the research design and develops the 
hypotheses. Chapter Four and Five present the key empirical findings of the research. 
Specifically, Chapter Four presents the first main empirical analysis, relating insider 
trading to earnings management. Its approach involves an explanation of the impact of 
regulatory dynamics as prescribed by SOX on insider trading earnings management 
relationship. Chapter 5 presents the second main empirical analysis. The Chapter looks at 
the relationship between a comprehensive set of earnings management techniques and 
future stock returns. In Chapter 6 the two main empirical findings are tied together as a 
summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations and limitations of the study. 
                                                 
11 Due to stricter regulations, managers might be adopting a passive and opportunistic strategy that cannot be 
easily detected by regulators, investors and other stakeholders. 
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2.0: Prior Research and Theoretical Framework. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to critically review the recent theoretical advances in the 
area and evaluate the contribution of this particular study to the existing literature in these 
areas. It is important to clarify that this section discusses the literatures that are general to 
the overall thesis and is not restricted to the context of the independent empirical essays. 
The review here is given to show the present state of knowledge about this topic that is 
addressed in the two empirical essays and to clarify the broad contribution of this thesis to 
the general state of knowledge in this area. It is important to note that, there is a vast array 
of literatures on insider trading, earnings management and related constructs like financial 
markets regulation and firm performance. Out of this vast array of literatures, this chapter 
delimits what is actually important for the current thesis.  
 
2.1: Theoretical Framework. 
This study has two main aims: First, it examines the relationship between insider trading 
and earnings management. Secondly the study investigates earnings quality and firm 
performance within US S&P 500 firms. The study builds upon three streams of research 
ideas that are: 1) opportunistic insider trading, 2) techniques used to manage earnings and 
3) the policy implications of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 200212.  
 
This chapter reviews prior literature in the area. The first section of chapter 2 introduces 
the broad objective of this particular chapter. This is followed by an attempt to provide a 
legal definition of insider trading. It is important to note that several factors have 
influenced the trading behaviour of several stakeholders over the past decades, affecting 
the received wisdom regarding who is an insider.  One way that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has responded to this is to establish a clear definition of insider 
trading.  In Section 2.2, the definition is presented and the dynamics that influenced this 
definition over the years outlined. Following that a discussion of insider trading, which the 
proceeding section has defined, broad issues relating to earnings management are 
introduced. In the final section, broad issues relating to the regulation of insider trading and 
                                                 
12 The implication here was that whether the market really required regulations like SOX to boost investor 
confidence and promote the market's integrity. 
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earnings management are discussed. This material sets the regulatory and policymaking 
context in which my results, presented in the two empirical essays, should be discussed.  
 
2.2: Trading By Corporate Insiders/Directors of a Company. 
“Our markets are a success precisely because Americans enjoy the world’s highest level of 
confidence. (…) Investors trust that the marketplace is honest. They know that our 
securities laws require free, fair and open transactions.”  
 
A. Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, Address to the “SEC Speaks” Conference, February 1998. 
 
Trading by corporate insiders otherwise termed insider trading13 (company directors, 
officers, and employees) refers to the buying and selling of shares of one’s own company 
or that of one’s employing corporation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which regulates such trading in the United States under the powers granted to it by the 
1934 Securities and Exchange Act define an insider as:  
-Any officer with the authority to influence the entire company, in other words, makes 
policies for the company, 
-A director,  
-An owner of more than 10 percent of any equity class of stock (This includes not only 
executives working for a corporation, but also other entities such as mutual funds, hedge 
funds or institutions who hold an amount equal to or greater than 10% of issued and 
outstanding shares). 
 
Academic research in this area has focussed on evaluating the sources and consequences of 
an insider’s informational advantage. Therefore, the various strands of research have 
investigated whether insiders earn abnormal profits from their trades at the expense of 
outside investors. Prior studies have examined the types of information that insiders are 
privy to, the sources of the informational advantages that they enjoy and the extent of the 
advantages and disadvantages to the market of any regulation of their privileged position. 
Frequently, insiders sell (buy) after an increase (decrease) in prices and their trades are 
                                                 
13 For the purpose of my research, I will limit my interpretation of an insider to employees of a company with 
the exception of the 10 % owners, as they do not possess executive powers to influence several managerial 
decisions and company earnings.   
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frequently followed by a partial price reversal (Ke et al., 2003). It is a generally held belief 
in security markets that when insiders are buying their own stock, they do so because they 
believe the stock is set to rise in value. However, when they sell, they could be doing so for 
a number of reasons and not simply because they believe the value of the firm’s share price 
may drop. This suggests that insider buying may be a good signal regarding corporate 
prospects, but insider-selling motive may be a more difficult portent to interpret. Insider 
trading has been a term that most investors associate with illegal conduct as it may involve 
short-term market timing. Researchers and regulators have often differentiated aspects of 
the trade that may be considered illegal. The SEC defines illegal insider trading as being 
the buying and selling of securities involving a breach of fiduciary duty, or some other 
relationship of trust and confidence. Such breach involves trading while in possession of 
material non-public information about a security.  
 
Generally, possession of information might not be a crime as mandated by the SEC, 
especially when the information is not a factor in the decision of the trade.  If the 
information is material, then it is the fiduciary responsibility of Insiders to report to other 
investors rather than engage in trading based on such knowledge. In most class litigation 
actions, the type of insider trading frequently discussed is the illegal insider trading that 
involves material non-public information. It relates to trading in securities that takes place 
when insiders are privileged to confidential information about important events affecting 
the firm and use the information to reap profits, or to avoid losses, on the stock market. 
This is done to the detriment of other investors who buy or sell their stock without the 
advantage of knowing the information the insider possesses.  
 
Legal prohibition of UK insider trading was recently adopted in securities regulation, as it 
did not become a criminal offence to trade while in possession of firm specific information 
until sometime in the 1980’s. This was followed by the Criminal Justice Act (1993) and the 
Financial Services and Market Act of 2001 that prohibits insider trading in the UK.   The 
Act stipulates that it is a criminal offence to deal or encourage another person to trade or 
disclose inside information. Though insider trading was not specifically forbidden by the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, amendments of US security laws dating back to the 
1960’s have identified aspects of insider trades that can be considered a criminal offence.  
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The type of Insider dealings that this study investigates is the legal aspect of insider trading 
(especially at the time of the trade).  This involves publicly disclosed filings with the SEC. 
The results of this research may shed light on the behaviour of different stakeholders after 
the recent enactment of securities laws as prescribed by SOX 2002. There will be no 
classification of any trade as illegal or immoral at this point. What is relevant here is the 
argument that in certain transactions there should be strict rules (adopted either for moral, 
or less plausibly, for efficiency reasons) which determines who has the right to trade, what 
information is to be available and who has the right to the profits that arise from success in 
such deals (Barry, 1996). 
 
It has been very difficult to provide any evidence linking insider trades to particular types 
of private information as some Insiders trade approximately 2 years prior to the disclosure 
of economically significant and price sensitive information (Ke et al., 2002). This, 
presumably, may be to avoid class action litigation that might be brought forward by 
investors, or regulators, for breach of fiduciary duties by management. It might also just be 
that Insiders have a pretty good idea about the medium term prospects of the firm which is 
not traceable to any specific piece of news, but may rather reflect a general feeling of 
corporate well-being. In their litigation avoidance hypothesis, Beneish and Vargus (2004) 
presented evidence of how insiders can avoid litigation while trading on non-public 
information. This has been a potential weakness of previous research as it has been very 
difficult to accuse insiders of trading while in possession of significant price-relevant 
information if their trades are investigated over a very short window. Intensive insider 
trading activities (purchases or sales) may be of interest as they are likely to be 
information-motivated (Lin and Howe, 1990). When some “Outsiders” (investors) mimic 
insider trades, they may also earn abnormal profits like insiders (Gelband, 2005).  
 
Other researchers have presented arguments contradicting the idea that an Insider trade can 
be based on knowledge of subsequent earnings disclosure. Elliot et al. (1994) found no 
relationship between insider trading and foreknowledge of future earnings in their trading 
decisions, as they were able to see less selling by insiders before periods of good and bad 
earnings announcements. Others have documented insider-trading activities before 
earnings announcements but find no correlation with foreknowledge of any price- relevant 
information. (See; Penman, 1982, Givoly and Palmon, 1985, Sivakumar and Waymire 
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1994, Noe,14 1999). One potential weakness of most of this research is that it has looked at 
trading by corporate insiders over a relatively short window. Insider trading decisions are 
presumably based on forecasts of earnings a year or more into the future rather than the 
underlying earnings to be announced in the next quarter (Ke et al., 2003). These authors 
hypothesised that to identify the relationship between insider trading and foreknowledge of 
price-sensitive information, it is necessary to study trading over a long window. It is very 
important to understand here that, often Insiders are wise enough to get their wives, 
cousins and friends to trade on price sensitive information but this is a very rare situation. 
Strictly speaking, most research published and litigation cases have investigated whether 
insider trades are correlated with unanticipated movements in share prices or earnings 
news leading to high forecast errors.  
 
2.2.1: Regulation and Restriction of Insider Trading. 
The first and most important US regulation on insider trading was the Securities Act of 
1933. The law of insider trading has evolved through a series of judicial opinions in a 
process that closely resembles common law adjudication rather than the statutory 
interpretation of the law (Bainbridge, 2005). This was swiftly followed and amended by 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Both acts were enacted after the collapse of the 
stock market in 1929. This regulation (like successive regulations) was intended to 
promote market integrity and level the playing field among market participants, company 
officers and institutional investors, and more especially the small investors who had largely 
been wiped out by the 1929 Crash (Markarian, 2005).  
 
After the 1987 stock market crash in the US, the SEC responded to the violation of its 
existing insider trading regulation by imposing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 1988 that raised the penalty of illegal insider trading to 1 
Million dollars and 10 years imprisonment (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). This act re-codified the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 as Section 21A of the Exchange Act. The Act 
amended the language of the 1984 Act by providing that a penalty can be imposed against 
                                                 
14 Noe (1999) for example found out that increases in insider trading in the 20 days prior to disclosure are not 
specifically correlated to management earnings forecast errors or other corporate events.  But after a 
management earnings forecast, Noe realised that there happens to be a significant positive association 
between net insider purchases made within 20 days and a significant growth in earnings expanding over a 
period of between 3-5 years. Noe’s, (1999) result relates to the type of insider trading that we frequently 
consider illegal and can easily be linked to significant price sensitive information due to the direct price 
movement after the transaction. 
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a person not only for trading in a security while in possession of material non-public 
information, but also that a person can be thought of having violated this Act by 
communicating such information. The most recent regulation is the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 enacted after the Enron, WorldCom, and other high profile corporate scandals. This 
Act mostly involves an amendment and the strengthening of previous insider trading laws. 
 
The most important requirements to these successive regulations can be summarised as 
follows: 
1) Filing requirement: they are now required to file the amount of shares they own in 
their corporation. 
2) Online reporting requirement: To report their trades to the SEC online within two 
business days15. 
3) Profit recovery requirement: Required all insiders to return to their corporation any 
capital gains made from the purchase or sale of their company’s stock if both 
transactions occur within a six-month period (habitually termed short swings 
profits).  
The regulations also provided clear-cut definitions of several contextual issues that have 
been subject to ambiguity and hence regulatory arbitrage. The most important definitions 
to these regulations can be summarised as follows:  
• Definition of an insider: The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
defined an insider as either officers, directors, corporation’s vice presidents 
and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporations stock, 
• Insider Trading Liability: Rule 10b5-1 addresses the issue of when 
an insider trading liability arises in connection with a trader's "use" or 
"knowledge" of material non-public information. The rule posits that a 
trader trades on material non-public information when they purchase or sell 
securities while aware of such information. The rule further sets certain 
affirmative defences that protect individuals and entities in situations where 
material non-public information was not a factor in the trading decision 
                                                 
15 The requirement before the SOX of 2002 was that they report the sales and purchases of such stock to the 
SEC by the 10th of the following month. This requirement gave them up to 40 business days for some trades. 
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since the trade was presumably carried out pursuant of a pre-existing 
contract, situation or a plan. 
•  Misappropriation Theory16: Rule 10b5-2 addresses the issue of 
when a breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise 
to a liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. 
 
2.2.2: Arguments for and Against Insider Trading. 
Quotable Quotes:  
"Stock Exchange persons who are Inside traders would make the rules against insider 
trading and this would be a sham".  
“It would be foolish to place too much faith in mechanical or procedural devices, where 
these are not backed up by a strong ethical culture within the organisations and within the 
profession itself” Tomasic, R., (1992), “Self-regulation, Business Ethics and Insider 
Trading” Published in: Casino capitalism? Insider trading in Australia 
/Canberra:Australian Institute of Criminology. 
 
Differences exist in relation to the arguments for and against insider trading regulations. 
The strand of argument that favours strict regulations argues that insider trading is unfair 
and the failure to penalize violators of securities regulations can seriously undermine 
public confidence in capital markets (Wisniewski, 2004). However, such policies are often 
flawed because they tend to outlaw some forms of insider trading that are beneficial to the 
economy and are in reality not at all unethical in nature. Tomasic (1992) argued that 
although the failure of the regulatory authorities to enforce insider trading regulations is 
serious enough, the persistence of insider trading as a phenomenon is also influenced by 
the fact that it is tolerated within the securities industry at large. A number of economists 
and researchers have pointed out some beneficial effects of insider trading and legal 
theorists have written dissertations discussing when insider trading is illegal and when it is 
not (McGee, 2008). 
 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the prohibitory nature of insider trading laws only 
serves to make provision of this crime very monopolistic in nature. Making insider trading 
                                                 
16 The misappropriation theory states that anyone who misappropriates (steals) information from their 
employer and trades on that information in any stock (not just the employer's stock) is guilty of insider 
trading. An individual might be the private secretary of company A, though not directly employed by 
company A, company A might be planning a takeover of company B and whilst working as the private 
secretary, might acquire information that company A wishes to takeover company B and trade on the shares 
of company B. even though by implication the secretary have not violated the fiduciary duty of company A 
shareholders, they have violated those of company B shareholders. 
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more risky rather than preventing it may just pass huge profits to those with the know-how 
and audacity to undertake it (see Bris 2005). When alcohol was outlawed in the US it did 
not stop Americans drinking it simply forced the provision of alcohol underground into 
Mob controlled speakeasies. In a similar way Bris (2005) argues that tightening Insider 
trading laws simply sharpens the peak of the distribution of profits paid to effective insider 
traders.    
 
Those in favour of deregulation contend that the exploitation of non-public information by 
insiders could be an efficient way to compensate managers for their innovations (See 
Manne, 1966, and Carlton and Fischel, 1983) and that insider trading could potentially 
benefit society through promoting a more accurate pricing of a firm’s asset (Udpa, 1996 
and Roulstone, 2003). Deregulatory arguments are premised on the claims that trading by 
corporate insiders do promote market efficiency and do assign property rights on inside 
information to managers which seems like an efficient compensation scheme (Bainbridge, 
2002). Additionally, Leland (1992) argues that when insider trading is allowed, stock 
prices incorporate more information and are higher, as opposed to when it is not allowed. 
This argument suggests that insider trading incorporates superior information to that 
provided by external shareholders. The implication here is that stock markets are to some 
degree informationally efficient (in the strong form sense) and that share prices do rapidly 
adjust to insider trades (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Moreover, laws that prosecute insider 
trading fail to eliminate or completely recoup the profits made by insiders, and make 
acquisitions more expensive. This suggests that, by increasing the market reaction to an 
acquisition, insider trading laws make it profitable to violate the regulations (Bris, 2000). 
 
At first glance, insider trading is a difficult issue to understand as perfectly legitimate 
transactions takes place in the market where information is asymmetric and not equally 
available to all market participants (Barry, 1996). Different models discussing insider 
trading based on material non-public information assumes that an Insider is informed in 
every period and thus trades with the desire to profit from this information about the firm’s 
future prospects. Nonetheless, research has discovered that their trades are habitually 
infrequent, meaning they might not possess any informational advantage most of the time 
and might be exposed to regulatory frictions that discourage trading at all (Huddart and Ke, 
2006). Kelly et al., (1987) argued that the $100 million fine levied by the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) against Wall Street trader Ivan Boesky was the earliest most 
spectacular development in the crackdown on insider trading and provided a new era in 
insider trading regulatory enforcement. This and other penalties signal the determination of 
the SEC to significantly curtail illegal insider trading.  
 
It is important to note that, though many market participants would not trade on insider 
information due to its illegality or immorality, many would still want to buy a stock if the 
tip from the insider is judged to be reliable (Kelly et al., 1987). Those who support 
deregulation of insider trading argue that it contributes to market efficiency by encouraging 
the flow of information unto the market thereby facilitating the price formation process 
(Manne 1966). Moreover, few firms do restrict insider trading beyond habitual SEC 
regulations (Easterbrook, 1981). However, Bettis et al. (2000) argued that recently, over 90 
% of S&P firms do impose trading restrictions on insiders. These facts make the argument 
that shareholders of firms are harmed by the trading of executives difficult to reconcile due 
to the absence of widespread private restrictions on insider trading actions. As Manne 
(1966) documented, allowing insider trading might be an effective way of compensating 
entrepreneurs. On grounds of market efficiency, since insider trading moves stock market 
prices in the direction of true/fundamental values, there is no need for regulation (Kelly et 
al., (1987)). As Barry (1996) suggested, the fewer restrictions relating to insider trading, 
the faster the information will flow into the market and profits of such dealings will be 
lower as the information about such dealings is transmitted to the market. Unless the 
practice is considered unfair, there would apparently be no justification for regulation. 
Even when investors want to justify the unfairness of insider trading, the application of the 
rules might be a problem. This is because; insiders with potential access to inside 
information on certain stocks might adjust their portfolios so as to be in position to gain at 
the expense of other investors. 
 
Several arguments have also been presented in favour of insider trading regulations. Laws 
enacted by regulatory bodies in financial markets have deterred insiders from trading with 
foreknowledge of next earnings announcement especially when future news is expected to 
be bad (e.g. Weber, 2005). Since the SEC for example enacted the Insider Trading 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (IFSFEA) there has been limited insider trading 
prior to an earnings announcement as this law specifically holds top management 
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responsible for employees illegal trading (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). The argument that insider 
trading should be regulated has emerged largely from its reliance upon private information 
that customarily leads to an expropriation of uninformed investors (Bainbridge, 2002). 
This is regarded as a form of self-dealing by senior management in breach of their 
fiduciary duties to their shareholders, who may stand at the other end of the trades they 
make while being less well informed than they are. On the grounds of fairness, arguments 
can be made that inefficiencies may arise due to the withholding of information leading to 
moral hazard. Moreover, those who possess insider information have an unfair advantage 
over other market participants. If other investors think that Insiders of specific corporations 
do have an unfair advantage over other market participants, they might not be interested in 
investing in that corporation (Kelly et al., 1987). This then results in deadweight losses 
because gains from trade in financial markets are eroded because investors hold back for 
fear of being fleeced by senior executives in the company whose stock they aim to deal in. 
 
Gains from insider trading can originate from different kinds of information. These range 
from ordinary insider information about a company and its operations to more complex 
information like those relating to rumoured mergers and acquisitions. Customarily, the 
type of insider trading information that habitually leads to a lot of public attention involves 
information of the “bombshell” variety that includes mergers and acquisitions, mineral 
discoveries, IPO, high assets sales or purchases and so on (Carlton and Fischel; 1983). 
Despite the fact that most discussions have focused on trading gains, an insider might trade 
on inside information by just holding shares they had once wished to sell. For example, a 
corporate executive who might have wanted to sell shares in a trading period might act on 
inside information maybe relating to a takeover and hold on to the shares. When the share 
price rises, he might reap significant profits at the expense of other investors (Kelly et al., 
1987). Non-trading based on insider information is seemingly an abuse similar to active 
insider trading based on inside information. But it is difficult to attach criminal sanctions to 
acts of omission. In accordance with the arguments above, visible insider trading that 
habitually attracts widespread criticism are just tips of the iceberg. There are millions of 
trades based on inside information that may not be known by other market participants. It 
is important to note that, all trading is based on different valuations that ultimately imply 
either different information or different interpretations of the same information. 
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In an effort to limit non-trading, recent rules like the SOX have introduced guidance on 
pre-planned trading regulated through rule 10b5-1. While SOX does not change the 
primary definition of who an insider is, the Act reduces the filing dates of SEC forms 4 
from approximately 40 to two business days. Insiders are required to report their trades 
from the 10th of the month following the trade to two business days after the reported 
transactions. SOX also give the SEC new executive powers to seek any equitable relief that 
might be appropriate for the benefit of investors and all stakeholders (Huddart and Ke, 
2007).   
 
The SEC has previously regulated insider trading based on different rules. Regime changes 
have created different opportunities for new regulations. Although in theory different 
regulations have been based on the violation of insider trading legislation relating to 
material non-public information, in practice enforcement has been limited to “bombshell” 
information cases. Corporate mergers and acquisitions and large earnings manipulations 
like the Enron and WorldCom cases have caused significant concerns and have been the 
principal area of investigation and enforcement by SEC regulators. Regulation of insider 
trading must therefore not be regarded as an attempt to eliminate all or even most of the 
gains made by insiders with material non-public information. It should nonetheless be 
regarded as aiming to reduce or perhaps eliminate one particular type of insider trading 
presumably relating to the use of “bombshell” information that may cause widespread 
public outcry (Kelly et al., 1987). As most insider income from equities is arguably legal, 
the issue involved in the regulation of insider trading is not whether to allow insiders to 
profit from their information. It relates specifically to whether regulatory authorities should 
seek to outlaw gains from particular types of information, especially those that relate to 
advanced knowledge that should have been disclosed to other investors to create a level 
playing field. 
 
In an effort to understand how to effectively regulate insider trading, researchers have 
sought different pieces of evidence on circumstances where profitable insider trading 
might be possible. Additionally, they have looked at the association between different 
types of insider trades (purchases or sale) and subsequent abnormal returns. To my 
knowledge, insiders of small firms are found to be on average net purchasers while insiders 
at large firms are on average net sellers (Seyhun, 1986); insider trades of small firms 
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predict future returns better than trades at large firms and when insiders buy stocks with 
poor past performance (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), and R&D expenditures; they do 
thereby increase the informational asymmetry between Insiders and other investors. These 
allow Insiders at firms with high R&D expenditures to reap higher profits from their trades 
than insiders at other firms. These characteristics relating to the cross sectional differences 
in insider trading and of firms where Insider trades might be most profitable may prove 
useful to regulators and other stakeholders who might be interested in limiting an Insider’s 
unfair advantage over other investors (Huddart and Ke, 2006).  
 
Trade quantity and value can be other characteristics that should be watched closely in an 
effort to regulate insider trading. This is because previous research has provided 
inconsistent results on how market assumptions about these are related to expected price 
adjustments. As in Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1976) price-taking models, individuals believe 
that they can trade any amount without necessarily altering the market price, rendering 
them “price-takers” in trading the asset. On the other hand, models relating to imperfect 
competition assume that insiders choose the quantities they trade with the assumption that 
these might have an impact on future price adjustments (Kyle, 1985). As in Park and Park 
(2004), in an effort to regulate insider trading, authorities should monitor trading amounts 
as this might influence future stock returns especially when “bombshell” information items 
are concerned. Several business media reported that Enron Corp. had a high volume of 
insider sales transactions in 2001. There were a total of 9.5 million shares sold at a value of 
$131 million compared to only 10.000 purchases at a value of $0.37 million.  
 
Despite these arguments, it is important to recognise that, in the vast majority of countries, 
insider trading has been difficult to regulate because of the complications in defining an 
Insider and price sensitive information. Insider trading is a “victimless crime” in that the 
outsider counterparty to the trade enters the transaction willingly, although he may regret 
having done so later. Also, separating trading based on private information and trading 
based on portfolio rebalancing, or liquidity needs has been very difficult (Korczak and 
Lasfer, 2008). Enron is a classic example of the difficulty of discerning a state of mind, 
where for example Ken Lay claimed that as CEO, he believed everything was fine. Could 
someone with a PhD in Economics really be that naive? Perhaps only the accused really 
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knows their state of mind and until they disclose what they know, it is difficult to really 
understand what was going on.  
 
2.2:3: US, UK and EU Regulation of Insider Trading.  
The insider trading laws in the United States are rooted in the common law tradition of 
England, on which the US legal system is based (Newkirk and Robertson, 1998). As 
suggested by Fidrmuc et al., (2006), like most EU countries, there are major differences 
between regulation of insider trading in the US and UK in relation to (1), the primary 
definition of (illegal) insider trading, (2) the essence of the regulation and (3) the length of 
time before which insiders must report their trades and (4) the level of the enforcement of 
the regulations. These differences of regulation explain how informative a director’s trades 
are likely to be.  
The table below summarises some of the basic differences in the two sets of regulations. 
 
 3
2
 
 
    
T
ab
le
 1
: 
U
S
 a
n
d
 U
K
 R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
In
si
d
er
 T
ra
d
in
g
. 
 C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s.
  
U
S
 
U
K
 
R
eg
u
la
to
ry
 a
u
th
o
ri
ty
 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
. 
T
h
e 
m
ai
n
 
re
g
u
la
to
r 
in
 
th
e 
U
K
 
is
 
th
e 
F
in
an
ci
al
 
S
er
v
ic
es
 A
u
th
o
ri
ty
. 
  
R
eg
u
la
to
ry
 o
ri
g
in
 
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
 a
n
d
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
A
ct
 o
f 
1
9
3
4
 
1
9
8
5
 C
o
m
p
an
ie
s 
A
ct
. 
T
h
is
 w
as
 f
o
ll
o
w
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
1
9
9
3
 
C
ri
m
in
al
 
Ju
st
ic
e 
A
ct
 
(n
o
ta
b
ly
 
se
ct
io
n
 
5
),
 
1
9
9
7
 m
o
d
el
 c
o
d
e 
o
f 
th
e 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 S
to
ck
 E
x
ch
an
g
e.
 
D
ef
in
it
io
n
 
o
f 
an
 
in
si
d
er
 
In
 t
h
e 
U
S
, 
th
e 
1
9
3
4
 S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
 a
n
d
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
A
ct
 
d
ef
in
ed
 
a 
to
p
 
le
v
el
 
ex
ec
u
ti
v
e 
as
 
ei
th
er
 
o
ff
ic
er
s,
 
d
ir
ec
to
rs
, 
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
’s
 v
ic
e 
p
re
si
d
en
ts
 a
n
d
 o
w
n
er
s 
o
f 
m
o
re
 t
h
an
 1
0
 p
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
th
e 
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
’s
 s
to
ck
 
o
f 
an
y
 e
q
u
it
y
 c
la
ss
. 
T
h
e 
C
ri
m
in
al
 
Ju
st
ic
e 
A
ct
 
o
f 
1
9
9
3
 
d
ef
in
es
 
an
 
in
si
d
er
 a
s 
a 
d
ir
ec
to
r,
 e
m
p
lo
y
ee
 o
r 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
 o
f 
is
su
er
s 
o
f 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 o
r 
so
m
eo
n
e 
w
h
o
 h
as
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 
in
si
d
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
b
y
 
v
ir
tu
e 
o
f 
th
ei
r 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t,
 o
ff
ic
e 
o
r 
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
. 
1
7
 
R
ep
o
rt
in
g
 
o
b
li
g
at
io
n
s.
 
A
ll
 i
n
si
d
er
s 
li
st
ed
 a
b
o
v
e.
 
A
ll
 i
n
si
d
er
s 
li
st
ed
 a
b
o
v
e.
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
1
7
 I
n
 t
h
e 
U
K
, 
n
o
t 
al
l 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s 
ar
e 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
 i
n
si
d
er
s 
re
g
ar
d
le
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
si
ze
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
h
o
ld
in
g
s.
 F
o
r 
ex
am
p
le
, 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
k
er
s,
 b
ro
k
er
s,
 i
n
su
ra
n
ce
 c
o
m
p
an
ie
s,
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
b
an
k
s,
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
ad
v
is
er
s,
 e
m
p
lo
y
ee
 b
en
ef
it
 p
la
n
s,
 p
en
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
s,
 a
n
d
 m
u
tu
al
 f
u
n
d
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
v
ie
w
ed
 a
s 
in
si
d
er
s 
(F
id
rm
u
c 
et
 a
l.
, 
2
0
0
6
).
 
 3
3
 
 
 
In
si
d
er
 
tr
ad
in
g
 
o
ff
en
ce
. 
A
n
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
 i
s 
g
u
il
ty
 o
f 
in
si
d
er
 t
ra
d
in
g
 w
h
en
 h
e 
1
) 
tr
ad
es
 
o
n
 
co
n
fi
d
en
ti
al
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
ab
o
u
t 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
ev
en
ts
 a
ff
ec
ti
n
g
 t
h
e 
fi
rm
, 
th
er
eb
y
 r
ea
p
in
g
 
p
ro
fi
ts
 o
r 
av
o
id
in
g
 l
o
ss
es
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt
 1
) 
en
co
u
ra
g
es
 
an
o
th
er
 p
er
so
n
 w
h
o
 i
s 
n
o
t 
in
 a
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
 t
o
 a
cq
u
ir
e 
th
is
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
to
 
tr
ad
e 
an
d
 
3
) 
d
is
cl
o
se
s 
th
is
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 t
o
 a
 t
h
ir
d
 p
ar
ty
. 
 
A
n
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
is
 
g
u
il
ty
 
o
f 
in
si
d
er
 
d
ea
li
n
g
 
ac
co
rd
in
g
 
to
 
th
e 
C
ri
m
in
al
 
Ju
st
ic
e 
A
ct
 
o
f 
1
9
9
3
 
w
h
en
: 
1
) 
h
e 
d
ea
ls
 
in
 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 
th
at
 
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
 
af
fe
ct
ed
 
in
 
re
la
ti
o
n
 
to
 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
2
) 
h
e 
en
co
u
ra
g
es
 
an
o
th
er
 
p
er
so
n
 
to
 
d
ea
l 
in
 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 
d
u
e 
to
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 t
h
at
 a
re
 p
ri
ce
 a
ff
ec
te
d
 a
n
d
 3
) 
h
e 
d
is
cl
o
se
s 
th
is
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 t
o
 a
n
o
th
er
 p
er
so
n
. 
R
el
ev
an
t 
L
aw
s.
 
 
T
h
e 
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
 A
ct
 o
f 
1
9
3
3
 (
S
ec
ti
o
n
 1
7
 c
o
n
ta
in
ed
 
p
ro
h
ib
it
io
n
s 
o
f 
fr
au
d
 i
n
 t
h
e 
sa
le
 o
f 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
).
 T
h
e 
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
 a
n
d
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
A
ct
 o
f 
1
9
3
4
. 
S
ec
ti
o
n
 1
6
  
(b
) 
ad
d
re
ss
es
 
sh
o
rt
 
sw
in
g
 
sa
le
s.
 
R
u
le
 
1
0
b
 
(5
) 
ad
d
re
ss
es
 
tr
ad
in
g
 
o
n
 
n
o
n
-p
u
b
li
c 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
. 
P
ro
h
ib
it
s 
fr
au
d
 
re
la
te
d
 
to
 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 
tr
ad
in
g
. 
R
u
le
 
1
0
b
 5
-1
 a
d
d
re
ss
es
 t
h
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 o
r 
ab
st
en
ti
o
n
 r
u
le
. 
R
u
le
 1
0
b
5
-2
 a
d
d
re
ss
es
 t
h
e 
m
is
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
io
n
 t
h
eo
ry
. 
T
h
e 
In
si
d
er
 T
ra
d
in
g
 S
an
ct
io
n
s 
A
ct
 o
f 
1
9
8
4
. 
In
si
d
er
 
T
ra
d
in
g
 a
n
d
 S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
 F
ra
u
d
 E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
A
ct
 o
f 
1
9
8
8
 
T
h
e 
1
9
7
7
 
m
o
d
el
 
co
d
e 
o
f 
th
e 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
to
ck
 
E
x
ch
an
g
e.
 
T
h
e 
C
o
m
p
an
ie
s 
A
ct
 o
f 
1
9
8
5
. 
T
h
e 
U
K
 M
is
u
se
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 A
ct
. 
T
h
e 
li
st
in
g
 r
u
le
s 
o
f 
th
e 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 S
to
ck
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
so
u
rc
e 
b
o
o
k
 o
f 
A
u
g
u
st
 2
0
0
2
, 
ch
ap
te
r 
1
6
. 
F
in
an
ci
al
 
S
er
v
ic
es
 
A
ct
 
1
9
8
6
 
F
in
an
ci
al
 
S
er
v
ic
es
 
an
d
 M
ar
k
et
s 
A
ct
 2
0
0
0
. 
C
ri
m
in
al
 J
u
st
ic
e 
A
ct
 o
f 
1
9
9
3
 (
N
o
ta
b
ly
 s
ec
ti
o
n
 5
).
 
 3
4
 
 
O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ru
le
s 
In
 t
h
e 
U
S
, 
th
e 
es
se
n
ce
 o
f 
in
si
d
er
 t
ra
d
in
g
 r
u
le
s 
is
 
th
at
 
th
ey
 
sh
o
u
ld
 
ab
st
ai
n
 
fr
o
m
 
tr
ad
in
g
 
o
r 
u
n
d
is
cl
o
se
d
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
o
r 
re
le
as
e 
th
is
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
to
 
th
e 
en
ti
re
 
p
u
b
li
c 
(H
u
 
an
d
 
N
o
e,
 
1
9
9
7
).
 
In
si
d
er
s 
ca
n
n
o
t 
tr
ad
e 
w
it
h
in
 a
 t
w
o
 m
o
n
th
 w
in
d
o
w
 
ad
ja
ce
n
t 
to
 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
o
f 
in
te
ri
m
 
o
r 
fi
n
al
ly
 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
ts
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
o
r 
1
 M
o
n
th
 p
ri
o
r 
to
 a
 
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t.
 
M
an
y
 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
im
p
o
se
 
a 
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
 
o
n
 
th
e 
B
o
ar
d
 
m
em
b
er
s 
th
at
 t
h
ey
 m
u
st
 o
n
ly
 t
ra
d
e 
in
 a
 t
en
 m
o
n
th
 
w
in
d
o
w
 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 
an
 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
(s
ee
 H
il
li
er
 a
n
d
 M
ar
sh
al
l,
 2
0
0
2
) 
  
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 t
im
e 
fr
am
e 
P
re
v
io
u
sl
y
, 
th
e 
S
E
C
 a
ll
o
w
ed
 u
n
ti
l 
th
e 
1
0
th
 d
ay
 o
f 
th
e 
m
o
n
th
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 o
n
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
m
o
n
th
 i
n
 w
h
ic
h
 
in
si
d
er
s 
tr
ad
ed
 
to
 
re
p
o
rt
 
th
ei
r 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
s.
 
T
h
e 
S
ar
b
an
es
 O
x
le
y
 A
ct
 o
f 
2
0
0
2
 c
h
an
g
ed
 t
h
e 
la
w
s 
in
 
tw
o
 w
ay
s:
 f
ir
st
ly
, 
in
si
d
er
s 
w
er
e 
re
q
u
ir
ed
 t
o
 r
ep
o
rt
 
al
l 
tr
ad
es
 
el
ec
tr
o
n
ic
al
ly
 
an
d
 
th
ey
 
sh
o
u
ld
 
b
e 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 w
it
h
in
 t
w
o
 b
u
si
n
es
s 
d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 e
x
ec
u
te
d
. 
 
U
K
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 r
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
 s
p
ec
if
y
 t
h
at
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
 
m
u
st
 i
n
fo
rm
 t
h
ei
r 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
d
el
ay
 a
b
o
u
t 
an
y
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
 
n
o
 
la
te
r 
th
an
 
th
e 
fi
ft
h
 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
d
ay
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e 
tr
ad
in
g
 d
at
e.
 S
u
b
se
q
u
en
tl
y
 t
h
e 
co
m
p
an
y
 m
u
st
 i
n
fo
rm
 t
h
e 
S
to
ck
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
b
y
 t
h
e 
en
d
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 b
u
si
n
es
s 
d
ay
 a
n
d
 a
ls
o
 e
n
te
r 
th
is
 t
ra
n
sa
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 R
eg
is
te
r.
 I
n
si
d
er
 
tr
ad
in
g
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 i
s 
d
is
se
m
in
at
ed
 i
m
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 
to
 
th
e 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
st
o
ck
 
ex
ch
an
g
e 
v
ia
 
th
e 
o
n
li
n
e 
R
eg
u
la
to
ry
 
N
ew
s 
S
er
v
ic
e 
(R
N
S
) 
w
h
o
 
fu
rt
h
er
 
d
is
se
m
in
at
es
 
it
 
to
 
d
at
a 
v
en
d
o
rs
 
(H
il
li
er
 
an
d
 
M
ar
sh
al
l,
 2
0
0
2
).
  
 3
5
 
 
P
ri
m
ar
y
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 s
it
e.
 
E
d
g
ar
 
d
at
ab
as
e 
co
m
p
il
ed
 
an
d
 
h
o
st
ed
 
b
y
 
th
e 
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
 
an
d
 
E
x
ch
an
g
e 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
. 
In
si
d
er
 
tr
ad
in
g
 d
at
a 
ar
e 
o
n
 S
E
C
 f
o
rm
s 
3
, 
4
 a
n
d
 5
 A
n
d
 
d
is
cl
o
se
d
. 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 s
to
ck
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
o
n
li
n
e 
re
g
u
la
to
ry
 n
ew
s 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
 
P
o
te
n
ti
al
 
p
en
al
ti
es
 
an
d
 
sa
n
ct
io
n
s 
O
n
e 
m
il
li
o
n
 d
o
ll
ar
 f
in
e 
an
d
 u
p
 t
o
 1
0
 y
ea
rs
 j
ai
l 
te
rm
, 
a 
ci
v
il
 f
in
e 
an
d
 u
p
 t
o
 t
h
re
e 
ti
m
es
 t
h
e 
p
ro
fi
t 
g
ai
n
ed
 o
r 
lo
ss
es
 t
h
at
 h
as
 b
ee
n
 a
v
o
id
ed
 (
K
o
rc
za
k
 
an
d
 L
as
fe
r,
 2
0
0
6
).
 
U
p
 t
o
 s
ev
en
 y
ea
rs
 j
ai
l 
te
rm
 a
n
d
 u
n
li
m
it
ed
 f
in
e.
  
 36  
2.3: Earnings Management-Introduction and Definitions: 
There have been various ways in which the concept of “Earnings Management” has been 
defined. This section summarises the different definitions that best describe earnings 
management and that have been used in the popular accounting and finance literature. One 
of the most prominent definitions has been Healy and Wahlen, (1999, p. 368) who defined 
earnings management as: 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”  
 
The definition above identifies the impact of judgement in the construction of earnings. As 
discussed by Healy and Wahlen (1999), judgement can be exercised through numerous 
future economic events like the expected lives and salvage values of long-term assets, 
employer’s obligations for pension benefits and other post-employment benefits, deferred 
taxes, and losses from bad debts and asset impairments. Managers also have the choice to 
decide upon suitable accounting methods within GAAP that are recommended by standard 
setters to report the same economic transactions, such as the straight-line method, 
accelerated depreciation methods, or LIFO, FIFO, or weighted average inventory valuation 
methods. Rules on revenue recognition or the straightforward manufacture of false revenue 
are an easier way to forge accounts as they give more room for judgement in financial 
reporting. They can also exercise judgment in the management of working capital, for 
example the management of inventory levels, the timing of inventory shipments or 
purchases, and receivable policies. They can also exercise discretion over different issues 
relating to company expenditures like research and development (R&D), advertising and 
reported cost of good sold customarily referred to as real earnings management. Apart 
from the transactions cited above, there are many hundreds of standards that provide 
managers with the opportunity to exercise judgement in financial reporting.  
 
In another definition, Schipper (1989, p. 92), limiting her discussion to the external 
financial reporting function, defines earnings management as: 
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“A purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gains.” 
 
This definition, though slightly different from the frequently cited Healy and Wahlen’s 
(1999) definition, is interesting as it specifically suggest that accounting numbers are 
frequently a source of information about a firm’s value. It is important to note that the 
Schipper (1989) definition is the first to include real earnings management as the definition 
discusses the timing of financing decisions to alter the reported earnings of the corporation.  
 
Beneish (1999, p. 3) defined earnings manipulation as opposed to legitimate earnings 
management as: 
 
“An instance where management violates GAAP in order to beneficially represent the 
firm’s financial performance.” 
 
The third definition by Beneish primarily presents a distinction between what might be 
termed earnings manipulation (GAAP violation) and earnings management (within 
GAAP).  
 
One of the starkest observations from the definitions above is the suggestion that financial 
reports habitually reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying economic 
performance of the company. The underlying motivations and influences of earnings 
management have not been clearly identified in the literature. Accounting standards are 
thought to add value and to enable financial statements to effectively portray differences in 
firms’ economic positions and performance over time and in a credible manner. Standards 
will be exposed to contrasting opinions of the degree of relevance and reliability of 
accounting information. For example, standards that emphasise the credibility of financial 
reports usually provide room for less judgement and definitely provide less accounting 
information. On the other hand, standards that stress relevance at the expense of reliability 
may provide accounting information that is viewed by users as containing more 
unconvincing information (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Nonetheless, fraudulent accounting 
and accruals management are not accomplished through changes in the underlying 
economic activities of the firm but through the choice of the accounting methods that has 
been used to represent those underlying economic activities. On the other hand, real 
earnings management involves changes in the firm’s underlying operations like changing 
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R&D expenditures, acceleration of sales through potential price reductions, assets sales to 
influence gains or looses, etc (Gunny, 2005).   
 
Judging by the evidence presented by different researchers, earnings management is 
difficult to define. In an attempt to discuss this issue, many authors have distinguished 
between earnings management, earnings manipulation and outright financial fraud. They 
have ventured that, managing earnings is possibly permissible within GAAP. They use 
opportunities offered by the accounting system (for example accounting discretion or 
judgement) and selection of income increasing (decreasing) accruals to report a favourable 
earnings figure. The manager chooses discretionary accruals from an opportunity set of 
generally accepted procedures defined by accounting standard setting bodies (Healy; 
1984). When managers manage earnings to an egregious level as in the Enron and 
WorldCom cases, it is frequently viewed as earnings manipulation18. These are cases 
where managers were thought of as having committed fraud on a very large scale. The 
SEC normally takes enforcement actions against firms that have violated the financial 
reporting process as defined by the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. Since April 1982, 
the Security and Exchange Commission has been publishing details of its enforcement 
actions in a series of accounting, auditing and enforcement releases (Dechow et al., 1996). 
 
The former SEC chairman, Steve Levitt (1998) differentiated earnings management from 
earnings manipulation (probably earnings managed to an egregious level) by arguing that 
in recent times, managing earnings is giving way to manipulation. His objection was that, 
financial markets in the 1990’s were witnessing an erosion of the quality of earnings 
because of a reduction of financial reporting quality. In this regard, earnings manipulation 
can be viewed as an “extreme management” of earnings almost in a mockery of GAAP 
despite maintaining some vestigial accord with standards. This may be the case where a 
firm has publicly restated their earnings; been found guilty following litigation, or is 
undergoing a regulatory body’s (for example the SEC) anti-fraud enforcement actions. For 
example; the cases brought against Enron, WorldCom, Arhold, Parmalat etc., are beyond 
doubt situations where management are subject to a high degree of culpability and hence 
can be thought of as representing earnings manipulation. Studies of earnings management 
based on stock returns also suggests that investors discount “abnormal” accruals relative to 
                                                 
18 Beneish (1997, 1999) differentiated earnings management from earnings manipulation and described high 
level earnings management like the Enron and WorldCom case as earnings manipulation. 
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“normal” accruals, indicating that they view abnormal accruals as more likely to reflect 
earnings management (Healy and Whalen, 1999). 
 
Financial regulators and standard setters have been concerned about how much discretion 
to allow management to exercise in financial reporting. GAAP provides managers with 
substantial discretion in managing aggregate, or specific, accruals and management employ 
such discretion to manage earnings around certain earnings targets. Accounting earnings 
generally involves cash flows from operations, non-discretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. Within the bounds of GAAP, management have considerable 
flexibility in the choice of inventory methods, allowance for bad debt, expensing of 
research and development, recognition of sales not yet shipped, estimation of pension 
liabilities, capitalisation of leases and marketing expenses, delays in maintenance 
expenditures, and so on (Degeorge et al, 1999). In summary, those managing earnings 
usually accelerate revenues, or delay expenses, in order to aggressively generate income.  
 
A basic prediction of previous research has been that management should try to exploit the 
specific behaviour of discretionary accruals to engage in earnings management 
(McNichols, 2000). This line of thinking has become even more important after the Enron 
scandal as researchers argued that the company was able to exploit the unobservable 
features of specific accrual. In this regard, the US SEC and other regulatory authorities 
have been committed to a vigorous investigation of earnings manipulation and director’s 
dealings during the 1990’s. This is because recent corporate scandals have been related to 
both insider trading relationships and earnings manipulation. This was echoed by the 
famous speech in 1998, by the then SEC chairman Arthur Levitt where he expressed 
concern over the level of earnings management and its effect on resource allocation. 
Schipper (1989) argues that excess management of earnings may lead to earnings un-
informativeness.  As in the Daniel et al., (1998) model, positive (negative) discretionary 
accounting might be employed to signal the undervaluation (overvaluation) of a company 
relative to its true/fundamental value. 
 
Changes in the use of accounting discretion can influence the informativeness of 
accounting earnings. Therefore the higher the precision of managerial information relating 
to the undervaluation (overvaluation) of their company relative to economic fundamentals, 
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the higher the certainty of the degree of accounting discretion to be employed. The primary 
focus of most earnings management research has mostly been on detecting whether and 
when earnings management takes place. Though this might be difficult to achieve, as a 
starting point, researchers have been looking at the incentives that influence earnings 
management and how patterns of unexpected accruals are aligned to incentives (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  If we knew the objective of earnings management it might be simplier to 
detect the pattern it follows.  
 
In a survey on earnings management definitions, Ronen and Yaari (2007, p. 25) 
differentiated the various forms of earnings management as: 
 
1) Beneficial (White) when earnings management enhances the transparency of reports by 
taking advantage of the flexibility on the choice of accounting treatment to signal the 
managers private information on future cash flows.  
2) Opportunistic or efficiency enhancing (Gray) that involves the manipulation of reports 
within the boundaries of compliance with bright line standards. In such circumstances, 
earnings management involves choosing an accounting treatment that is either 
opportunistic or economically efficient.  
3) The pernicious (Black) involves outright misrepresentation and fraud. In this case, 
earnings management is the practice of using tricks to misrepresent or reduce transparency 
of financial reports.  
 
The following quotation from the SEC litigation releases relating to the Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases may explain how the SEC views earnings management (or 
manipulation) and further carries out its enforcement actions. 
Litigation release No. 18514/December 18, 2003, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release No. 1928/December 18, 2003 states; 
 
“ On December 18, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against Charles D. 
Erwin, the former Chief Operating Officer of Hanover Compressor Company (“Hanover”) 
and against Michael J. McGhan, It’s former chief Executive officer, alleging that they 
orchestrated a managed earnings scheme to inflate the company’s reported pre-tax Income 
and meet Hanover’s earnings goals and estimates during 2000 and 2001………….” 
Further, the releases writes, “As a result, according to the SEC, Hanover recognised 
revenues for this deals in contravention of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles...” 
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This case involves earnings overstatement to meet the company’s earnings goals.  
In some cases, earnings management may have a different incentive for example, to “meet 
or beat” analyst’s expectations, benefit from previous trades, or understate earnings to 
avoid tax or other regulatory concerns, and so on and there may be a breach of fiduciary 
duties by management involved.  
 
This quotation from the SEC AAER’s No. 1912 may also open up some understanding: 
“The Securities and Exchange Commission announces today the filing of fraud charges 
against the former chief executive officer, Chief Financial Officer, and Controller of the 
San Diego-Based Gateway, Inc., for engaging in a fraudulent earnings manipulation 
scheme to meet Wall Street analyst’s expectations and for making false statements and 
concealing from the investing public important information about the success of...”  
 
The defence here seeks to prove that manager did not manipulate/manage earnings, in 
breach of their duty to other stakeholders through concealing material information19.  
 
2.3.1: Classification of Earnings Management. 
Earnings management is habitually classified into three categories: fraudulent accounting 
that involves the violation of GAAP through accounting discretion, accruals management 
involving earnings management within the bounds of GAAP, and real earnings 
management where managers try to influence reported earnings through actions that 
substantially changes the underlying cash flows thereby influencing reported earnings. One 
specific difference between real earnings management and other forms of earnings 
management is that fraudulent accounting and accruals management are not accomplished 
by changing the underlying economic activities of the firm but through changes in the 
accounting method that has been employed to report the underlying activities (Gunny, 
2005). It is usually difficult to evaluate real earnings management as being in violation of 
common law because of the business judgement rule. The business judgement rule is an 
American case law acknowledging that directors manage the company. It’s a presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors normally act on an informed basis, in good 
                                                 
19 For details, you can look through the SEC website for other ways the SEC litigates individuals who have 
violated securities laws. Note that, it may not only be company management involved in the litigation 
process, the auditors either external or internal, management, creditors, debtors and so on may decide to 
assist in managing earnings for different motives. 
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faith, and in the honest belief their action is for the best interest of the company. The rule 
recognises that the daily operation of a business involves managing several risky and 
controversial decisions. The directors should therefore be allowed to make decisions 
without fear of being prosecuted. The business judgment rule further assumes that it is 
unfair to expect those managing a company to make perfect decisions all the time. 
 
In extant earnings management research, much of the discussions have been focused on the 
management of abnormal accruals using models that fail to distinguish the pure accruals 
manipulation from manipulation of real activities. Contributions that focus on earnings 
management through real activities have been concentrated on investment performance 
(Roychowdhury, 2003). In the spirit of Graham et al. (2005), real operating decisions 
customarily involve the timing of investments, cash flows and financing decisions like 
changing R&D (Bushee, 1988), capital expenditures or sometimes unexpected asset sales 
or purchases by the corporation (Bartov, 1993).  
 
2.3.1.1: Accrual-Based Earnings Management. 
Accrual Accounting is the preparation of accounts such that expenses and revenues are 
recognised at the time that they are incurred and earned respectively, irrespective of when 
the firm paid out or received the money. Accrual earnings is regarded as a superior 
measure of firm performance than cash flows because it mitigates timing and mismatching 
problems inherent in measuring cash flows over short intervals (Dechow,1994). 
Accounting principles (IAS and IFRS) customarily provide for the use of accrual 
accounting in financial reporting, providing flexibility in the preparation of financial 
reports. This flexibility is subject to managerial discretion, which could enhance the 
informativeness of earnings by allowing communication of private information 
(Holthausen, 1990) or induce managers to manage income opportunistically thereby 
creating distortions in reported earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
One of the most prominent ways managers may manage earnings is by the managing of 
accruals with no direct cash flow consequence. Examples include unjustifiable bad debts 
provisions, delaying of assets write-offs, and opportunistic selection of accounting methods 
(Roychowdhury, 2003). Several researchers have attempted to decompose total accruals 
into two components, which include the discretionary and non-discretionary accrual 
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components. These accrual components affect earnings differently as the non-discretionary 
accrual component are adjustments to cash flows customarily authorised by accounting 
standards while discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash flows selected by managers 
to report a favourable earnings figure. This discretionary component of accruals creates a 
loophole for managers to manipulate the accrual component of earnings. Due to the 
flexibility accorded by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), accrual 
earnings management is subject to managerial discretion (Subramanyam, 1996). The 
managerial discretion could be informative; in which case, managers present the financial 
statements such that they are more informative to users. In the torrent of research papers 
discussing earnings management, the choice of the so-called discretionary component of 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management has been extensively justified. Earnings 
management is a routine business that has been subject to a great deal of managerial 
discretion and consequently earnings manipulation (Kang et al., 2006). Arguably, 
managers tend to adjust up (down) earnings by inflating (deflating) current-period accruals. 
 
In linking the accruals anomaly to other firm based expectations relating to future 
performances like stock returns, researchers have employed either the behavioural 
approach or the risk based approach. The behavioural approach suggests that higher 
accruals lead to lower future stock returns and lower accruals are followed by higher future 
stock returns argue that investors do recognize the low persistence of accruals and tend to 
overprice it (See Sloan, 1996; Collins and Hribar, 2000; and Xie, 2001). The argument 
here is that investors over-extrapolate current earnings, seemingly ignoring the transitory 
nature of earnings boosted by a comparatively high proportion of accruals. The risk-based 
argument suggests that the accruals-return relationship is a manifestation of the presumed 
growth-value anomaly, which Fama and French argued has a liquidation risk explanation 
(Zhang, 2006). One of the weaknesses of accruals based models is their heavy reliance on 
the chosen metric for accruals. In the extant literature, the assumptions invoked have been 
rather piecemeal in nature; for example in the Jones models, revenue is not discretionary 
while the modified Jones model assumes that it might be discretionary (Chen et al., 2005). 
Moreover, it does not capture earnings management through cash flows and discretionary 
changes in different items like R&D, selling, general and administrative expenses, capital 
expenditures, etc (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  As in Dechow et al., (2005), these models 
generate tests of low power.  
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2.3.1.2: Real Earnings Management. 
Discussing earnings management based on accruals alone, they customarily understate 
earnings management. Recent research has provided evidence that earnings might be 
managed through changing real activities. Managers might take real actions to meet 
earnings target that influences shareholder value in both the short and long run. They are 
less likely to be challenged by regulators on purely business decisions when they for 
example sell a plant or reduce R&D expenditures. For example, companies that want to 
sell their assets to influence reported earnings might have found a buyer by the end of the 
year. They have the choice to either report the transaction close to the end of the year or 
delay the finalisation of the transaction to the next year (Bartov, 1993). However, this 
might depend on whether the acquiring management team is also interested in using the 
purchase or sale of this item to influence reported earnings in the current year. Apart from 
timing decisions that influence reported earnings, managers might take variables that are 
free from the effects of pure accrual manipulation to an abnormally high level. In extant 
research it is found that managers usually report abnormally low cash flow from 
operations, abnormally high production cost, and reduce discretionary expenses to 
influence reported earnings (see Dechow et al., 1998, Roychowdhury, 2003).  
 
2.3.1.3: Cost and Benefit of Real and Accruals Earnings Management.  
Several reasons might motivate managers to employ real earnings management at the 
expense of accruals manipulation. Firstly, real earnings management has a far lower 
likelihood of auditor or regulatory (SEC) enquiry compared accrual manipulations. 
Secondly, the decisions to manipulate earnings through accruals are limited to year-end 
periods when companies prepare their annual reports (though companies might still 
manage earnings through quarterly reported earnings). On the other hand, real earnings 
management can still take place during the whole accounting period. Real earnings 
management on the other hand can generate its own problems. Firstly, the techniques 
employed customarily involve some cost to future cash flows. For example, a company 
might institute price discounts at the current accounting period to boast reported earnings, 
but this might be a short term objective to meet a current earnings target that might have a 
longer term repercussion especially on future cash flows. Customers in the long term might 
expect future price discounts that might also lead to lower cash flows from sales in the 
future (Roychowdhury, 2003). Real earnings management might negate the value of 
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companies. Jensen (1993) presents evidence that excessive R&D and capital investment 
during the1980s destroyed at least $10 billion each at such companies as General Motors, 
Ford, British Petroleum, Chevron, and DuPont. 
 
2.3.1.4: GAAP Earnings Management. 
It is generally thought that GAAP defines earnings and when managers follow GAAP, 
earnings are not being misrepresented. However, research shows that this is not true as 
earnings can still be managed within GAAP. GAAP earnings management involves 
managing GAAP to influence reported earnings. Roychowdhury (2003) argued that 
managers, for example, might take advantage of the absorption-costing system requirement 
of GAAP to report lower cost of goods sold (COGS). To be able to do this, they might 
produce more than the quantity required to meet sales and normal target inventory levels. 
This over production might give them the opportunity to allocate fixed cost to higher than 
normal end of period inventories and this will nonetheless reduce the resulting cost of 
goods sold. GAAP rules generally permit many accounting choices that facilitate creative 
reporting that lead to earnings management. 
 
2.4: Earnings Manipulation or Management? 
As in Beneish (1999) earnings manipulation refers to instances in which a company’s 
managers may violate Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to favourably 
represent the company’s financial performance. In this case, firms subject to SEC 
enforcement through the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases might be 
regarded as likely practitioners of earnings manipulation. According to Dye, (1988), and 
Evans and Sridhar, (1996), opportunities for such manipulations of earnings arise because 
of the flexibility permitted by GAAP, and also because it may be costly to require and 
enforce less flexible financial reporting rules.  
 
In terms of the discussions presented here, managing earnings is possibly within GAAP, 
while earnings manipulation is in complete violation of GAAP. The degree of un-
informativeness of earnings is higher in manipulated than on managed earnings leading to 
outsiders repudiating manipulated earnings, which may not be the case when earnings are 
managed within GAAP. This does not preclude companies with earnings managed within 
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GAAP becoming subject to action class litigation. Table 2 below presents some points of 
distinction between earnings management and earnings manipulation. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation. 
 Earnings 
Management. 
Earnings 
Manipulation. 
GAAP Within GAAP Violate GAAP. 
Informativeness. Fairly misleading. Totally Misleading 
(Uninformative) 
Regulatory/Outsiders 
View. 
May repudiate Repudiate. 
 
2.5: Insider Trading Relationship to Earnings Management. 
This section discusses briefly the relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management. However, since this forms the core of my main empirical investigations, this 
is discussed in more detail and conclusions drawn in Chapter 4.  
 
There is much evidence in academic literature and in the popular press that managers use 
their discretion over accounting numbers to achieve some private gain. One method 
through which researchers have investigated this private gain has been through managerial 
self-dealing in their corporations stock while managing earnings.  In some circumstances 
managers have still been able to manage earnings and prolong consecutive earnings 
increases while coordinating personal stock trades (Ke et al., 2003). Beneish and Vargus 
(2002) documented that tradable strategies that jointly exploit earnings management and 
insider trading signals earn economically significant one-year ahead returns and that these 
returns dominate strategies based on either accruals or insider trading individually. They 
concluded that signals contained in insiders’ trading behaviour are useful in distinguishing 
opportunistic from informative earnings management, and in making refined assessments 
of earnings quality. Insiders are thought to manage earnings upwards before selling their 
shares at inflated prices (Bolton et al., 2002, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk 2003, Park and Park, 
2004) thereby acquiring significant profits from such trades.  
 
These studies provide a theoretical framework on how a firm’s accounting decision is 
associated with insider trading and offer empirically testable propositions for earnings 
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management (Park and Park, 2004). The pump and dump hypothesis have been explained 
in different ways and documented in different markets. In the Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) 
model that addressed the causes and consequences of mis-representing a firms’ 
performance, the authors argue that when managers intend to sell some of their holdings in 
the short-term, the incentive to misreport and the occurrence of misreporting (e.g., 
engaging in earnings management) increases. Trueman (1990) suggests that managers 
would have an incentive to manipulate their firms’ current-period earnings in order to 
influence the post-announcement stock prices, esspecially when they intend to sell their 
ownership in the subsequent accounting period. In Hong Kong, Bikki and Judy (2007) 
documented a positive association between earnings management and insider selling after 
the fiscal year-end. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis where managers sold shares after managing earnings upwards prior to the 
crises.  
 
Another group of study argue that insiders trade with information pertaining to future 
earnings changes. While not testing the abnormal accruals surrounding insider trading 
specifically, Noe (1999) reported that managers tend to sell their shares primarily after 
their firms report good earnings performance, and that they also tend to purchase their 
firms’ common shares after their firms report bad earnings performance. This is in line 
with recent work by Ke et al., (2003) who argued that insiders sometimes trade with 
information pertaining to a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases, without 
necessarily using discretionary accruals. Their buying (selling) frequently preceeds stock 
price increases (decreases) (Seyhun, 1986, Rozeff and Zaman, 1998, Ke et al., 2003). The 
finding in this paragraph is in line with Seyhun (1986) who reported that insiders are more 
knowledgeable about their firm’s future prospects and thus can predict future stock price 
changes.  
 
 
Beneish et al., (2004) investigated two hypotheses about the relation between insider 
selling and earnings management in periods preceding poor corporate performance in their 
litigation avoidance hypothesis. This was through a sample of 462 firms that experience 
technical default in 1983-1997. They documented that managers manage earnings upwards 
after they have engaged in abnormally high levels of insider selling. According to the 
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authors, the findings indicate insider trading provides managers with incentives to 
subsequently manage earnings upward, to distance their selling from the revelation of bad 
news and reduce the likelihood of reputation, employment, and litigation losses. The 
implications are that investors and those with oversight authority (e.g., boards of directors, 
auditors, and regulators) should consider monitoring prior rather than contemporaneous 
insider-trading activity as a part of their corporate governance practices. This has been 
supported by recent evidence (e.g. Weber, 2005) who suggested that insiders manage 
earnings in order to distance their sales from negative earnings news hence avoiding the 
appearance of undertaking an illegal insider trade. Also, most well known financial market 
fraud and litigation cases associated with earnings management have frequently had close 
links to prior Insider dealings20.  
 
2.6: Motivations for Earnings Management. 
The objective of this section is to identify the various theories/motives for managing 
earnings that have been tested by prior research. This will help the reader understand the 
theoretical advances in the area and the specific research issues to be tested. Research on 
earnings management has proposed different theories of why companies manage earnings. 
The decision to manage earnings emanates from specific economic, financial, political or 
social interest. Such interest may be important to the corporation or the managers in a 
precise period. For example, using income decreasing earnings management techniques, 
management of a corporation may benefit from tax reductions, price control reductions and 
increases, and while using income increasing techniques for example, management may 
get increased bonuses and fulfil their stewardship responsibilities.  
 
In some circumstances, management may be faced with circumstances where the influence 
of regulatory bodies may force them to report an unmanaged earnings figure without the 
use of uninformative discretionary management techniques. The various papers listed 
below discuss some of the motivations of managing earnings on the part of stakeholders in 
a corporation. However not all earnings management is opportunistic. As reported by 
                                                 
20 To view details of this relationship, see some of the cases involving earnings manipulation in the 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases in the SEC website. In most of these cases, managers are 
being sued for guiding accounting earnings while conducting personal stock trade. 
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Holthausen (1990), Aria et al (1998), earnings management can remarkably not be tied to 
any incentive to manage earnings21.  
 
Before we proceed with some of the constructs that may have a significant relationship to 
the level of earnings management, it will be interesting to cite a speech by the former SEC 
chairman to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants on the 24th of October 
2000 
 
“Like never before, companies are under increasing pressure to "make their numbers" or 
risk losing millions of dollars in their stock value, simply because they are a penny or two 
shy of Wall Street earnings expectations. Auditors are sometimes encouraged to "go easy" 
on a judgment call, or "look the other way" when it comes to accounting sleight of hand, 
all in the name of boosting revenues. In this environment of conflicting interests, the 
investing public relies on the accountant to stay true to his or her fiduciary duty, to never 
lose sight of the precious franchise that is theirs to guard so vigilantly”. 
 
2.6.1: Income Increasing Earnings Motivations. 
This section discusses the various alternative motivations for income increasing earnings 
management and the pattern that would be consistent with that motivation. 
 
2.6.1.1: Earnings Based Compensation And Bonus Schemes (Implications 
for Corporate Governance). 
Prior studies present evidence of a relation between managers’ contractual agreements and 
earnings patterns. These patterns are often consistent with earnings being reported to 
benefit managers through increased bonuses (Healy (1985), Gaver, et al., (1995) and 
Hothausen, et al., (1995)).Managers are occasionally remunerated with bonuses and other 
kinds of compensation if certain company earnings targets are met. Some of the 
compensation schemes depend explicitly on accounting earnings especially bonus schemes 
and performance plans (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Performance plans, for example, 
award managers the value of performance units or shares in cash or stock if a certain long-
term (3-5 years) earnings target is met.  Bonus plans are similar except that they stipulate 
annual rather than long-term earnings goals (Healy, 1985). Compensation schemes and 
others (particularly performance plans) have been viewed as creating an incentive for 
                                                 
21 There is the valuation implication where managers might manage earnings when they think the stock price 
of their company have been undervalued (or overvalued) and they want to portray the true value of the 
company. 
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managers to select accounting and accruals to maximize the value of their bonus awards 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  The schemes appear to be an effective way of influencing 
managerial accrual and accounting procedure decisions. Other popular forms of 
compensation that may entice management to manage earnings may include, stock options, 
insurance plans, stock appreciation, and restricted stock grants, etc. In most corporations, 
compensation plans may depend on such policies like a fixed bonus for attaining a reported 
earnings target, a linear variable bonus for exceeding the target and a linear variable 
penalty for reporting income below the target (Koch and Wall, 2000). Koch and Wall 
(2000) studying the circumstances surrounding the use of accruals in two companies 
Sumbeam (1996-1997) and Citicorp (1987) found the respective firms management of 
earnings was motivated by compensation policies adopted for CEO’S. Managers might 
therefore manipulate earnings upwards either in order to avoid adverse contractual 
consequences to their bonus schemes and employment situations or to conceal a firm’s 
actual performance to other stakeholders. 
 
Financial reporting in general and earnings management in particular is a key subject for 
corporate governance because; it conveys information regarding firm value and thus the 
quality of the management. However the way corporate governance relates to earnings 
management is not always obvious since investors and researchers find it tricky to 
unambiguously determine the actual motive for earnings management. Recall that, 
Holthausen (1990) and Aria et al. (1998) remarked that earnings management might not 
necessarily be opportunistic. There is no doubt that, incentives can be devised so as to 
encourage managers to attain- or at least report- a high degree of target accomplishment, 
but the means used are not always those intended or desired. Such schemes may perhaps 
encourage competition among managers where co-operation would have been preferable 
from the shareholders perspective, and may encourage the manipulation of actions and 
reports so that senior managers become increasingly misinformed about what is in reality 
happening whilst being lulled into a false sense of security that all is well. In Japanese 
management style for example, members assist and encourage each other in achieving 
corporate objectives and there is a link from substantial monetary rewards to overall target 
achievements. But in the United States, target achievement and related rewards are most 
prevalent and assessed at senior management level and are customarily linked to incentives 
like bonus schemes, pension bonuses, stock options, etc. Within Enron brutal 
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“Performance Review Committees” allowed colleagues to rank each other with those 
getting the lowest ranking being fired. This effectively set colleagues in direct open 
competition for survival.  
 
The case of WorldCom is a typical example. Managers had bonuses that were based on 
revenue growth. Their salaries, bonuses and options were also tied to the stock price of the 
company. For example, top-level managers like Ebbers and Sullivan were receiving about 
$10m of retention bonuses and several loans from the company that were repayable on 
termination (Ball, 2007). This made the incentive to engage in higher earnings 
management.  
 
2.6.1.2: Stewardship Value of Accounting. 
Several studies have shown that reported accounting information is used to value 
companies and earnings management influences stock prices (see Sloan (1996), Xie 
(1999)). Despite the theoretical popularity of cash flow valuation models, accounting 
earnings is still widely used in share valuation and to measure performance in management 
and debt contracts (Dechow et al., 1998). As a means of fulfilling their contractual 
obligations to other stakeholders, managers or shareholders might be interested in 
influencing earnings management (Dye, 1988). Graham et al. (2005) surveyed CFO’s and 
they indicated that they manage earnings to maintain or increase the stock prices of the 
firms they are managing. Nor is it normal to find analysts forecasting dividends, as 
opposed to earnings. Several empirical work have also argued that a firm’s propensity to 
increase abnormal accruals depends on the relative stock price premiums that can be 
achieved from reporting positive or negative earnings surprises (Rajgopal et al., 2007).  
 
Shareholders, for example, may wish to satisfy prospective investors or lenders especially 
when the firm requires additional support to survive and may sometimes think that the only 
way to do this is for management to manage (manipulate) their earnings figure. The 
stewardship value of accounting information itself may drive management to manage 
earnings (manipulate) frequently. The stewardship view documented by Dye (1988) is also 
linked to the compensation contract in place for the senior management team. As long as 
compensation contracts are linked to accounting data, managers can always manage 
earnings to benefit from such contracts.  
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Recent issues for earnings management research have been the impact of agency 
relationships between owners and managers (Shackleford and Shevlin, 2003). Dhaliwal et 
al. (1982) studying the association between the ownership control status of the firm and the 
accounting methods they adopt, found out that, in large companies (for example 
multinationals), where there is a strong separation of ownership and control, there is a 
tendency for management to adopt accounting methods that boost reported earnings. They 
believe managers always have an incentive to control information thereby releasing 
favourable results that may satisfy current shareholders. They are therefore obliged to 
choose accounting methods that may result in higher reported earnings leading to higher 
equity. Management may favour favourable earnings for fear of a backlash from investors 
calling for their replacement or to avoid various kinds of litigation. This may lead to the 
adoption of accounting policies that inflate earning figures. Historically too, few investors 
will accept some kind of explanation for a persistent fall in profits influencing shareholders 
to push for positive discretionary accruals which may frequently be uncritically welcomed 
by investors. 
 
2.6.1.3: Debt Covenants and Related Liquidity Implications22. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) found out that firms that violate debt covenants could incur 
re-contracting costs and in order to avoid this cost, they frequently overstate reported 
earnings. When investors are not bound by debt covenant obligations, if they want to 
borrow money, they must report earnings with covenant related variables that may be 
favourable to creditors. In conclusion, liquidity needs and credit engagements act as an 
incentive for management to manage earnings along specific earnings target.  
 
2.6.2: Income Decreasing Earnings Motivations. 
This section discusses the various alternative motivations for income decreasing earnings 
management and the pattern that would be consistent with that motivation. 
 
                                                 
22 The level of compensation and Bonus schemes, stewardship value of accounting and debt covenants and 
liquidity implications generally influences management to rather overstate earnings. 
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2.6.2.1: Price Control/Tax Implications23 
Bowman and Navissi (2001) examining the relationship between price controls and 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals found out that firms will be more aggressive in 
decreasing income using various income-decreasing earnings management techniques to 
lower profits to increase the probability that their price increase application should be 
approved. Also if a firm reduces its earnings figure, they pay less tax than when earnings 
are increased. Private firms in developing or transition economies have the incentive to 
underreport sales and profits to avoid taxes, predatory behaviour by government officials, 
or escape extortion by criminal gangs (see Johnson et al 2001).  
 
Addressing the tax implications on earnings management from the perspective of Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, recent research has suggested that the relationship 
between ownership and control may have an implication for how companies try to avoid 
taxes. When firms, for example, want to provide high quality financial information to 
external stakeholders, they are constrained into managing earnings. Public companies are 
furthermore found to be less interested in earnings management than private companies 
(Goncharov and Zimmerman, 2005). 
 
2.6.2.2: Import Relief and Other Subsidies. 
Management is sometimes motivated to report a loss to benefit from import relieve and 
other state subsidies. Provisions of an import relieve and other state subsidies will provide 
managers with an opportunity to increase the generosity of state subsidies for supposed 
harm done to national producers. (Jones, 1991). Local and national governments usually 
give subsidies to some important loss making companies to improve their performance so 
as to meet some capital market requirements. Many small companies also have incentives 
to reclassify selling, promotional, advertisement and other expenses to lower their tax 
expense (Noronha et al., 2008). The implications are that some firms might manage 
earnings downwards to give the impression that they are not doing well.  
 
                                                 
23 Most of the studies relating to earnings management emphasize mostly situations where earnings are 
overstated using positive discretionary accruals. In other circumstances, management may be motivated to 
understate earnings to benefit from import relieve and other state subsidies, pay low taxes, etc using negative 
discretionary accruals. 
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2.6.2.3: Audit Firm/Quality24. 
The level of audit quality and listing requirements may influence management’s decision 
to manage, or manipulate earnings, and affects their opportunities to do so. It has been 
observed that an effective25 audit acts as an incentive for company management to report 
meaningful earnings figures short of accruals and other manipulations. Despite the auditing 
profession, managers are often judges in their own case regarding their performance in 
serving shareholders. Historically, companies in countries with a strict audit quality regime 
have tended to engage less in earnings management (manipulation) than those in countries 
with less audit quality compliance procedures (e.g. Francis et al. 1999). Previous studies 
have documented the influence of a high quality audit on earnings management (Becker et 
al., 1998; Francis et al. 1999) and that a quality auditor (i.e.: a big 4 auditor, DeAngelo, 
1981) tends to reduce the level of discretionary accruals employed to manage earnings. De 
fond and Jiambalvo (1991) further found out that the audit quality is frequently influenced 
by the audit firm in question as firms audited by the big 4 audit firms are less likely to have 
errors or irregularities which can be considered to be proxy for earnings management than 
firms audited by the Non Big 5. The specific irony here is that, the big 4 managed Enron 
and WorldCom.   
 
In Germany and the Netherlands for example, due to their flexible audit quality regimes, 
companies there report more discretionary accruals management than companies in France 
and UK with stricter audit quality regimes. As noted in several studies of about earnings 
management, what is frequently managed is a subset of the manager’s financial report that 
requires some discretion. GAAP, auditors, audit committees and legal rules constrain 
reporting especially in areas that are specifically discretionary (Schipper, 1989) and if 
properly interpreted, there would be less earnings management. 
 
2.6.2.4: Listing Requirements and Stock Market Pressures. 
Also, if a company is listed in a foreign stock market, thereby relying on international 
capital markets with a different audit and accounting procedures, there may be some 
variations in its reporting and compliance procedures that may constrain manipulation or 
                                                 
24 The quality of audit and the listing requirements by the major exchanges influences management to report 
proper accounting earnings figure short of accrual manipulation and management techniques. 
25 Effectiveness is defined here as an audit that is not influenced by conflicts of interest. 
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management of earnings even when opportunities exist to do so. It is generally believed 
that managers may be constrained by the reporting requirements despite other incentives 
that may be available for them. Furthermore, regulator and other stakeholders are always 
of the presumption that companies audited by the big 4 and listed in a foreign stock 
exchange, are less likely to manage earnings than companies not audited by the big 4 and 
listed on national market. However, since foreign listings are usually motivated by the 
liquidity needs of a corporation, this may instead act as an incentive to manage earnings 
using income-increasing techniques. The quality of information is of interest to the capital 
market when they are listed on the stock market, as different stakeholders may be 
interested in the accounting information. When firms are listed in the stock market, they 
are required to provide high quality financial information to the investing public. In this 
regard, accounting regulations normally limit their ability to pursue blatant forms of 
earnings manipulation (Goncharov and Zimmerman, 2005). 
 
When a firm is missing an earnings target by a mere cent, they may see their stock price 
decline precipitously. On the contrary, when a firm beats a target by a few cents, there may 
be a boost to its stock price. These are surely the reason why it is more popular for firms to 
miss their targets by a cent and less likely to see that firms exactly making or exceeding 
their target by a cent (see DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), Mohanram, 2003) When firms are extremely close to a target, the incentives to 
take earnings just over the target becomes exceedingly strong. In these cases, the firms will 
try and use some form of upwards earnings management to “bump up” earnings over the 
target. Additionally, when firms are way below their targets, they have an incentive to 
make things look even worse. These are for two reasons: Firstly, it is highly unlikely that 
any amount of earnings management will get them over the target or meet analyst’s 
expectations. Secondly, if the firm is way below the target, the costs of being even worse 
are typically minimal (Mohanram, 2003). This point was supported by Arthur Levitt (1998, 
p. 1), former head of the SEC. In a speech describing the big-bath restructuring in his 
famous the “numbers game” speech, he argued that: 
“Companies remain competitive by regularly assessing the efficiency and profitability of 
their operations. Problems arise, however, when we see large charges associated with 
companies restructuring. These charges help companies "clean up" their balance sheet - - 
giving them a so-called "big bath. Why are companies tempted to overstate these charges? 
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When earnings take a major hit, the theory goes Wall Street will look beyond a one-time 
loss and focus only on future earnings. And if these charges are conservatively estimated 
with a little extra cushioning, that so-called conservative estimate is miraculously reborn 
as income when estimates change or future earnings fall short.” 
  
2.6.2.5: Trading by Corporate Insiders. 
Insider trading relationship to earnings management is mostly discussed from the 
opportunism hypothesis, where insider trading is partly due to the willingness to benefit 
from private information and from other equity related incentives. The most direct 
evidence of insider trades acting as an incentive to manage future earnings have been 
raised by Beneish (1999), although other research has concluded that insider trading can be 
informative about future earnings changes or management due to a specific event that may 
be price sensitive. From prior theoretical findings, insider trading motivates Executives to 
take actions to increase firm earnings (See for example Jaffe (1974), Givoly and Palmon 
(1985), Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishney (1994) and Rozeff and Zaman, 
(1998) Ke et al, (2003)). Secondly, earnings management influences future firm 
performance (see Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Penman and Zhang (2002), Richardson et al. 
(2002), Chan et al., (2006). These researchers suggest that insider’s trades are informative 
with buying and selling being followed by future price increases (decreases). I therefore 
suggest that, insiders will buy (sell) shares and manage earnings to report an increase 
(decrease) in the profit of the corporation. The details of this are captured within the results 
of my research as this is part of my hypothesis but it is in line with the suggestion of 
Beneish (1999, 2002), and Beneish and Vargus (2002), though this was not the principal 
objective of the those researchers. This motive together with the regulatory motivations for 
earnings management discussed in section 2.6.8 are the most important motives for this 
research as the objective of this thesis is to investigate insider traders motivations for 
earnings management.  It is important to note that under this hypothesis, managerial 
accruals are focused on misleading outside investors and other stakeholders of the true 
nature of a company’s earnings. 
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2.6.2.6: Legal rights of outside investors. 
Leuz et al (2003) examining the extent to which Insiders overstate performance to outside 
investors found out that, when legal protection is low for outside investors, this may act as 
an incentive for insiders in publicly-traded firms to overstate performance to outside 
investors. The legal rights accorded to outside investors and the qualities of their 
enforcement are both associated with the properties of firms’ accounting earnings. In Ball 
et al. (2000), the argument put forward is that an improvement in the legal rights of all 
stakeholders, politicization of accounting standard setting and enforcement actions 
weakens the demand for timely and conservative accounting income, and conversely 
increases the demand for an income variable with low volatility. In these countries whose 
legal system originates from code-law, the comparatively strong political influence on 
accounting occurs at national and firm levels. Governments establish and enforce national 
accounting standards, typically with representation from major political groups and 
external stakeholders such as labour unions, banks and business associations. Such a 
setting makes sure the rights of every stakeholder are respected.  
 
2.6.2.7: Regulatory Motivations for Earnings Management. 
Several regulatory policies both at the industry and national level have previously 
motivated corporate managers to report either earnings decreases or increases.  As Watts 
and Zimmerman, (1978) hypothesised, managers of firms that are vulnerable to adverse 
political investigations or anti-trust investigation have incentives to manage earnings to 
present a less profitable situation. Research by Cahan (1992), provided evidences 
supposing that, where firms are under investigation for anti-trust violations they report 
income-decreasing abnormal accruals in investigation years. Jones (1991) found that when 
companies apply for import relief, they reduce their income in the years in which they 
submit their applications. At the industry level, financial institutions face considerable 
regulatory and other pressures that are habitually linked to future accounting information. 
For example, banks are expected to satisfy certain capital adequacy requirements that are 
written in terms of accounting numbers. Such regulations generate incentives for firms to 
manage the income statement and balance sheet variables of interest to regulators (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999).  
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2.6.2.8: Other Motivations for Earnings Management26. 
Earnings management can be motivated by peer pressure and ego, where the need of those 
in control of the company influences the decision by managers to influence reported 
earnings. Managers also manage earnings to hide accounting fraud like when they have 
stolen cash from the company and other assets. Managers sometimes have excessively 
strong belief in themselves and the company they manage and might want to influence 
reported earnings to portray the company as profitable. The temptation to deceive others is 
a universal human weakness that influences the way earnings and other performance 
metrics are reported. Even in the absence of any economic motive to defraud it may be that 
a poor performance reduces the senior management team sense of self-worth.   
 
2.7: Penalties for Insider Trading and Earnings Management Offences.  
This section explains ways in which managers can be penalised for managing earnings. 
Penalties range from financial penalties imposed by the regulatory authorities to personal 
penalties that are usually incurred by the individual after committing insider trading and 
earnings management offences.  
 
2.7.1: Financial Penalties. 
Financial penalties range from restitutions, recoveries, fines and seizures of the assets of 
the individuals and institutions involved in the insider trading and earnings management 
offences. At the level of the corporation, they are sometimes charged with civil penalties 
that sometimes run to millions of dollars. Xerox is an example of a company whose 
executives appeared to have manipulated earnings during the 1990s while concurrently 
exercising large amounts of stock options and selling large numbers of shares in the open 
market. In April 2002 the SEC sued Xerox for manipulating reported earnings, and as part 
of the settlement with the SEC, Xerox was forced to restate reported revenues for the 
period between 1997 and 2001. Due to the restatement, reported revenues were reduced by 
$2.1 billion and net income by $1.4 billion. The SEC’s lawsuit accused Xerox of using a 
variety of tricks to inflate net income, including inappropriately allocating the revenue 
stream on their equipment leases. Other firms whose executives were accused of inflating 
                                                 
26 This section was compiled from information in presentation slides and informal   communication with 
Professor Ray Ball during his visit to the University of Edinburgh as part of the Citigroup Lecture, University 
of Edinburgh, 2007. 
 60  
earnings and exercising stock options or trading in their shares on the open market include 
Waste Management, Tyco, and Enron (Bergstressera and Philippon, 2004).  
 
Individuals charged with insider trading and other offences that led to corporate failures 
always suffer much wealth loss in the form of lost income, bonuses, shares and options and 
salaries. They are customarily requested to return any profits earned. Auditors and their 
firms involved in audit failures are habitually sanctioned with civil penalties. Andersen 
was fined $7 M as settlement for the audit failures of Enron. Financial institutions accused 
of aiding Enron’s financial manipulation were also sanctioned. Citigroup was sued for $2 
billion, J.P Morgan Chase for $2.2 billion, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce for $2.4 
billions, and so on (see table 4 and 5 below).  
 
2.7.2: Criminal Penalties27. 
Federal legislations legally indict and convict suspects who are found guilty of criminal 
offences relating to insider trading, earnings management and other corporate frauds. 
Following the SEC investigations, up to 30 executives were convicted of insider trading 
and earnings management offences. Skilling received 24 years, Andy Fastow, the company 
Chief Financial Officer was convicted for 6 years imprisonment, after agreeing to supply 
evidence about other managers, Richard Causey, the company’s chief accounting officer 
was sent to prison for 5 and half years. Worldcom executives convicted include Ebbers, the 
company’s Chief Executive Officer that received life imprisonment, Scott Sullivan who 
was the company’s Chief Financial Officer who received 5 years, Myers, the company’s 
financial controller received a year, and others like Yates, Vinson and Norman received 
minor sentences. Other executives that have been convicted in recent times include John 
Rigas (15 years) of Adelphia communications, his son Timothy (20 years), and Michael 
(10 months)28. In Rite Aid, Bergonzi (the CFO), Grass (CEO), and others were convicted. 
Computer associates Chief Executive Sanjay Kumar was convicted to 12 years and Tyco’s 
Chief Executive Kozlowski’s and Mark Swartz received long sentences also (see table 5).  
                                                 
27 Information in this section has been collected from reading through the SEC website including information 
on the accounting and auditing enforcement releases over many years. I also had the chance to attend a 
presentation by Ray Ball at Edinburgh University where several aspects relating to these criminal and other 
penalties were discussed. 
28 In 2006 The Riga’s family, which founded the now-bankrupt Adelphia Communication through a 
settlement with the U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York and the SEC decided to 
forfeit 95 percent of its assets totalling more than $1.5 billion. Those assets including cable systems that were 
valued at $700 million to $900 million and bonds valued at around $567 million. 
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2.7.3: Market Penalties. 
Investor’s forecasts earnings for companies and these earnings are customarily utilised to 
value companies. When the reported earnings do exceed the forecast, the firm’s stock price 
normally increases, though it might be at a slower rate. When earnings are lower than the 
forecast, the stock prices may drop. Though this encourages earnings management, the 
stock market sometimes discounts the effect of a firm’s earnings management on the 
reported earnings and thus undervalues companies. Banks29 involved in aiding the various 
firms in their deceptive practices were faced with lawsuits and settlements that tarnished 
their credibility. Table 3 below presents the type of shareholder wealth looses that often 
follows high accounting fraud.    
 
 
Table 3: Scary Numbers: Destruction of Shareholder Wealth. 
Company Estimated Amount ($ US) 
Enron  $60,000,000,000. 
Cisco $450,000,000,000. 
WorldCom  $175,000,000,000. 
Source: http://www.sox-online.com/shocking.html as retrieved on 28 Apr 2008 18:24:10 GMT. 
 
2.7.4: Reputational Penalties. 
Trust and integrity are essential for the functioning of most capitalist markets and without 
trust; most markets would be unable to exist as they do (Glassman, 2003). Corporate 
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom habitually plunge the profile of previously high 
profile executives. This normally leads to a loss of reputation, prestige, peer respect and 
friends. This is because most businesses are conducted primarily on a personal level and 
companies don’t like to do business with executives whose words cannot be trusted. There 
are also implicit penalties in the managerial labour market for insider trading and earnings 
management offences. Firms that are subject to the SEC enforcement actions or have had 
their earnings restated often have a high managerial turnover and such managers often 
found it difficult to acquire a new job (Desai et al., 2004). So the failing is not the 
manipulation so much as getting caught in the process of doing it.  
                                                 
29 Citigroup was sued for $2 billion, J.P Morgan Chase for $2.2 billion, Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce for $2.4 billions, and so on. 
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2.7.5: Personal Penalties. 
Physical and mental stress that often follows indictments and convictions for corporate 
fraud is enormous30. This sometimes affects the family and other close relatives. Also, 
there is always a loss of one’s liberty when there is a conviction for corporate fraud. Some 
top executives of firms under investigation sometimes end up committing suicide (for 
example Cliff Baxter at Enron) for several reasons that might range from their inability to 
cope with stress and looses generated from the investigations. Robert Lay was convicted 
and his conviction was annulled as a result of his death.  
                                                 
30 This often leads to suicide. Clifford Baxter, a former senior executive of the bankrupt US energy giant 
Enron, committed suicide apparently because of stress generated from the severe looses and public interest in 
the case. 
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Table 4: Summary of Recent US Earnings Management Scandals. 
Company name Time period  
Adelphia communications corporation 1999-2001 
Bausch and Lomb inc. 1997-2000 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 1999-2001 
Cendant  1997-1998 
CMS Energy 2000-2001 
Computer Associates 1999-2000 
Conseco Inc, 1999-2000 
Dynergy Inc. 2001-2002 
Enron Corporation 1997-2001 
HealthSouth Corporation 1999-2002 
K Mart corporation 2001 
Merck & Co. 2002 
Microstrategy Inc. 1998-2000 
Qwest Communications 2000-2001 
Rite Aid Corporation 1998-2000 
Sunbeam Corporation 1997-1998 
Symbol technologies 1998-2002 
Texlon Corporation 1999 
Tyco international 1997-2002 
Waste Management Inc. 1992-1997 
Worldcom Inc 1999-2002 
Xerox Corporation 1997-2001 
 
Source: Compiled by author. The list is not exhaustive as it was developed on a random search on the SEC 
website. It includes only firms alleged to have committed accounting fraud by the Accounting Auditing and 
Enforcement Releases (AAER’s). 
 
The following companies have so far been charged with financial impropriety: Adelphia, 
Arthur Andersen, Critical Path, CSFB, Enron, HealthSouth, Homestore.com, ImClone 
Systems, Kmart, Martha Stewart Living, Merrill Lynch, Qwest, Salomon Smith Barney, 
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Tyco, U.S. Technologies, WorldCom. The following companies are under investigation as 
at 22 March 2009 Arthur Andersen, Enron, Global Crossing and Kmart. The following 
cases have been settled Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, Gemstar/TV Guide, Merrill 
Lynch, Piper Jaffray and Xerox. 
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Table 5: Sarbanes-Oxley Hall of Shame: Executives Charged. 
Executive(s) Charged  Company name 
Philip Anschutz Qwest (Founder) 
Joseph Nacchio Qwest (former CEO 
Jonathan Beck AA (former RVP) 
Kevin Clark AA (former RVP) 
Timothy Ganley AA (former VP) 
David Thatcher AA (former CFO) 
David Duncan Arthur Andersen (former Sr. Audit 
Partner). 
Timothy Belden Enron 
Andrew Fastow Enron (former CFO) 
Lea Fastow Enron (former Asst. Treasurer) 
Kevin Howard Enron Broadband Services (former CEO) 
Kenneth Lay Enron (former Chairman/CEO) 
Jeffrey Skilling Enron (former CEO) 
Franklin C. Brown Rite Aid (former general counsel and vice 
chairman) 
Irvin Brown Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Jacob Fekete Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Aaron Jacobowitz Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Herman Jacobowitz Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Jacob Jacobowitz Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Victor Jacobowitz Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Sholem Klein Allou Healthcare, Inc 
Nachman Lichter Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
James Brown Adelphia Communications (former VP 
Finance) 
John Rigas Adelphia Communications (founder and 
former CEO) 
Michael Rigas Adelphia Communications (former EVP) 
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Continued from above: Executive(s) Charged  Company name 
Tim Rigas  Adelphia Communications (former CFO) 
Bernard Ebbers WorldCom (former CEO) 
Scott Sullivan Worldcom (former CFO) 
Stephen Garofalo Metromedia Fiber Networks (chairman) 
Clark McLeod McLeod USA (former CEO) 
Dennis Kozlowski Tyco (former CEO) 
Frank Quattrone Credit Suisse First Boston (former 
technology investment banker) 
Richard Scrushy HealthSouth (former CEO) 
Martha Stewart Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia 
(founder and former CEO) 
A. Alfred Taubman Sotheby's (former Chairman) 
Sam Waksal ImClone Systems (former CEO) 
7 former senior executives Symbol Technologies 
27 directors and officers Royal Dutch / Shell Group 
Source: Constructed by author from data from  
http://www.sox-online.com/hall_of_shame.htm 
 
2.9: Regulation of Earnings Management. 
Earnings management is customarily regulated at the national level. In the United States, 
the Security and Exchange Commission has been regulating earnings management through 
its securities laws that seek to influence the integrity of its capital markets. Specifically, the 
provisions of Section 13(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are focused on 
earnings management practices. It requires that firms whose securities are registered with 
the Security and Exchange Commission to file quarterly (form 10Q) and annual financial 
statements (forms 10K) in conformity with US GAAP. Changes in accounting standards 
and their regulations are usually intended to mitigate earnings management, provide 
information for stakeholders, and improve decision-making for different stakeholders 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The objective of this section is to explain issues relating to the 
sources and consequences of security market regulations. Specifically, the researcher 
presents the different theories that have motivated security market regulations.  
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In its effort to regulate earnings management, the authorities have been concerned about 
the different issues that motivate earnings management. These include auditor 
independence, open market insider trading, executive bonus schemes and stock based 
compensation, etc. In the literatures; such regulations have been found to improve earnings 
quality. In an effort to defend the need for earnings management regulations, Lang et al. 
(2007) argued that firms from countries with weaker investor protection show more 
evidence of earnings management than US firms who have strong securities market 
regulations. In 1999, the SEC chairman Arthur Levitt spoke publicly against widespread 
earnings management and its impact on the integrity of the US financial market. This was 
followed by many high profile corporate scandals and regulatory changes to improve 
financial reporting. After a series of consultative meetings and broader discourse, the SOX 
were enacted in July 2002. 
 
2.9.1: The Influence of Public Policy on Financial Markets and The Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (officially titled the Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act) was enacted in July 2002 by the US Congress to restore 
investor’s confidence after a series of corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. 
These scandals impaired the trust and confidence of stakeholders in accounting 
information. The Act brought CEO’S, CFO’s and auditors under intense scrutiny.  The Act 
was named after its main architect’s Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael 
Oxley. The Act applies to certain US and foreign companies that are registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. After the scandals, one of the key concerns of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and other institutional regulators was to implement 
reforms that were designed to produce more reliable financial reports. It was designed to 
reduce fraud and conflicts of interests, while increasing financial transparency and 
improving confidence and trust in financial markets. The Act related to a number of 
diverse issues ranging from wide corporate governance responsibilities by public 
institutions to enhanced criminal and civil penalties for the violation of securities laws. It 
included the threat of fines and imprisonment for senior executives from organisations that 
do not comply with specific provisions.  
 
 68  
2.9.1.1: SOX Regulations Relating to Insider Trading. 
Section 403 of the SOX of 2002 provided two important changes that require earlier public 
notification of Insiders' transactions in their company's securities and the wider public 
availability of information relating to those transactions.  
The two main new provisions are: 
a- the first relates to the requirement that all trades must be reported within two business 
days following the date the transactions were executed.  
b- Section 403 (a) of the SOX of 2002 requires that Insider’s file electronically all their 
transactions and provide online accessibility of such reports. To facilitate the 
implementation of this requirement, the Commission created a new on-line filing system 
for these forms and insiders were required to report their trades on SEC forms 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Section 306 of SOX prohibits any director or executive officer of a company from 
purchasing or selling any equity security during a pension plan blackout period. This 
prevents plan participants and beneficiaries from engaging in transactions involving those 
securities for the specific period when their access price-sensitive information offers them 
an informational advantage. 
  
2.9.1.2: SOX Requirements Relating to the Containment of Earnings 
Management Practices. 
SOX Section 201 focuses on the services outside the scope of practice of auditors. 
Activities prohibited include amendments made to Section 10A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 on the following issues:  
1: Prohibited Activities: except with pre-approval, it shall be unlawful for a registered 
public accounting firm to provide an audit client with any non-audit service, including: 
(a) Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements 
of the audit client; 
(b) Financial information systems design and implementation; 
(c) Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; 
(d) Actuarial services; 
(e) Internal audit outsourcing services; 
(f) Management functions or human resources; 
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(g) Broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; 
(h) Legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and 
(i) Any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible. 
2: Pre-approval for Non-Audit Services- A registered public accounting firm may not 
engage in any non-audit service, including tax services, that is specified as a prohibited 
activity above for an audit client, unless the activity is approved in advance by the audit 
committee of the issuer firm. 
 
SOX Section 302 focuses on corporate responsibility for financial reports. 
The section requires that, for each company filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As in Section 302, the Chief Executive 
Officer(s) and the Principal Financial Officer(s), or persons performing similar functions 
need to certify in each quarterly, or annual, report filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) that: 
1-they have reviewed the reports.  
2-the report does not contain any untrue statements of material facts, omissions, etc, under 
which such financial statements can be considered misleading. 
3- the financial statements fairly present the financial condition and results of operations 
for the reported periods, financial reports do not contain material misrepresentations and 
are fairly represented the CEO and CFO are responsible for internal control problems, the 
CEO and CFO must report any deficiencies in internal accounting controls, or any fraud 
involving the management of the Audit Committee; and finally, they must indicate any 
material changes in internal accounting controls. 
 
SOX Section 401 focuses on the disclosures in periodic reports. Section 401(a) of the SOX 
requires that each annual and quarterly financial report filed with the Commission should 
disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements and obligations. Section 
401(b) of the SOX relates to Non-GAAP Financial Measures. It requires that public 
disclosures of any non-GAAP financial measure by a public company (that are customarily 
referred to as "pro forma financial information") must be presented in a manner that: 
 
 70  
A-Does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the non-GAAP financial measure, in light of the circumstances 
under which it is presented, not misleading; and 
B- Reconciles the Non-GAAP financial measure with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). 
 
SOX Section 404 focuses on the management’s assessments of internal control over 
financial reporting. The section requires that annual reports of public companies to file an 
annual internal control report as part of their annual report. It holds management directly 
responsible for internal control structures and must report any problems with this structure 
as quickly as possible. 
Section 409 of the SOX Authorises a "Real Time" Disclosure System. The Section obliges 
companies to disclose “on a rapid and current basis” information concerning material 
changes in its financial condition or operations.  
 
SOX 902 focus on frauds and Conspiracies to Commit Fraud Offences. The sections affirm 
that it is a crime for any person to alter, destroy or conceal any document that might hinder 
fraud investigations or other official proceedings.  
 
2.10: What Are the Government’s Objectives for Creating Security Market 
Regulations? 
The accounting and finance research can be classified into several categories as discussed 
in prior literature (See Jonsson, 1998 for an overview). In this research, accounting and 
finance is viewed as a tool for measurement and/or the regulation of social and security 
markets regulations. In viewing accounting as a measurement tool, its goal is to convey 
information about constructs that are exogenous to the accounting system (Marton, 1998). 
Example of these constructs include when accounting is used to value companies through 
their stock market performance in a particular point in time (Jonsson, (1998), Beaver, 
(1989) p.104).  
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In the second dimension where accounting is viewed as an instrument for regulation of 
social relations31 and the overall financial markets, it becomes a tool for the regulators to 
control the behaviour of different stakeholders of accounting information. This is 
seemingly the case when some stakeholders can abuse the production and use of 
accounting information. This dissertation assumes accounting can be used both as a 
measurement tool and for social relations. The behavioural pattern of senders and receivers 
of accounting information is studied. An overview of the various choices in influencing 
earnings information made by producers of accounting information is carried out, followed 
by its impact on external users and other stakeholders.  
 
Like prior security market regulations, the SOX of 2002 was conceived amidst stock 
market failures that influenced the need for an evaluation of responsive regulatory policies 
(Romano, 2005). Most sections of the SOX can be traced from the 1934 Security and 
Exchange Act that was enacted after the 1929 stock market crash. This Act and its future 
amendments has been the basis of market regulation in the US. In the US, insider trading 
and earnings management are regulated by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Besides government restrictions, a large number of US firms do impose significant control 
mechanism to mitigate insider trading and earnings management practices. Institutions and 
managers with the duty to regulate public policy have been concerned about market abuse 
and ways in which this can be controlled. According to lecture notes acquired from 
Professor William Forbes (2008), several decades ago, William George Bryan in his 
infamous “Cross of Gold” speech to the Democratic convention in Chicago in 1896 
condemning the proposed return to the gold standard stated: 
 
“On the one side stand the….moneyed interests, aggregated wealth and capital, imperious 
arrogant, compassionless. On the other side stand an unnumbered throng.”        
 
This theme was picked up by President Woodrow Wilson during the industrial conflicts of 
the 1920 where he stated that: 
 
“The great monopoly of this country is the money monopoly”   
                                                 
31 Prior research has investigated this in relation to the politicisation of accounting. In these studies, the 
primary interest has been to investigate the extent to which politics influence accounting practices. Most of 
these studies (e.g. Ball et al. 2000) classified countries according to their legal systems (whether code law 
with high political influence or common law where accounting is determined by the private sector) to 
ascertain if the political system influences accounting practices. 
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 An early expression of alarm regarding the threat to the democratic process from 
monopoly finance was the Pujo Committee of the US Senate meeting in 1912. Here 
Ferdinand Pujo Counsel to the Senate Banking Committee concluded 
 
“The terrific concentration of power in banker’s hands from many sources was 
threatening…. The bankers were neither just a national asset nor [just] a national danger 
– they were both.”    
 
Arthur Levitt (1998, p1), then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
stated in his famous “Numbers Game” speech that: 
 
  “Trading based on privileged access to information can demoralize 
investors and destabilize investment. It has utterly no place in any fair minded, law 
abiding economy. It’s a chronic danger. It’s all too evident in today’s marketplace. 
And it’s a crime. The American people see it, bluntly, as a form of cheating. They  – 
along with the SEC  - have zero tolerance for the crime of insider trading. Let’s 
state clearly, and in the unambiguous terms it deserves. Insider dealing is legally 
forbidden. It’s morally wrong. And it’s economically dangerous”    
  
The current Head of Enforcement at the UK’s Financial Services Authority, as if not to be 
outdone, stated this in a speech to the American Bar Association in October 200732 
 
 “We do see market abuse –of which insider dealing is the highest profile aspect – 
as posing a risk to our statutory objectives. It is a financial crime – it may not attract the 
immediate moral outrage of a violent crime against a person, but it is, in our view, and in 
the view of the UK government a serious white-collar crime with potential sentences of up 
to seven years imprisonment.” 
 
(http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/1004_mc.shtml) 
 
  
Institutions have been concerned about the degree of conflict of interest in the management 
of public corporations. Several individuals and institutional investors usually acquire price 
sensitive information that is not available to other investors. They normally trade on this 
information, thereby making profits at the expense of those without this information. In a 
                                                 
32 This quotation is taken from Bris (2005, p 268) and is from a speech given by Levitt in Washington on 27th 
of February 1998 when the bull run in the US economy was in full swing. 
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bid to constrain the conflict of interest, significant amendments are usually being made to 
responsive new regulations. A case in point is the recent prescription of Section 16(a) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act, that requires a timely disclosure of all trades via an SEC 
Form 4, currently made available on the SEC’s Edgar public filings database.   
 
As discussed in Roe, (1994, p 112), at the inception of securities regulation and the 
regulatory authority in the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission and its 
founding Chairman William O. Douglas crystallized the hawkish view of interventionist 
financial capital.  
Douglas argued that: 
 
“When Finance moves into the zone of exploitation whenever it becomes the master 
rather than the loyal servant of investors and business.  To make finance the 
servant rather than the master becomes the central plank of any public policy 
reform.”  
 
He further argued that: 
 
           “People who dominate financial markets have tremendous power. Such people    
become virtual governments in the power at their disposal. Sometimes it is the duty 
of government to police them, at times to break them up, to deter further growth.”      
 
Investors and other stakeholders are generally sensitive to stock price movements. The 
stock market forecast earnings for companies and these earnings are customarily utilized to 
value companies. When the reported earnings do exceed the forecast, the firms stock price 
increases. When the said earnings are lower than the forecast, the stock prices might drop. 
This encourages earnings management.  
 
Accounting regulations are usually intended to mitigate earnings management, provide 
information for stakeholders, and improve decision-making for different stakeholders 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). This has been supported by Lang et al. (2007), who argued that 
firms from countries with weaker investor protection show more evidence of earnings 
management than US firms who have strong securities market regulations. In 1999, the 
SEC chairman Arthur Levitt spoke publicly against widespread earnings management and 
its impact on the integrity of the US financial market. Trust and integrity are essential for 
the functioning of most capitalist markets and without trust; most markets would be unable 
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to exist as they do (Glassman, 2003). Corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom 
habitually plunge the profile of previously high profile executives. 
 
2.10.1: What Gave Rise to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002? 
The origin of the SOX can be traced from the high profile scandals in the US involving 
many public corporations like Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and so on. These 
scandals brought enormous wealth loss to the public leading to a lack of trust and 
confidence in the US regulatory and financial system. Those who recommended or 
completely embraced the swift enactment of the SOX were appeared to be swayed by the 
fact that neither the contracting devices that were supposed to control managers, nor 
efficient securities markets, worked to prevent or spot the problem before the failures of 
those corporations (Ribstein, 2002). However, before this act, regulators have been 
concerned about the level of investor protection. Several of them were of the opinion that 
US investors and firms need to be assured that there are strong security market regulations. 
In 1999 for example, the SEC chairman Arthur Levitt spoke publicly against widespread 
insider trading and earnings management practices and their impact on the trust and 
integrity of the US financial system.  
 
One major concern that follows for the SEC was how to implement reforms that could 
effectively produce more reliable financial reports. After the failures of these major 
corporations, the overriding concern was to look for ways of reducing fraud and conflicts 
of interests, thereby increasing financial transparency and improving the confidence and 
trusts of investors in financial markets. This led to the enactment of the SOX. All 
companies trading in the US, including their subsidiaries and private companies initiating 
initial public offerings were required to comply with its provisions. 
  
2.10.2: How Are the Regulation (SOX) Going to Affect Insider Trading and 
Earnings Management?  
Research on insider trading’s relationship to earnings management and firm performance 
has been enormous in volume. Additionally, the recent corporate scandals have spurred 
regulators to re-examine the strength and implications of recent regulations. Prior policy 
discussions have sought to defend the suitability of financial market regulation (Fishman 
and Haggerty, 1992). This has led to the strengthening of regulations for insider trading 
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and earnings management as prescribed by the SOX of 2002 (See Section 2.9.1 for the new 
SOX regulations). 
 
One major line of argument that has not been discussed in different empirical findings is 
the impact of the disciplining effects on the insider trading and earnings management 
relationship. This has originated from the impact and influence of the threat of litigation as 
a result of potential wealth losses by those not privy to certain information that insiders 
might be entitled to.  These suggest that the public/management choice for stricter 
regulation is becoming increasingly a focus to regulators and all other stakeholders. In the 
“pump and dump” hypothesis, Bolton et al. (2002) provided evidence to suggest that the 
disciplining effects are not effective as managers are able to inflate stock prices through 
earnings management before selling shares. The “pump and dump” hypothesis is similar to 
the findings of Beneish (1999), who, in his study of 64 cases of fraudulent financial 
reporting, reports a mechanism where managers overstate earnings before engaging in 
massive insider selling. In another study by Park and Park (2004), the empirical evidence 
supported the assertion that insiders increase current discretionary accruals for firms whose 
managers sell their ownership stake out in the subsequent period than for other firms, 
indicating that managers who sell out deliberately increased current-period earnings 
through the use of positive discretionary accrual techniques. Furthermore, insiders buying 
(selling) are thought of as frequently following stock price increases (decreases) (See 
Seyhun, 1987; Rozeff and Zaman 1988; Ke et al., 2003). These arguments suggest that the 
theory of financial services regulation has not been effective over the past periods. 
 
In contrast, Beneish et al. (2004) provided evidence that is contrary to this hypothesis in 
their litigation avoidance hypothesis. Prior to this, Beneish and Vargus (2002) have 
provided evidence that managers engage in insider selling, before managing their shares 
upwards. Their findings indicate that trading by corporate insiders provides incentives to 
subsequently manage earnings to distance their trades from subsequent revelation of bad 
news, thereby reducing the potential likelihood for litigation and reputation concerns. The 
litigation avoidance hypothesis has been supported by a recent study by Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2008), who argued that due to legal risks, insiders avoid trading on extreme 
earnings changes. The authors argue that it is more difficult to sell before bad news than to 
buy before good news, and insiders would be particularly reluctant to keep selling their 
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shares and exercising stock options if future earnings news contains exceptionally negative 
information. 
 
The impact of regulation has also been discussed from the information hierarchy 
hypothesis. According to Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990), the information 
content of a director’s trade does depend on the type of director that executed the trade. 
Specifically, Seyhun (1986) documented that the average abnormal returns for trades by 
officers are significantly higher than those of other non-executive directors, while Lin and 
Howe (1990) documented that trades of Directors, Chairmen and other company officers 
contain more information than those of institutional shareholders that are not involved in 
the day-to-day management of the firm. Other researchers have not found evidence to 
support the information hierarchy hypothesis and even argue that insiders cannot 
exclusively benefit from any informational advantage, except if they are subject to less 
scrutiny. They argue that, the Chief Executive might have better information than other 
insiders, but because he or she is heavily scrutinized by regulators and market participants, 
they may be more reluctant to trade on any information that might be price sensitive (Jeng 
et al., 1999, P 32).  
 
These theories suggests that strict regulatory regimes might influence the way insiders 
trade and employ discretionary accounting techniques to disguise information motivated 
trading. Quite recently, Graham et al. (2005) provided evidence that managers still manage 
earnings to influence future stock prices, and investors do extrapolate past trends from 
accounting information and make decisions on the future. However, they employ real 
earnings management techniques as well as accruals management techniques to manage 
earnings. The effects of these two techniques upon earnings are discounted differently by 
investors in their valuation of companies (Chan et al., 2006). These suggest that regulators 
have to be concerned about the relationship between these two techniques on insider 
trading and future firm performance. In a recent study, Beneish, et al. (2001) stated that 
there is a negative relationship between capital expenditures and future stock returns for 
their sample of “extreme winners and loser” portfolio’s.  
 
The impact of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX) has been discussed in the literature.  
In a recent article by Cohen et al. (2007), the researchers found evidence suggesting that 
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firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods after the passage 
of SOX. Specifically, they documented that there has been a steady increase of accrual-
based earnings management from 1987 until the passage of SOX; this was followed by a 
significant decline after the passage of SOX. On the other hand, the level of real earnings 
management declined prior to the introduction of the SOX of 2002 and increased 
significantly after the passage of the Act. In the light of the recent regulatory intervention 
as prescribed by SOX, managers might be willing to trade off the benefits of inflated stock 
prices (through accruals and real earnings management techniques) with the costs of 
earnings management. Nonetheless, they might decide to employ techniques that are less 
susceptible to regulatory detection. This might involve trading off the more detectable 
accruals earnings management for real earning management. As suggested by Beneish and 
Nichols, (2007) the high costs associated with fraudulent financial reporting, makes it 
necessary for investors to effectively exploit all information useful in assessing fraud, due 
to its influence on accounting earnings and subsequent stock returns. The recent thrust of 
US earnings management regulations has been to encourage companies to constantly 
provide relevant and timely informative disclosures. This has been supported by the recent 
SOX regulations, that 1) limits the timeframe which insiders have to disclose their trades to 
the public (see Section 403 of the SOX) and 2) provides for a more comprehensive and 
timely disclosure of annual report information (See Section 409 of the SOX). Despite the 
strict regulatory regimes to suppress earnings management, some investors are capable of 
unravelling manipulated financial statements and making investment decisions on the basis 
of these documents. As in Shivakumar (2000) investors are not misled by earnings 
manipulation. This is in contrast to Rangan (1998) who claimed that managers succeeded 
in fooling investors due to their inability to effectively discount manipulated earnings 
reports. Managers too have the ability to switch techniques as a result of difficulties in 
managing earnings through discretionary accruals alone. It is therefore important to verify 
whether the stock market responds differently to the financial information of companies 
that have or have not managed earnings through either method.  
 
The evidence above does not suggest that insider trading and earnings management can be 
completely suppressed from the regulatory intervention. This is because prior disciplining 
effects have never completely achieved their desired objectives. While they can be 
suppressed, they cannot be completely eliminated. This study therefore looks at the impact 
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of the current regulatory intervention (SOX of 2002). The study wishes to investigate if 
SOX regulations have really brought any substantial benefits to the US stock market, 
especially major corporations in the S & P 500 Index of companies?  
   
2.10.3: What has Changed After the Sarbanes Oxley Act? 
Firstly, the act has imposed significant financial and other penalties on those who violate 
security laws. Insider trading bans has also been imposed during pension fund blackouts. 
Furthermore, Insiders are also required to return to their corporation any capital gains made 
from the purchase or sale of their company’s stock if both transactions occur within a six-
month period (habitually termed short swings profits). The speed of reporting has also 
changed and this is likely to have major implications on the ability of insiders to earn 
abnormal returns at the expense of outside investors. Before the recommendation from the 
recent SOX legislation, the SEC granted until the 10th day of the month following the 
month in which the trade has been executed for insiders to report their transactions. This 
suggests that they had effectively up to 40 days to report their trades after the earnings 
announcement. After the Act, insiders were required to electronically report their trades 
after its execution within two business days.  
 
2.11: Conclusion. 
This chapter provides a summary of the written accumulation of knowledge on the areas of 
insider trading and earnings management. It is important to note that this section broadly 
discusses the literatures that are general to the overall thesis. A more subtle discussion of 
the literature that is specifically focused to the two independent essays is discussed in 
chapter 4 and 5. 
 
 The section has been organised as follows: section 2.2 has discussed the literature on 
insider trading; section 2.3 has discussed earnings management. This has been followed by 
a section on the classifications and motivations for earnings management. A final section 
discusses the penalties for earnings management, the regulation of earnings management 
and finally reasons for the enactment of SOX are addressed. Splitting the existing theories 
in this way assist in modelling the actual relationship between insider trading on the one 
hand and earnings management and firm performance on the other hand in light of the 
recent intervention as prescribed by SOX of 2002.  
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The chapter does show that in the theory on insider trading and earnings management, the 
findings so far has been inconclusive. Moreover, despite the literatures and the financial 
press being replete with articles on financial market regulation, no study has investigated 
the influence of financial market regulation on insider trading and earnings management. 
After splitting the theories, this thesis wishes to investigate how the SOX of 2002 has 
influenced the relationship between insider trading and earnings management on the one 
hand and earnings management and firm performance on the other hand. These issues are 
addressed in chapter 4 and 5 which are the main empirical essays.  
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3.0: Research Design. 
This section of my research looks at the general sources of data employed in the thesis and 
also presents the details of the samples used. Some basic descriptions and explanations 
necessary to understand the nature of the data common to both empirical essays are given. 
 
3.1: Introduction. 
The original sample is drawn from companies in the S&P 500 in March 2007 and includes 
the period 1997-200633. All of the firm’s in the S&P 500 index are large publicly held 
companies and their stocks trade on the New York Stock Exchange. The S&P 500 is the 
most widely watched index of large-cap US stocks. These firms and their subsidiaries are 
obliged to comply with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. However, there have been 
different data requirements to construct the sample for the two main essays of the research.  
 
The data that have been used for this research are: 
• Insider trading data 
• Accounting line items data, including various accruals information and total assets 
from the balance sheet, etc.  
• Earnings per share (both forecasts and actual). 
• Share Prices. 
 
Most of the required data are made available to the public as part of institutional and 
individual company’s corporate governance policies. 
 
3.1.1: Sample Construction. 
The empirical investigation for testing the relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management uses two separate samples. This has been developed in relation to the constructs 
in the hypothesis and the issues to be tested in the two essays. The first essay investigates 
insider trading relationship to earnings management in the light of the recent regulatory 
intervention as prescribed by the SOX legislation. The second essay investigates the 
relationship between earnings quality and firm performance in light of the recent regulatory 
                                                 
33 Though the actual estimation period is 1997-2006, data has been collected from 1996 to be able to estimate 
changes for different items and until 2007 to be able to estimate one year ahead stock returns for the final 
sample year. 
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intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Though the different empirical essays 
of the thesis approach the issues from different constructs, both parts use the S&P 500 firms 
with a common underlying set of accounting, stock price and insider trading data as required. 
The original sample is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 for the period 1997-2006. This 
makes 10 consecutive years, giving a total of 5000 firm years. As discussed below, the 
metric employed to test similar issues like earnings surprises, discretionary accruals and net 
shares traded are the same for the two tests. However, the basic test has been conducted 
differently. Recall that, the first section of the thesis looks at the relationship between insider 
trading and earnings management post Sarbanes Oxley. Nonetheless, the two samples use 
different constructs to either include or eliminate a firm in a specific year as discussed in the 
empirical sections. There is an induced survivorship biased discussed in detail in section 
6.4.5 as part of the limitation of the study. The two empirical essays employ an unbalanced 
panel and have different final sample sizes specified in the different test. 
 
3.1.2: Data Sources. 
Insider trading data: This data has been collected from the National Archives of Electronic 
Records and from the Edgar filings compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). The file summarises insider trading transactions in all publicly held firms and is a 
summary of the ORS (ownership reporting system file) form 3, 4 and 5 compiled by the 
SEC. Both databases report details of the insider transactions including: 
• Insider’s names. 
• Title of the insider. 
• The type of transaction (whether acquisition or dispositions). 
• The specific transaction and reported dates. 
• The amount of shares traded. 
• The market values of these shares. 
• The insider’s holdings. 
It is important to recognise that SEC forms 3, 4 and 5 summarise the original insider 
transactions. Accounting Data: this data have been collected from DATASTREAM, which 
has been made available by the University of Glasgow. Earnings Per Share: Forecasts and 
actual earnings per share data have been collected from the IBES.  
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3.2: Description of the Various Databases. 
This section describes the various databases that have been used to collect the data.  
  
 
3.2.1: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) was created in 1934. Before this 
period, individual government agencies were in charge of maintaining their own records and 
the records were not available in all circumstances for public consumption. Some took great 
care of the materials, but many did not. The online database carries insider-trading data. 
These data can be assessed from the securities database of the Access to Archival Databases 
(AAD). Specifically, it contains data on two categories of private sector securities: Records 
About the Proposed Sale of Unregistered Securities by Individuals, created, 1/4/1972 - 
9/29/2000, documenting the period 1/4/1972 - 9/29/2000 containing about 809,220 and 
Records on Trading of Securities by Corporate Insiders, created, 7/11/1978 - 3/12/2001, 
documenting the period 7/11/1978 - 3/12/2001 containing about 5,502,888. Details relating 
to this database can be assessed publicly at http://www.archives.gov/.  
 
3.2.2: Edgar. 
EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, performs automated 
collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies 
and others for companies that are required by law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The filings by companies can be searched through the 
database and it allows you to retrieve real-time filings for a specific company and to find key 
company information, including the company’s name, address, telephone number, state of 
incorporation, Central Index Key (CIK) number, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code, and fiscal year end. You simply need to type in the name of the company or its CIK 
number. A CIK is the unique number that the SEC's computer system assigns to individuals 
and corporations who file disclosure documents with the SEC. You do not need to know the 
number to be able to conduct your search but searching by that number narrows your 
search34. I have used this database to collect most of the insider trading data. It is SEC forms 
3, 4 and 5 that contains insider trading data. It gives you a summary of the data for the 
companies, individuals and time period selected. Insider trading collected from the Edgar 
                                                 
34 This information has been summarised from the details of the SEC website that can be assessed at 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/quickedgar.htm and from other pages of the SEC website that describes the Edgar 
Database at www.sec.gov 
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database and from the national archives for electronic records has been used in chapter four 
as motivations for earnings management.  
 
 
3.2.3: Datastream. 
Thomson DataStream35 is an online software system that provides data for over 175 
countries and 60 markets worldwide. It is an encyclopaedic database that covers over 25 
million time-series and 400,000 global companies. The coverage varies over time depending 
on the series. Most market data has been made available on a daily basis and most economic 
data has been available monthly or quarterly. Most of the data available are historical and 
some of the data has been made available over a period of close to three decades. To use 
DataStream, the software is normally loaded on most University’s accounting researcher’s 
offices, workstations and libraries, or in the computers in the accounting and finance 
departmental libraries for use by its students.  
 
3.3: Measurement of Variables. 
This section explains how the various variables employed in the research have been 
measured, including the caveats employed and their technical advantages. This has been 
used in the main empirical chapters (4 and 5). The net insider trading estimates have been 
used to evaluate if insiders are net buyers (sellers) of their corporations stock in chapter 4. 
Estimates of real, discretionary and Beneish M-Score have been used in chapter 4 to proxy 
for earnings management and for other robustness test. In chapter 5, they have been used to 
as a proxy for the quality of earnings.   
  
3.3.1: Estimation of Net Insider Trading. 
Following previous research net insider transactions (whether they are net buyers or sellers) 
are estimated in a predefined period. It is identified based on the following rules: Only 
transactions by the senior executives of firms are selected, this includes the top five 
executives (Chief Executive Officers (CEO), Chief Financial Officers (CFO), Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), The President and the Chairman of the board). This is because; 
                                                 
35 This information has been assessed from: 
http://www.thomson.com/content/financial/brand_overviews/Datastream_Advance 
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top-level insiders possess more valuable information and earn abnormal returns from their 
trades (e.g. Seyhun (1986), (1998) Lin and Howe (1990), Beneish and Vargus, (2002).  
 
Many studies report that not all insider trades are equal in their predictive ability as some 
may be more valuable than others (Gelband, 2005); thus the researcher eliminated 
transactions of less than 100 shares. This is because previous research has questioned their 
predictive abilities (example Penman (1982), (1985), Givoly and Palmon, (1985) and 
Beneish and Vargus, (2002), Beneish et al. (2004)). Since the primary focus of this study is 
on open market transactions36, it excludes derivatives transactions (stock bonuses, options 
exercised, transactions by trustees, etc) that are customarily not linked to the open market37. 
Moreover, since insider sales after the exercise of options are likely to be related to the 
director’s remuneration packages and whether the options are likely to be in the money, their 
information content are likely expected to be low (Fidrmuc et al. 2006). Following Beneish 
et al. (2004), net insider trading is computed as follows for firm i in period t.  
 
NST it  = Σ (S_P it  / O_S it ) − Σ(S_S it  / O_S it ) -------------------------------(3.1) 
 
Where; 
NST it  = Net shares traded for firm i in period t. 
S_P it  = Shares purchased for firm i in period t. 
S_S it  = Shares sold for firm i in period t. 
O_S it = Outstanding shares for firm i in period t. 
                                                 
36 It is important to note that more than 99 percent of these trades of less than 100 were sale transactions. 
Insiders sell for many reasons – to purchase assets, to fund their children education, estate planning, etc. 
Liquidity needs might be reflected in the less than 100 shares. Open market insider trades are used because; 
they are made voluntarily by the insider and are not subject to any set of rules. They can thus be used to 
identify the investor’s sentiments. 
37 Insiders customarily exercise stock options at a significant discount to the market price of the company’s 
stock. They often exercise these options, because they expect it to expire very soon and not necessarily 
because this is a particular good time to buy their company stock. On the contrary, open market purchases 
represent a much higher risk to the insiders and are usually a bullish sign. Often, an insider buying on the 
open market is because they do not have exercisable options available, and yet they still want to buy the 
stock at that particular time due to their bullish expectation. These are some of the reasons why only open 
market transactions have been used.  Additionally, as discussed by Bergstresser and Phillipon (2004), some 
empirical research investigating the influence of executive compensation on firm performance takes 
executive exposure to the stock price as exogenous. The implications are that it does not have any direct 
influence on firm value. 
 85  
As in Fidrmuc et al., (2006), the number of shares outstanding helps to estimate the relative 
size of each transaction. The values for the net shares traded are summed up over the firm for 
each particular day, and they are further accumulated for all days in the years 1997-2006. 
The net selling firms have been defined as firms with their net shares traded less than 0 (NST 
< 0). On the other hand, the net buying firms have been evaluated as firms with their net 
shares traded greater than 0 (NST >0). They are finally associated with fiscal years based on 
the transaction date reported at the SEC.   
 
3.3.2: Estimation of Earnings Management. 
Since the seminal article by Healy (1985) earnings management has been measured by 
discretionary accruals. Current research habitually employs two methods in estimating 
earnings management. These are an earnings management proxy constructed by separating 
out the discretionary element in accruals, and changes in real operating items. Nonetheless, 
discretionary accruals have been suggested as capturing a larger portion of the earnings 
management (Dechow et al. 1995). The accrual benchmark definition applied in this research 
is based on the discretionary accruals model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate 
earnings management. The Dechow et al. (1995) model show that the modified Jones (1991) 
model tends to outperform other known models that have been developed to detect earnings 
manipulation. Precedence is given to the Dechow et al. (1995) model which is a cross 
sectional version of the Jones (1991) model that implies that receivable changes are 
discretionary and company managers are able to exercise some discretion over revenue 
recognition and sales.  
 
Following prior research (Jones, 1991 and Dechow et al. 1995), the usual starting point in 
measuring discretionary accruals is the computation of various elements of the total 
component of accruals. The non-discretionary accrual component is then subtracted from 
total accruals to determine the discretionary accrual component. 
 
This is given as: 
 
DAP it = TA it - NDAP it -------------------------------(3.2) 
 
DAP it = Discretionary accruals proxy for firm i at period t. 
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TA it = Total accruals proxy for firm i at period t.  
NDAP it  = Non-discretionary accruals proxy for firm i at period t. 
Or more simply discretionary accruals are simply the estimation error retrieved from the 
accruals benchmark model of Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) or whatever the chosen 
model is.   
 
3.3.2.1: Estimation of Total Accruals. 
Following previous studies on earnings management total accruals are computed as follows: 
 
TA it = (∆CA it - ∆CL it - ∆Cash it+ ∆STD it - DEP it )/(A 1−it )----------------------(3.3) 
 
Where: 
TA it =  Total accruals for firm i at period t. 
∆CA it  = Change in current assets (Datastream datatype code wc02201) firm i at period t; 
∆CL it  = change in current liabilities (Datastream datatype code wc03101) firm i at period t; 
∆Cash it = Change in cash and cash equivalents (Datastream datatype code wc02001) firm i 
at period t; 
∆STD it = Change in debt included in current liabilities (Datastream datatype code wc03251) 
firm i at period t; 
DEP it = Depreciation and amortization expense (Datastream datatype code wc01151) firm i 
at period t and, 
A 1−it = Total assets (Datastream datatype code wc02999) firm i at period t for the prior year. 
Where changes in the various items are the difference between current period values 
(denoted as period t) less the previous period (denoted as period t-1).  
 
3.3.2.2: Estimation of Non-Discretionary Accruals. 
The problem with most earnings management research is the difficulty in identifying the 
(unobservable) discretionary component of accruals. Following Healy (1985), non 
discretionary accruals are defined as the adjustments to the cash flows mandated by the 
accounting standard-setting bodies, while discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash 
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flows that are selected by the auditor under a manager’s watchful eyes. Non discretionary 
accruals estimation follows Dechow et al. (1995) and is given as: 
 
NDA t  = α 1 (1/A 1−t ) + α 2 ((∆REV t  - ∆REC t )/ A 1−t )) + α 3 (PPE t  /A 1−t )---------------(3.4) 
 
Where NDA t  = Estimated non-discretionary accruals at time t. 
 Where ∆REV t= Change in revenue at time t (datastream datatype code wc01001). 
∆REC t= Change in receivables at time t (datastream datatype code wc02051). 
PPE t   = Property, plant and equipment at time t (datastream datatype code wc02501). 
A 1−t = Total assets in the prior year.  
 
Estimates of the firm specific parameters α1 , α 2 ,α 3 , are generated using the following 
model in the estimation period:  
 
TA t= a 1 (1/ A 1−t ) + a 2 (∆REV t / A 1−t ) / + a 3 (PPE t / A 1−t ) + ν t ,---------------------(3.5) 
 
Where: 
TA t= total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. a 1 , a 2 , and a 3  denote the OLS estimates of 
α1 , α 2 ,α 3 . 
 
The only adjustment relative to the Jones (1991) is the change in revenues, which is adjusted 
for the change in receivables in the estimation period. The original Jones (1991) model 
implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the estimation 
period or the event period. The modified version of the Jones (1991) model by Dechow et al. 
(1995) implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from 
earnings management. This is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than to manage earnings 
by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. 
 
The model assumes that the changes in revenues, receivables and gross property, plant and 
equipment are explanatory variables that control for the portion of accruals relating to less-
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discretionary changes in working capital accounts and expenses relating to depreciation. 
Following the Jones (1991) model, the modified model rests upon the presumption that non-
discretionary accruals are constant and it thus attempts to control for the effect of changes in 
the firms economics circumstances on non-discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995). As 
in prior studies, a two digit SIC industry cross-sectional model is used to estimate 
discretionary accruals in our study. The use of the two digits SIC codes across industry helps 
to relate time and industry-specific commonalities. The importance of the cross-sectional 
model is that it can extract common industry factors applied to discretionary accruals. The 
implications are that the discretionary accruals in the model reflect management’s choice 
rather than an adjustment to industry factor. Also, since the model is estimated year-by-year, 
changes in industry condition are also factored in the model. 
 
3.3.2.3: The Jones 1991 Model. 
The Jones (1991) model is habitually used in studies of aggregate accruals. It is based on the 
postulation that non-discretionary accruals are constant (Dechow et al. 1995). The model 
controls for the effect of changes in the firm’s economic characteristics on non-discretionary 
accruals. The model for non-discretionary accruals in the event year is: 
 
NDA τ = α 1 (1/ A 1−t ) + α 2 (∆REV τ )/ A 1−t  + α 3 (PPE τ )/ A 1−t ,............(3.6) 
 
Where NDA τ =Estimated non-discretionary accruals at time τ. 
 ∆REV τ = Revenues in year τ less revenues in year τ-1 scaled by total assets at τ-1; 
PPE τ  = Gross property, plant and equipment in year τ scaled by total assets at τ-1; 
A 1−t  =Total assets at τ-1. 
 
α1 , α 2 ,α 3= Firm-specific parameters. 
Estimates of the firm specific parameters α1 , α 2 ,α 3 , are generated using the following 
model in the estimation period:  
 
TA t / A 1−t = a 1 (1/ A 1−t ) + a 2 (∆REV t )/ A 1−t  + a 3 (PPE t )/ A 1−t  + v t ------- (3.7) 
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Where: 
TA t= total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. a 1 , a 2 , and a 3  denote the OLS estimates of 
α1 , α 2 ,α 3 . As above, total accruals are regressed on the inverse of total assets, revenue 
scaled by lagged total assets and property plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets 
to generate the firm specific parameters because the researcher assumes their normal level 
depends on them. v t  is the residual or error term of the regression.  
 
3.3.2.4: The Dechow et al. (1995) Modified Jones (1991) Model. 
An alternative version of the Jones (1991) model has been the Dechow et al. (1995) model 
that is frequently referred to as the modified Jones (1991) model. The model was developed 
as a result of researchers working to improve on its weaknesses. In the modified Jones 1991 
model by Dechow et al. (1995), non-discretionary accruals are estimated as: 
 
NDA τ = α 1 (1/A 1−t ) + α 2 (∆REV τ  - ∆REC τ )/ A 1−t  + α 3 (PPE τ )/ A 1−t ,-------(3.8) 
 
Where 
∆REC τ = net receivables in year τ less net receivables in year τ-1 scaled by total assets at τ-
1. 
The estimates α 1 , α 2 ,α 3  are non discretionary accruals during the estimation period (in 
which no systematic earnings management is hypothesized) are those obtained from the 
original Jones 1991 model. The only adjustment relative to the Jones 1991 is that the change 
in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables in the period. As suggested in the 
modified Jones model, the regression coefficients are estimated on a cross sectional time 
series period over the sample period. The original Jones 1991 model implicitly assumes that 
discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the estimation period or the event period. 
The model implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from 
earnings management. This is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than it is to manage 
earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. The thesis 
gives precedence to the modified Jones (1991) model by Dechow et al., (1995) which has 
become popular in recent academic studies.  
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3.3.2.5: A Critique of the Use of Discretionary Accruals. 
The Jones model was the first to evaluate how to isolate discretionary accruals from total 
accruals. In the seminal article by Dechow et al. (1995), the researchers evaluated the 
different models that detect earnings management. Their findings suggest that their modified 
version of the Jones’ model provides the most powerful way to detect earnings management.  
In Bergstresser and Phillipon (2004), the researcher used both the modified Jones model by 
Dechow et al., (1995) and the Jones model and found that, the discretionary accruals results 
were similar. After this model, other models have been developed that attempt to explain 
better methods for the estimation of discretionary accruals. Though most of the literature has 
employed the modified Jones model, the working capital accruals models by Peasnell et al. 
(2000) have also received some attention. Researchers using the working capital models 
have suggested that it is good for companies and industries with high working capital as 
modeling working capital for these companies increases the accuracy of the estimates. One 
novelty of the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) is that it provides better 
estimates of the impact of estimating discretionary accruals using a cross section of 
industries than time series models. 
 
Accruals are usually estimated with the formula above, or simply as the difference between 
the cash flow from operations and any estimated net income. A fundamental property of 
accruals is that over time, they are mean reverting, causing any planned or unplanned 
earnings management to be ineffective when viewed at an aggregate level over time. In this 
regard, managers who habitually employ accrual manipulations alone to build-up earnings 
may expect accruals to unwind over time leading to the suppression of earnings and lower 
future stock prices (Dharan, 2003). The reversing nature of accruals gives the possibility that 
firms that employ high accruals in a year may have to reverse it in the coming years.  
  
Despite the large number of studies that have adopted the version of the Jones (1991) and the 
modified Jones (1991) model as a proxy for earnings management, thereby using 
discretionary accruals to estimate abnormal accruals in a cross-country setting, recent 
literature has not relied upon such empirical measures and has instead focused on the 
limitations of discretionary accruals models.  
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An important critique has been their failure to identify their benchmark on the underlying 
economic earnings that is being managed (Leuz et al., 2003). Leuz et al. (2003) proposed an 
alternative model that involves a scaling measure of absolute cash flow from operations 
while using absolute working capital accruals as a measure of earnings management. The 
assumptions is that the scaling factor controls for differences in firm size and performance, 
and provides a direct benchmark for the absolute magnitude of economic earnings. 
Moreover, the scaling variable of total assets used is subject to the effect of cross-country 
differences in asset recognition rules and choices (Peasnall et al. (2000)). 
 
Other critiques have argued that there exists no fundamental rationale in including 
depreciation in the total accruals proxy. This is because a large body of literature (e.g. Healy 
and Wahlen) has suggested difficulties in managing depreciation over an extended period of 
time without the manipulation becoming obvious to investors. Moreover, the differences in 
depreciation rules across countries are difficult to comprehend and are unrealistically related 
to earnings management. The various models are usually estimated in time series firm-by-
firm or in cross- sectional regression using all firms in a given two-digit (or four digit) 
industry and year period by different researchers based on different caveats. Yearly 
estimations are used to make a one-year forecast of expected accruals, which when 
subtracted from the dependent variable yields unexpected accruals. 
 
3.3.2.6: Measurement of Real Earnings Management.  
Real earnings management is measured by employing a simple model that detects abnormal 
changes in a firm’s underlying operational activities as discussed by prior research (e.g., 
Roychowdhury, 2006, Gunny, 2005, Dechow et al., 1998). The technique assumes the 
abnormal components reflecting real earnings management are measured as residuals in the 
corresponding cross sectional regressions as listed below.  
 
Production Costs (PROD) = Cost of Goods Sold + Change in Inventory  
Discretionary expenses (DISEXP) = R&D + Advertising + Selling, General and 
Administrative Expenses. 
Accruals = Income Before Extraordinary Items-Cash Flow From Operations. 
Net Accounts Receivables are the Net Accounts Receivables. 
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Abnormal CFO = is the residual from the corresponding industry-year regression given by 
 
CFO t / A 1−t  = α*(1/ A 1−t ) + β 1*(S t /A 1−t ) + β 2 *(∆S/ A 1−t ) + ε t , ---- (3.9) 
 
Where A t  = assets at end of year t, A 1−t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, S t  = sales 
during year t, ∆S t  = change in sales during year t.  
CFO t is the cash flow from operations for firm i at period t. 
Abnormal production costs: is the residual from the corresponding industry-year 
regression: 
 
PROD t /A 1−t  = α *(1/ A 1−t ) + β 1*(S t /A 1−t ) + β 2 *(∆S t /A 1−t ) + εt,------- (3.10)  
Where A t = assets at end of year t, A 1−t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, S t = sales 
during year t, ∆S t  = change in sales during year t.  
Abnormal discretionary expenses: are the residual from the corresponding industry-year 
regression  
 
ADEXP t / A 1−t  = α*(1/ A 1−t ) + β 1  *(S t / A 1−t ) + β 2 *(∆S t /A 1−t ) + ε t , ---- (3.11) 
 
Where A t  = assets at end of year t, A 1−t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, S t  = sales 
during year t, ∆S t  = change in sales during year t.  
Abnormal accruals: Abnormal accruals are captured by the deviation from the predicted 
values of the corresponding industry–year regressions. Accruals relate to the difference 
between income before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations. It is measured 
using the following cross sectional firm-year regression:  
 
Accruals t /A 1−t = /1(1α A 1−t ) + 2α (∆ S t / A 1−t ) + 3α (PPE t / A 1−t ) + ε t ------- (3.12) 
 
Where A t  = total assets at end of year t, A 1−t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, ∆S t  
= change in sales during year t and PPE t  =property, plant and equipment at end of year t.  
Abnormal Receivables: is the residual from the corresponding industry-year regression  
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∆NR t / A 1−t  = α*(1/ A 1−t ) + β 1*(∆S t / A 1−t ) + ε t ,------ (3.13) 
 
Where A t  = is the total assets at end of year t, ∆S t  is the change in sales during year t, 
∆NR t  is the change in net receivables at the end of period t.  
Abnormal Inventory: is the residual retrieved from the corresponding industry-year 
regression  
 
∆INVEN t / A 1−t  = α*(1/ A 1−t ) + β 1*(∆S t / A 1−t ) + β 2 *(∆S 1−t / A 1−t ) + ε t -- (3.14) 
 
Where A t  = is the total assets at end of year t, A 1−t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, 
∆S t  is the change in sales during year t, ∆INVEN t  is the change in inventory at the end of 
period t. 
 
Real earnings management (RM) according to this research is assumed to be actions that 
managers undertake that deviate from the best practice to influence reported earnings and 
its accomplished by changing the firm’s underlying operations. Examples of RM include 
cutting prices towards the end of the year in an effort to accelerate sales from the next 
fiscal year into the current year, delaying desirable investment, and selling fixed assets to 
affect gains and losses, changing R&D investments budgets, all in an effort to boost 
current period earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006, Gunny, 2005). As in Graham et al., (2005), 
due to the pervasive occurrence of earnings management through real activities and its 
effect on the recent corporate scandals including large major corporations as Enron and 
WorldCom, it is likely that the attention of regulators Post SOX and the media would turn 
to this type of earnings management. It is important to note that, on the contrary the 
attention of regulators Pre-SOX was on accruals earnings management. In chapter 4, real 
earnings management has been used for the robustness check on the results on insider 
trading relationship to earnings management and in chapter 5, the relationship between real 
earnings management and firm performance have been thoroughly examined.  
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3.3.2.7: Detecting the Probability of Earnings Manipulation (Beneish M-
Score). 
The Beneish (1997, 1999) M-Score is a model that detects the probability of financial 
statements distortion. Though its approach is mathematical, it uses both total accruals and 
specific accruals to detect earnings management for firms with large discretionary accruals. 
The model can be estimated with eight or five variables based on data availability. When the 
5 or 8 variables are aggregated into what Beneish described as an M-Score, they are used to 
proxy the degree to which the earnings have been manipulated. Though Beneish used 
different cut off points in different research, most researchers have employed the cut-off 
point of -2.22. An M-Score of less than -2.22 suggests that the company will not be a 
manipulator. On the other hand, an M-Score that is greater than -2.22 signals a higher 
probability of financial statements manipulation.  
 
In constructing this model, Beneish relied on three sources of explanatory variables based on 
financial statements data. They include, the presumption that earnings manipulation is likely 
when a firm’s future prospects are poor (Kellogg and Kellogg (1991)), the impact of cash 
flow on accruals (Healy, (1985) Jones, 1991), contract-based incentives exist on earnings 
management (1986)).  Four of the eight ratios suggest financial statements distortions (Day 
Sales in receivables Index (DSR), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), 
Accruals), with the other four indicating a predisposition to engage in the manipulation of 
financial statements (Gross Margin Index (GMI), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Sales, General 
and Administrative expenses index (SGAI) and leverage index (LEVI)). All variables are as 
defined below. 
 
Based on 8 variables the Beneish M-Score is estimated as: 
 
M = -4.84 + .920*DSRI + .528*GMI + .404*AQI + .892*SGI + .115*DEPI -.172*SGAI + 
4.679*TATA - .327*LEVI --- (3.15) 
 
In case of data availability becoming a problem, the M-Score can be estimated based on 5 
variables as: 
 
M = -6.065 + .823*DSRI + .906*GMI + .593*AQI + .717*SGI + .107*DEPI----(3.16) 
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Prior research has also employed the Beneish (1999) model usually described as an M-Score 
in detecting earnings manipulation. In the academic literature, Fridson (2002) has long 
recognised the usefulness of the M-Score in detecting earnings manipulation. Investment 
professional organisations like Merrill Lynch have also employed the M-Score in predicting 
investments in client portfolios have the most suspect financial reports. 
 
The researcher discusses the various variables below and explains why according to Beneish, 
it can influence the likelihood of earnings manipulation.  
 
DSRI defined as Days' Sales in Receivable Index is the ratio of sales in receivable in year t to 
the corresponding year (t-1). It estimates whether receivables, inventories and revenues of a 
firm have been used to manipulate earnings. A large increase in days in receivable could be 
as a result of changes in credit policies to increase sales. Unusual accumulation of 
receivables might also be associated with an increased likelihood that revenues and earnings 
have been inflated to improve the company’s profits. In the original Beneish model, 
companies that had not manipulated sales had a mean index of 1.031 while those that had 
manipulated sales had a mean of 1.465, which represents a 43 percent increase.  
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GMI defined as Gross Margin Index measures the ratio of gross margin at year t-1 to gross 
margin at year t. A value greater than 1 indicates that gross margin has deteriorated. A 
deterioration of gross margin provides a negative signal about the firm’s future prospects. 
The firm would be more likely or willing to engage in financial statement manipulation to 
either decrease the resulting losses through the drop of sales or create artificial profits for the 
corporation. According to the original Beneish model, non-manipulators had a mean of 1.014 
and manipulators had a mean of 1.193, which represents an increase of 18 percent. It is 
important to recognise that, this index does not clearly tell whether a company is engaging in 
earnings manipulation or not. It only serves this purpose in the context of the other indicators 
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of poor earnings quality entering the Beneish M-score.  It however measures the risk that a 
company when faced with some circumstances might be interested in earnings manipulation. 
However, when the index is relatively higher, the company can be thought of as already 
engaging in earnings manipulation.   
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AQI defined as Asset Quality Index is the ratio of non-current assets except property, plant 
and equipment (PPE) to total assets. It measures the proportion of total assets whose future 
benefits are potentially less certain. More generally it is the ratio of asset quality in year t 
relative to asset quality in year t-1. If asset quality index is greater than 1, it is indicative that 
the firm has potentially increased its involvement in cost deferral. According to the Beneish 
model, non manipulators had a mean of 1.039 while manipulators had a mean of 1.254.  
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SGI defined as Sales Growth Index is the ratio of sales in year t to sales in year t-1. The ratio 
assumes that growth firms have greater incentives to manipulate earnings in order to 
maintain the confidence of shareholders. It specifically assumes that a reduction in sales 
might have a negative impact on future share prices. Thus firms with sales decreases might 
manipulate earnings to influence future stock prices. An increase in the index reflects a rise 
in sales and a significant increase might be due to earnings manipulation. According to the 
Beneish model, the mean for non-manipulators was 1.134 while those for manipulators were 
1.607 representing an increase of 42 percent.  
SGI =  
1
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DEPI defined as a Depreciation Index measures the change in depreciation. It is the ratio of 
depreciation in year t-1 versus the corresponding depreciation in year t. A depreciation index 
greater than 1 indicates that the rate at which assets are depreciated has slowed down. This 
suggests that the company might have employed income-increasing methods to boast 
earnings.   
DEPI = 
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SGAI defined as Sales and General and Administrative Expenses Index is the ratio of selling, 
general and administrative expenses in year t to the ratio at t-1. The index assumes that 
analysts would recognise disproportionate increases in sales as a negative signal of a firm’s 
future prospects and might indicate the likelihood that firms might be tempted to manipulate 
earnings to either decrease losses or report a profit.  
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LVGI defined as Leverage Index is the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t relative to 
the firms corresponding ratio in year t-1. It generally measures the change in leverage. A 
value greater than 1 indicates an increase in leverage. The index captures debt covenant 
incentives for earnings manipulation. 
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TATA is defined as Total Accruals to Total Assets. Total accruals or its residual has been 
used previously to assess the extent to which the company makes discretionary accounting 
decisions to influence reported earnings. This index measures the amount of accounting 
earnings that has a cash basis. An increase in accruals might reflect the fact that management 
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is struggling to manipulate earnings through discretionary influences on accruals. Following 
the Beneish model, the index for non-manipulators was 0.018 and for manipulators it was 
0.031 representing an increase of 72 percent.  
 
TAT = (( Current∆ Assets t - ∆Cash) – (∆Current Liabilities) – (∆Current Maturities of 
LTD t ) – (∆ Income Tax Payable t ) - (Depreciation and Amortisation t ))/Total Assets t ------
-(3.17) 
The fraudulent manipulation of a company’s earnings can have far reaching repercussions 
on investors, analysts, regulators, government, the real economy and the company itself. 
All these stakeholders have used the M-Score to determine which firms have been fudging 
their numbers. The importance of the M-Score model is that it raises red flags of the 
potentials for financial statements fraud. It can also help companies take prompt actions 
before external stakeholders are aware of fraudulent actions. The M-Score have been used 
in chapter 4 for the robustness test using alternative definitions of earnings management 
and in chapter 5 to determine the probability of financial statements fraud.  
 
3.3.3: Estimating Forecast Errors. 
Following Richardson et al. (2004) the researcher proxied for earnings surprises using the 
degree of analyst’s earnings forecast errors defined here as the difference between the actual 
and the forecast earnings per share (EPS) scaled by the share price of the company. The 
forecast error of the accounting year-end is used. When a company reports their actual 
earnings per share, it can be higher than the consensus forecast estimate prior to the 
announcement of earnings (positive surprise), lower than the consensus forecast (negative 
surprise) or meet expectations (zero surprise). The research model recognises differences 
between large and small earnings surprises due to the degree of discretion and changes in 
economic fundamentals that have affected the value of the company. This has been defined 
here as management earnings target. However, following Beneish (2004), because of recent 
accounting scandals and regulatory changes, theoretical papers may suggest large earnings 
surprises are a function of earnings manipulation.  
 
FE ),( ti  =
t)(i,
t)i,(f,t)i,(a,
P
EPS - EPS
--------------------(3.18) 
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Where FE= Forecast Errors. 
EPS = Earnings Per Share. 
P = Share Prices. 
a= actual 
f= forecast.  
The absolute surprise needs to be scaled since absolute changes in EPS will depend in an 
arbitrary way on the absolute size of the EPS (Bulkley and Krassas, 2006). I therefore scale 
the changes in the EPS by the stock prices in order to obtain a measure of the relative size of 
the earnings surprise. The forecast error specifies whether analysts’ forecast of earnings do 
exhibit systematic optimism or pessimism and is used as a proxy for future earnings. There 
are several reasons why forecast error is of interest: Analysts' forecasts influence market 
expectations and share prices, as reported by Fried and Givoly (1982). They documented that 
analyst’s forecasts are more associated with market returns than time-series based forecasts. 
Secondly, analysts' forecasts have implications for disclosure policy as discussed in 
Crichfield et al. (1978). Forecast error is used in the thesis as a proxy for future earnings in 
chapter 4.  
 
3.3.4: Estimating Stock Returns. 
Stock returns are estimated as: 
Ret t  = 
1
1
−
−
−
t
tt
P
PP
------------------ (3.19) 
 
Where: 
Ret t  is the current period stock returns. 
P t  is the firm current stock price. 
P 1−t is the stock price for the prior period. 
i.e. dividend payment contribution to return is ignored. This is because; the theories suggest 
valuations are not influenced by dividend policy (e.g. Marton, 1998, Krishnamurthy, 2005). 
In addition, Krishnamurthy (2005) argued that historically dividends have not been 
important. Even for strategies based on dividend yields, the contribution of dividends to total 
returns has not been significant. 
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Absolute prices are scaled because they customarily depend on the absolute sizes of the stock 
prices. The scaling helps obtain a measure of the relative sizes of the stock return. It is 
important to note that a significant amount of market based accounting research has 
commonly used firm returns (both adjusted38 and unadjusted) as a stock market measure of 
firm performance. Some studies employ the use of trading volumes as a measure of a firm’s 
performance. In most of these studies, depending on the issues to be measured, various 
windows have been used pre and post earnings announcements, ranging from an hour after 
earnings announcements to up to 10 years (Marton, 1998). It is important to note that most 
event studies relate unexpected earnings to firm returns. Unlike the Ball and Brown (1968) 
study that employed an 18 months investigation window, most employ a shorter window.  
 
This study employs the Easton and Harris (1991) approach that measures returns on a 12 to 
15th month window, based on US data. The windows either end on the balance sheet date or 
three months after this date. The 12-Month windows are normally used to evaluate the 
valuation perspective those measures and matches periods of accounting returns and stock 
returns. The 15th month window is consistent with the information perspective, primarily 
because they encompass the time when accounting earnings have been known to different 
stakeholders in the stock market and are used to make investment decisions.  
 
This research follows most stock market research (see Watts and Zimmerman (1986), 
Marton, (1998)), were returns measured on the 12th and 15th month windows are defined as 
one-year ahead stock return. Prior research has recognised the difficulty in specifying which 
of the two window lengths is more theoretically correct (see Marton, 1998). The 12-Month 
return window covers both the period of the accounting return and the stock return. On the 
other hand, the 15th month return window covers three months after the accounting 
information has been released. The importance of the 15th month window is that it covers the 
time period where the information is made public. In this regards, the effect of the 
information on the stock return is assumed to be included in the model.  
 
                                                 
38 Stock returns may be adjusted for taxes to give the after-tax rate of return, for inflation to effectively 
indicate its true purchasing power value, for GAAP to account for differences between international financial 
reporting, for risk to isolate risk measures relating to each investment. 
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There are several technical advantages for using raw stock returns, as opposed to abnormal 
returns, that have become popular in market based accounting studies since the Ball and 
Brown (1968) seminal paper. The measure of abnormal returns is usually the absolute 
returns less the movements in the market index. However, the stock market index is 
customarily dominated by a handful of companies in the US. Additionally, some companies 
customarily experience volatility in their stock prices and this may have a significant 
influence on the index thereby influencing the final measure of abnormal returns (Marton, 
1998). Raw returns are additive across assets, it is therefore reasonable to use raw returns 
when going from individual assets to a portfolio of stocks like the S&P 50039.  Additionally, 
simple returns are also better understood by investors.  Estimates of forecast errors used as a 
proxy for firm earnings surprises.  
 
3.4: Summary. 
This section provides a detailed specification of what is actually done in the analysis and the 
various constructs and stipulations that have been employed. First, the section starts by 
presenting the main issues that have been investigated in the thesis. It is important to 
recognise that the main research issue has been discussed in two subsidiary sections to reflect 
the two main empirical essays that have been undertaken in the research. The second section 
presents an introduction of the sample construction, data sources including a description of 
the various databases that have been used for data collection. This is followed by a general 
discussion of the statistical analysis employed, which is largely defined by the models that 
have been used. Justifications are provided for the main variables employed in the thesis. 
The statistical analysis involving the determination of net insider trading, earnings 
management, estimates of forecast errors and stock returns have been inspired by core 
research traditions of market based accounting and empirical finance.  
 
As this research is focussed on two empirical essays, the models have been applied to suit 
the research issues to be investigated by the two essays. Net shares traded have been 
estimated using open market insider buy and sell trades. Open-market stock transactions 
prior literature assumes managers can either manage earnings using real and discretionary 
                                                 
39 One other method that can be used is log returns. Its advantage is that it permit us to see the relative 
changes in the variable and compare directly with other variables whose values may have very different base 
values. However, it is additive over time, with shorter periods the distribution will be long-tailed, but is often 
not far from symmetric. 
 102  
accrual techniques. However, academic, practitioner and the media have often given 
precedence to discretionary accruals as a form of earnings management as opposed to real 
earnings management. This research investigates earnings management using real (Gunny, 
2005, Roychowdhury, 2006) and discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995) techniques 
Moreover, it is important to identify firms that are fudging their numbers so that correction 
actions can be taken. It is in such vein that this model employs the Beneish M-Score that 
predicts financial statements distortions.  
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4.0: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Insider Trading and Earnings Management. 
4.1: Abstract. 
This Chapter examines the relationship between discretionary accruals and Insider trading 
and discusses how this relationship may have changed as a result of the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. This study investigates whether regulatory intervention 
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has influenced the quality of financial reporting (by 
reducing real and discretionary earnings management). Apart from examining if there have 
been changes in the quality of financial reporting pre and post the Sarbanes-Oxley period, 
the researcher investigates whether incentives to manage earnings are reflected in insider 
trading and if this incentive changed after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Chapter further 
addresses the informativeness of insider trading without the use of discretionary accruals. 
The researcher examines this relationship during the period 1997 to 2006 based on a sample 
of S&P 500 firms. The findings of this Chapter is important to regulators and other public 
and private bodies that are interested in evaluating improper conduct by corporate insiders in 
relation to price sensitive information.  
 
The results suggest that the quality of earnings has improved after the introduction of the 
SOX. Overall, insider trading predicts future returns and investors employ discretionary 
accruals to influence reported earnings. However, post SOX, investors discount the value of 
firms with abnormally high earnings management through negative stock price responses 
reflecting a sophisticated processing of accounting information. Additionally, even without 
the use of discretionary accruals, insiders do not trade based on the knowledge of future 
returns. Overall, the results suggest that market participants detect and react to insider trading 
and earnings management practices under an invigorated regulatory regime.  
 
4.2:Background. 
In the last three decades, there have been numerous articles evaluating the relationship 
between insider trading by managers in their corporation’s stock and company earnings. 
Most US studies have been focused on trading by top level executives defined by the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act as officers, directors, corporation’s vice presidents and owners 
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of more than 10 percent of the corporations stock40. There has been no shortage of evidence 
that top-level executives have the ability to influence reported earnings via implicit pressure 
placed on auditors as they are directly involved in the day-to-day management of the 
company and its earnings. Prohibition against insider trading and earnings management may 
involve significant potential costs to managers that customarily lead to a negative reputation, 
criminal charges, or lawsuits from outside investors (Park and Park, 2004). As a response to 
the financial scandals of the late 1990’s and early 2000, current reforms have reflected the 
responsibility of managers to improve the integrity and credibility of financial reporting.  
 
In the US, the SEC has the mandate to regulate insider trading and earnings management. 
Specifically, the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and its amendments have consistently 
imposed different restrictions on insider trading and earnings management. After a series of 
consultative meetings, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in October 2002, aimed at 
improving the integrity of financial statements and to weaken insider trading motivated by 
foreknowledge of price sensitive information. Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 requires insiders to accept responsibility for the integrity of financial statements and 
they are obliged to certify that financial statements are not misleading and fairly represent 
the company’s operations. Additionally, Section 16b of the Securities and Exchange Act 
requires all insiders to return to their corporation any capital gains made from a purchase or 
sale of their company’s stock if both transactions occur within a six-month period (habitually 
termed short swings profits). The short swing rule41 was implemented to prevent insiders, 
who have greater access to material non-public information, from taking advantage of such 
information for the purpose of making short-term profits. Apart from institutional regulations 
by the SEC, a significant number of US firms do impose trading restrictions on insiders 
(Bettis et al., 2000). The increased penalties imposed under successive regulations including 
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
                                                 
40 Though the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act defined a top level executive as either officers, directors, 
corporation’s vice presidents and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporations stock, extant research 
on insider trading and earnings management eliminates the 10 percent owners as they are not directly 
involved in the day to day management of the company. This is in line with current research in the UK 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2006) that suggests that, directors who are more familiar with the day-to-day operations of a 
company trade on more valuable information. In the US, Lin and Howe (1990) demonstrated that trades by 
chairmen, directors, officers-directors, and officers do contain more information than those of large 
shareholders. 
41 The short swing rule is the purchase (sale) and a subsequent sale (purchase) of a corporation stock within a 
six-month period. 
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Enforcement Act of 1988 justifies the importance of insider trading as a potential source of 
market manipulation. 
 
4.2.1: Related Literature and Hypothesis. 
This section of the research reviews prior literature that is specific to the first empirical 
chapter of the research. Specifically, it discusses theory relating to insider trading and 
earnings management in light of the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by SOX. 
Since the relationship between insider trading and earnings management is a very complex 
phenomenon, preliminary investigations have suggested that there are many potential 
explanations of the relationship between insider trading and earnings management. These 
suggest the need for competing theories. A series of these competing theories are discussed 
below. Reading through the various theories will help the researcher to identify theories and 
variables that may improve the explanatory power of the model that will be developed. 
However, in choosing variables from the literature in this area, an assumption is made that 
there is a positive relationship between insider trading and earnings management and that in 
light of the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 
this relationship has been suppressed.  The assertion that insider trading and earnings 
management are positively related seems to be critical and has been supported by recent 
empirical investigations (See Park and Park, (2004), Ke et al., (2003), Beneish and Vargus 
(2002)). 
 
A host of research papers have discussed insider trading’s relationship to earnings 
management. However, none of these papers have examined the policy implications. As 
earnings news and stock price changes are customarily positively related (Ball and Brown, 
1968) insiders with material information habitually act as informed traders. Their buying 
(selling) frequently preceeds stock price increases (decreases) (Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and 
Zaman (1998), Ke et al. (2003)). Insiders also sell shares after managing earnings (e.g., 
Bolton et al., 2002), and trade with information pertaining to a break in a string of 
consecutive earnings increases (Ke et al., 2003).  
 
Since securities law forbids trades whose incentives may be based on private information, an 
insider trade that is followed closely by potentially value-relevant earnings disclosures might 
give the appearance that the trade was based on foreknowledge of the soon-to-be disclosed 
 106  
information (Weber, 2005). It is in this light that Beneish et al., (2004) suggested the 
litigation avoidance hypothesis where insiders may sell shares and manage earnings to 
distance themselves from the trade. Additionally, Weber (2005) suggested that insiders 
manage earnings in order to distance their sales from negative earnings news hence avoiding 
the appearance of undertaking an illegal insider trade. Though these two hypotheses are 
different from standard economic theories, they suggest that the agency mechanisms and 
some insider trading laws restrict insiders from strategic, self-serving trades. It is in this light 
that recent insider trading laws have been strengthened due to persistent high profile business 
failures that often appear to demonstrate a relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management. Since the SEC scrutiny is focused on evidence of active strategies (Elliot et al., 
1984), insiders might be adopting a passive strategy, where they may be trading several 
quarters in advance to distance themselves from disciplinary concerns. As Hope (2003) 
suggested, strict insider trading laws may prevent managers from manipulating earnings for 
profit while trading in their corporation’s stock. 
 
Policy discussions of insider trading have sought to defend the suitability of regulation (see 
Fishman and Haggerty, 1992); the various strands of insider trading literatures have not 
provided clear evidence that such disciplinary actions do in reality deter insiders from trading 
in advance of reporting a company’s financial performance. Additionally, the level of 
regulatory commitment to enforce the enacted legislation on insider trading and earnings 
management can profoundly influence the behaviour of the informed agents (Bhattacharya 
and Daouk, 2002). Thus given the mixed motivations for the relationship between insider 
trading and earnings management in light of regulatory interventions, we expect the 
relationship between insider trades and earnings management to be different in stricter 
regulatory environments than when the regulations are less strict. This study broadly tests if 
current regulations have suppressed earnings manipulations (thereby improving the quality 
of earnings) which are motivated by a desire to profit from insider trading. The next section 
(4.2.2) presents the background of the policy literature, while the following section (4.2.3) 
presents the hypothesis for this first empirical chapter. 
 
4.2.2: Policy Dynamics and the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
Over the years, the SEC has implemented rules to ensure investor protection. After the 1987 
stock market crash in the US, the SEC responded to the violation of its existing insider 
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trading regulation by imposing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
(ITSFEA) of 1988 that raised the penalty of illegal insider trading to 1 Million dollars and 10 
years imprisonment (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Due to the recent string of corporate scandals 
(Enron, WorldCom, Adelphi, etc), insider trading rules have been strengthened both at the 
federal and company level. One of the most prominent of such rules has been the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of September 2002. The Act introduced new rules and revised existing legislation 
to facilitate investor protection. Among the issues legislated against is the controversial 
insider trading and earnings management relationship that has arguably impaired the 
integrity and trust of financial markets in financial statements. Since this study emphasises 
insider trading’s relationship to earnings management in the light of the implication of 
structural changes (specifically new insider trading and earnings management regulations), it 
is essential to elucidate these regulatory dynamics.  
 
In securities regulation, the legal prohibition of insider trading is somewhat new. Despite the 
fact that as far back as 1934, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 addressed several 
issues relating to the immoral aspect of insider trading, the regulatory authorities have 
infrequently penalised insiders in relation to illegal insider trading. Quite recently, the effects 
of different corporate scandals have influenced regulatory changes with insider trading and 
earnings management being a prime target for suppression. At the regulatory level, several 
structural changes have taken place that may have an impact on earnings management’s 
relationship with insider trading. The first structural change in recent times refers to the 
widely reported speech made on 9/28/1998 by the then SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt, and the 
second was the enactment of regulation FD on Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading 
which took effect from October 23, 2000 and finally, SOX of 2002.  
 
In his now familiar speech, “The Numbers Game” In 1998, at an address at New York 
University, Levitt recognised that there is; 
 
“A grey area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; 
and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying 
financial performance of the company”. 
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His speech further expressed concern on selective disclosure and insider trading as he said 
that; 
 
“Seven months ago, I expressed concerns about selective disclosure.  Through conference 
calls or embargoed press releases, analysts and institutional investors often hear about 
material news before it is made public.  In the interval, there is a great deal of unusual 
trading. The practice had been going on for a long time.  And, while everyone was aware of 
it, and most were extremely uncomfortable with it, few spoke out.  As the investor's advocate, 
the SEC did and we will continue to do so.” 
   
Following concerns raised by the SEC chairman (Arthur Levitt), the SEC issued Staff 
Accounting Bulletin (SAB) no. 99 in August 1999. Its main function was to provide 
guidance for preparers and independent auditors on evaluating the materiality of 
misstatements in the financial reporting and auditing processes. Furthermore, it aims to 
influence summarize and put certain GAAP and federal securities laws in perspective as they 
are related to the concept of materiality. In this case, the auditor can be alerted of financial 
fraud.  
 
Recent high profile business scandals and executive law suits involving companies like 
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Xerox, Qwest and so on have been based on 
the insider trading relationship to earnings management. The global operations of these 
multinational companies affected different economies and in effect there was the 
expectations that there will be direct lose not only for US investors but also for other 
international investors. These scandals involving major US corporations have greatly 
exposed major weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework of US and international 
institutions. In order to ensure that external investors are protected, securities law of not only 
the SEC but all major financial centres in the world were to ensure that the investing public 
had access to some agreed levels of disclosure in corporate accounts about financial 
performance.  
 
The second structural change is when the SEC further adopted new rules to solve problems 
relating to selective disclosure and insider trading42. The new rules were adopted and 
                                                 
42 Details of the new rules is available on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm 
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amended principally to address problems relating to the selective disclosure of material non-
public information by issuers and to clarify two issues that arise under the law of insider 
trading. Specifically, the new rules were regulation FD, Rule 10b5-1, and Rule 10b5-2.  
 
Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) implemented in October 2000 is a new requirement that 
addresses selective disclosure. Selective disclosure occurs when issuers release material non-
public information about a company to a selected group of persons, (such as securities 
analysts or institutional investors), who may well trade with this information before 
disclosing the information to the general public.  
 
Paragraph 1 of the regulation proposes that; 
 
“When an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material non-public information to 
certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the 
issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must make public 
disclosure of that information”.  
 
Rule 10b5-1 addresses the issue of when an insider trading liability arises in connection with 
a trader's "use" or "knowledge" of material non-public information. The rule posits that a 
trader trades on material non-public information when it purchases or sells securities when 
aware of that information. The rule further sets certain affirmative defences that protect 
individuals and entities in situations where material non-public information was not a factor 
in the trading decision since the trade was presumably carried out pursuant of a pre-existing 
contract, situation or a plan. Finally, rule 10b5-2 addresses the issue of when a breach of a 
family or other non-business relationship may give rise to a liability under the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading. Researchers have suggested a need for significant 
changes in insider trading laws and the strengthening of rules on earning management.  
Consequently, the SEC further adopted important affirmative defences from insider trading 
liability, which established that an insider trading liability may not arise from transactions 
that were planned before the time when an insider came into possession of material non-
public information.  
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After several consultations, there was the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Act was 
signed into law on 30th July 2002, and introduced highly significant legislative changes to 
financial practice and corporate governance regulation. Based on its stringent new rules, its 
stated objective as in page 1 was: 
 
"to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures 
made pursuant to the securities laws". 
 
Before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that came into effect from August 1st 2002, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission granted until the 10th of the month following the 
month in which insiders traded to report their transactions (See Fidrmuc et al., 2006). After 
the Act, insiders were required to electronically report their trades after their execution 
within two business days. Researchers who wish to decriminalise insider trading have argued 
that if the theory of market efficiency is to guide accurate pricing of securities, information 
about securities must circulate freely. In such a vein, profits from insider trading can be 
lower if the information about such dealings is quickly transmitted to the stock market. The 
limit of the time lag gives outsiders the possibility to mimic insider trades and also gain 
abnormal returns (Gelband, 2005). Section 302, of the Sarbanes Oxley Act further penalises 
earnings management where Chief Executive Officer(s) and the principal financial officer(s), 
or persons performing similar functions need to certify in each quarterly or annual report 
filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) that, the financial report does not 
contain any untrue statements of material facts, omissions, etc, under which such statements 
can be considered misleading and that they do fairly present the financial condition and 
results of operations for the reported periods; further, that financial reports do not contain 
material misrepresentations and are fairly represented, 
 
4.2.3: Formulation of Hypotheses. 
The empirical findings on the current Chapter will provide some evidence on the 
implications of SEC regulations and other securities laws for insider trading relationship to 
earnings management. From the theoretical review, the researcher found that responsive new 
regulations like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are geared towards countering deficiencies that have 
arguably impaired the integrity of financial markets.  
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As earnings news and stock prices are positively related (Ball and Brown, 1968), insiders 
ought in the absence of regulatory or institutional constraints buy (sell) more shares in 
periods where they expect to influence reported earnings through the use of positive 
(negative) discretionary accruals. Strict insider trading rules may have an impact on the way 
managers do exercise their knowledge of private information about future prospects. 
Furthermore, strict insider trading laws may prevent managers from manipulating earnings 
for profit while trading in their corporation’s stock (Hope, 2003). In a recent article by Betzer 
and Theissen (2004), the authors investigated the market reaction to trades in German firms 
by executives and non-executive directors. They concluded that the German market needs 
UK type regulation that prevents insiders from trading prior to earnings announcements. 
According to the authors, insider trading on inside information in Germany does benefit 
from informational advantages and so earn improved market returns as compared to trading 
by outsiders. The fact that insiders might employ discretionary accounting techniques to 
influence reported earnings after prior insider trading may raise serious concerns about the 
firm’s earnings quality. A string of recent articles have examined the impact of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 on earnings management43, but to the best of my knowledge, none of 
these articles have linked earnings management to insider trading.  
 
To accommodate the influence of strict regulatory regimes and recent corporate scandals on 
relationship between insider trading and earnings management, insiders may noticeably 
change the timing of their trades relative to the use of discretionary accrual techniques. This 
hypothesis can be tested empirically be examining the relationship between discretionary 
accruals (a discretionary decision by management) and net insider trades, to regulatory 
changes (a public event that is not discretionary by management).  
 
Following these concerns, I broadly test two main hypothesis: 
 
H1: The regulatory intervention (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) had an effect. 
1-To suppress earnings management thereby improving the quality of earnings. 
2-To suppress earnings management conditional on prior insider trades. 
 
                                                 
43 Cohen et al., (2004) find evidence that there is a decrease of earnings management after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. 
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The term suppression in this thesis specifically means reducing earnings management. 
Testing if the regulatory intervention had an effect would justify why there was a need for 
the strengthening of financial market regulation after recent corporate scandals. It is 
important to recall that, most executives of firms that were alleged to have abused the market 
e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Adelphi, etc were accused of insider trading and earnings 
management offences. This is because, the regulation was meant to reduce market abuse 
through insider trading and subsequent earnings manipulation.  
 
The incentive to either buy or sell shares may be remote and not necessarily related to the 
intention to manage earnings. As a result of changes in expectations about a firm’s future 
cash flows the signalling literature occasionally argues that if an insider believes that his 
shares have been overvalued (undervalued), he will sell (buy) them, and so signal the 
overvaluation of others. If trading by corporate insiders is informative about future earnings 
(e.g. on firms growth and future prospects), there should be no association between 
discretionary accruals and insider trading (Park and Park, 2004). Insiders might have 
superior knowledge over other market participants; and their buying (selling) will be based 
on the expectations of a positive (negative) earnings outcome without the use of 
discretionary accruals. This has been supported in recent research by Ke et al. (2003), who 
reported that insider trading might be associated with post transaction stock returns without 
the use of discretionary accruals. I therefore examine if insider transactions influence post 
transactions performance as measured by the firm’s stock returns. I therefore test the 
additional hypothesis that links insider trading to future earnings performance as follows: 
 
H2: Trading by corporate insiders is informative to future earnings performance. 
 
This section has presented the literature that is specific to insider trading and earnings 
management in light of the recent regulatory intervention. The main objective is to motivate 
and position this research, in relation to previous research on insider trading and the earnings 
management relationship. First, there is the review of the literature on insider trading and 
earnings management and secondly, there has been a review of the policy literature on 
insider trading and earnings management regulations which led to the enactment of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.This has guided the development of the hypothesis for the first 
empirical essay.  
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4.3: Sample and Research Design. 
This section presents research design issues for the first empirical chapter of the research.  
 
4.3.1: Sample Selection. 
The original sample is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 for the period 1997-2006. This 
makes 10 consecutive years, giving a total of 5000 firm years. To estimate earnings 
management, the researcher collected different accounting and insider trading data for the 
respective firms from the period 1997-2006.  
 
Insider-Trading data has been collected from two sources. Between the periods 1997-2000, 
the data has been collected from the US National Archives & Records Administration.  From 
2001-2006 the data has been collected from the Edgar filings compiled by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Nonetheless, all the data is a summary of filings in the SEC 
form 3, 4, and 5 by insiders to the Security and Exchange Commission and there are no 
differences in the data. The file summarises insider trading transactions in all publicly held 
firms. Accounting and stock price data have been collected from DATASTREAM to ensure 
data consistency.  
 
To remain in the sample a firm has to satisfy certain conditions. Firstly, it must have 
sufficient data to estimate discretionary accruals and data to compute net shares traded. 
Consistent with prior research (see Jenkins et al., 2006), financial institutions are excluded 
due to their complex reporting regime, leaving the sample with 411 firms and 4110 firm 
years. Firms with less than 7 observations in the 2 digit SIC codes are deleted43, this leaves 
the sample with 364 firms and 3640 firm years. Firms with the necessary accounting data to 
estimate the discretionary accruals and real earnings management amounted to 3528 firm 
years and 358 firms. Since the analysis is restricted to open market transactions44, firms must 
have disclosed open market insider trading information during the accounting periods that 
                                                 
43 This is a slight departure from the prior papers (Jenkins et al. 2006) as most researchers do employ at least 
10 observations. However, only one group of firm fell under this group and my sample size would have been 
greatly reduced if I did not limit my selection criteria to at least 7 observations. 
 
44 The information content of some transactions are habitually low and are customarily eliminated in research 
relating to the information content of open market insider trades. Sales after the exercise of options are likely 
to be related to the remuneration packages of directors rather than any sort of market information (Fidrmuc et 
al., 2006). 
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satisfy the definition for determining net insider trading. Insider trades are matched with 
fiscal years by the transaction date reported to the SEC. For every firm and on every fiscal 
year, the researcher computed the net number of insider transactions. The researcher further 
matches these net transactions to discretionary accruals, total accruals and other proxies like 
firm returns to address different research issues. To eliminate the effects of differences for 
firms that do not appear consistently over the period, I require a constant sample of firms that 
exists in the pre and post SOX period45. The final sample involves an unbalanced sample of 
firm years covering the period of analysis. 
 
Several reasons do account for why the researcher aggregated the data for firm years (not 
firm-quarters). Firstly, the sample would have been greatly reduced given the time series 
data requirements to estimate earnings management. Secondly, most firms do not disclose all 
accounting data in specific quarters. Thirdly, the researcher found that there was scarcity of 
disclosure of insider trading for most firms in most months in different accounting periods, 
and finally, the research aims to identify the impact of regulatory dynamics (SOX) on insider 
trading and earnings management.  
 
4.4: Measurement of variables. 
The test uses estimates of net shares traded, earnings management using real and 
discretionary accounting techniques, earnings management based on the probability of 
financial statements manipulation as measured by the Beneish M-Score, estimates of forecast 
errors and stock returns. This is covered in detail in Section 3.3. 
 
4.5: Empirical Results. 
I commence by reporting the descriptive evidence on each of my hypotheses after which I 
provide formal statistical tests of my predictions using regression analysis. After the 
presentation of the descriptive evidence, the main empirical investigation employing 
regression analysis commences by testing the relationship between discretionary accruals 
and prior insider trading. To specifically answer the research question, the researcher asks 
whether incentives to manage earnings are motivated by prior insider trading more in the 
                                                 
45 A similar technique was adopted by Jenkins et al., (2006), who argued that, the benefits of eliminating 
potential volatility of the data caused by the introduction of new firms and the introduction of survivorship 
bias outweighs the costs. 
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overall sample period or in the post SOX period, using interactive variables. The researcher 
then tests the relationship between insider trading and future stock returns. This is because 
the timing behaviour argues that managers might strategically choose when they trade to 
either benefit from prior insider trades or distance themselves from their trades. In the next 
sub-section, the researcher investigates information motivated insider trading without the use 
of discretionary accruals and with the use of discretionary accruals post SOX. Since earnings 
management and insider trading are jointly determined, potential problems of endogeneity 
exist. This two-way causality chain is resolved by employing the 2 stage least squares. As a 
robustness check, the researcher adjusts the model using alternative definitions of earnings 
management.  
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Table 7 Panel A and B present’s descriptive statistics for the entire sample firm years, 
the pre SOX era and the Post SOX era respectively. As in table 7 panel A, the sample 
firms mean (median) values of discretionary and total accruals are respectively –
01.2100 (-0.41) and –5.3850 (-4.7640) percent of lagged total assets. Consistent with 
previous research (Sloan, 1996 and Bradshaw et al., 2001), this establishes that 
accounting accruals is habitually income decreasing primarily due to non-current 
accruals for depreciation and amortization. I document that analysts are optimistic 
judging from the realised mean forecast error of 2.45%. However, their median forecast 
error is negative (-4.31%).  Results for the Pre and Post SOX periods are similar where 
accounting accruals are primarily income decreasing. Insiders in the overall sample 
period and the pre SOX period are mostly net sellers of the corporations stocks judging 
from realised mean net shares traded of -0.0012 and -0.0075. However, in the post SOX 
period, insiders are mostly net buyers of their stock judging from the mean net shares 
traded of 0.0022 (see table 7 Panel B). The difference in mean of the net shares traded 
between the Pre and Post SOX era is 0.0096 and the t-stats is -4.18.  This might be as a 
result of the increasing confidence in the financial market after the recent corporate 
reforms for the US stock market.  
 
As in Figure 3, the highest amount of discretionary and total accruals was realised 
during the period of 2000 and 2002. Like total accruals, the magnitude of the 
discretionary accruals metric which proxies for the discretion managers use to achieve 
their financial reporting objectives systematically reduces after its peak of 2000-2002, 
the period of the intense corporate scandals. The effect of the period of the late 1990’s 
in magnifying earnings management cannot be underestimated. In fact, it might be 
viewed a what led to the corporate scandals of the period 1999-2002. This is because, 
during this period as many firms were making significant profits, managers of rival 
firms were facing huge pressure to improve their own performance. When this is 
followed by systematic structural changes like the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
of 2002, they have the potential to mitigate earnings management. On average, I found 
that discretionary accruals under the modified Jones Model reduced from the pre 
Sarbanes-Oxley value of -2.2000 percent of total assets to the post Sarbanes-Oxley 
value of -0.2200 percent of total assets. The difference of mean between these periods is 
statistically significant and is -0.0193 with t stats of -5.1000.  The Non-Discretionary 
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estimates suggest that in the pre SOX era firms employ negative non discretionary 
accruals of -0.0421 and in the post SOX era of -0.0401. The difference of mean 
between the Pre and Post SOX period is -0.0022 and t-statistics of -0.8200. In the Pre 
(Post) SOX era, the M-Score is -3.0900 (-3.2941) suggesting that overall, the 
probability of earnings manipulation is low.  The difference in mean is 0.2044 and the t 
stat is 4.19. The net income in the Pre (Post) SOX period is 0.0582 (0.0628) suggesting 
that firms are more likely to be profitable before the SOX era. The difference in mean is 
-0.0045 and the t stat are -0.90. The annual returns in the Pre (Post) SOX era is 0.2255 
(0.1414) suggesting that in both period, investments are more likely to be profitable. 
The differences in mean between the Post and Pre SOX period is 0.0842 and the t-stats 
is 4.58. The net shares traded for the Pre SOX period is -0.0075 suggesting that insiders 
are more likely to be net sellers before the passage of the SOX Act, however, in the Post 
SOX period, the net shares traded is 0.0022 suggesting that after the SOX period, 
insiders are more likely to be net buyers. The differences in mean between the Post and 
Pre SOX period is 0.0096 and the t stat is -4.18.  
 
Plot of Figure 2 support this assertion that in the Post SOX era, firms are less likely to 
use discretionary and total accruals to boast reported earnings. The observed earnings 
pattern suggests that there has been a reduction in the use of discretionary accruals after 
the period of intensive corporate scandals in the United States. The results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that earnings management has been suppressed in recent times, 
especially after the corporate scandals of 2001 and the enactment of the SOX. Finally, 
the sample firms have mean and median total assets averaging 30694583 (7138787), an 
average market-to-book ratio of 4.7940 (3.1000) and leverage of 1.0209 (0.9875) in the 
overall sample period. 
 
4.5.1: Correlation Between Variables. 
Table 8-Panel A: Correlation for the Overall Sample Period (Pearson 
Correlation are Shown Above the Diagonal with Spearman Below the 
Diagonal). 
This is the correlation Table pooled for the entire sample over the period 1997-2006. 
Correlations that are significant at the 5 percent levels are marked in bold and variable 
descriptions are provided below. Each cell contains the Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
coefficients with the P-Values in parenthesis. There are several technical reasons why 
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the Pearson and Spearman Rank correlations are included. Firstly, it helps the 
researcher investigates if the data is normally distributed and secondly if there may be 
multicollinearity between the independent variables. 
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Table 8 Panel A presents the correlations coefficients (p-value in parentheses) of the 
dependent and the independent variables. Consistent to Sloan (1996), discretionary accruals 
are positively correlated to net income and are significant at the 5 percent level (Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.073 (0.016) and p-value of 0.0071 (0.005)). This is 
consistent to our expectations that firms that employ positive (negative) discretionary 
accruals to report favourable (unfavourable) earnings have high (low) accounting income at 
the end of the accounting period.  Annual returns are also highly correlated to the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.1190 (0.0210) and p 
value of 0.0000 (0.0041)). One interpretation of this might be that investors do not realise the 
impact of discretionary accruals sufficiently early to discount the stocks of the firm leading 
to lower returns.  
 
I also noted the positive correlation between discretionary accruals and prior year net shares 
traded (Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.077 (0.225) with a p value of 0.004 
(0.000)). These suggest that net buying (selling) firms usually have positive (negative) 
discretionary accruals. Firm size is highly correlated with net income but the spearman rank 
correlation result is slightly insignificant (Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 
0.060 (0.009) and p-values of 0.025 (0.100)). The market to book ratio is negatively 
correlated to discretionary accruals however, the spearman rank values is positive (Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficient of -0.036 (0.028) and p-values of 0.051(0.183)). The 
interpretation of the Pearson value suggest that firms with more growth prospects are more 
likely to manage earnings unlike firms without growth prospects.  The relationship between 
market and book ratio and net income is negative, suggesting that firms with more growth 
prospects are more likely to invest their earnings than those without growth prospects 
(Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of-0.132 (-0.004) and p values of 0.000 (0.000). 
The change in sign might be due to the effect of outliers. 
 
The correlation between market to book ratio and leverage is negative, which suggest that 
firms with more growth prospects are more likely  to have more debts than firms with less 
growth prospects (correlation coefficient of -0.050 (-0.149) and p values of 0.016 (0.000). 
The relationship between leverage and annual returns is negative, which suggests that firms 
with more debts are more likely to have their stock prices discounted by investors unlike 
firms with less debts (Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of -0.142 (-0.004) and p 
value of 0.000 (0.000).  
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The correlation coefficients for the pre and post SOX era are reported in panel b and c of 
Table 8. In the pre SOX era, the correlation results are very similar to those of the overall 
sample period. Specifically, I found a positive and significant correlation between 
discretionary accruals and net income, discretionary accruals and stock returns, and 
discretionary and net shares traded. However, in the post SOX period, the relationship 
between discretionary accruals and net income is insignificant (Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation coefficient of 0.012 (0.032) and p-value of 0.767 (0.148)). This suggests that 
discretionary accruals do not directly influence net income after the introduction of SOX. 
The correlation between market to book ratio and leverage in the pre (post) SOX period is 
negative and significant (Pearson (Spearman) correlation of –0.009 (0.214) and the 
respective P values are significant at the 5 percent level. However, the Pearson (spearman) 
correlation of -0.008 (-0.085) in the post SOX period is also negative but the relationship is 
insignificant at the 5 percent level for the Pearson correlation coefficient. The results overall 
suggests that in the pre and post SOX period, firms with more growth prospects are more 
likely to manage earnings. In the pre SOX period, the Pearson (Spearman) rank correlation 
of net shares traded and discretionary accruals is positive and is respectively 0.051 (0.223) 
and both results are significant at the 5 percent level. In the post SOX period, the relationship 
is also positive (Spearman and Pearson correlation is respectively 0.136 and 0.212) and 
significant at the 5 percent level.  The implications are that firms that are more likely to be 
net sellers (buyers) of their corporations stocks are more likely to use negative (positive) 
discretionary accruals to influence their results in both the pre and post SOX period. 
 
4.5.2: Evidence Based on Regression Analysis. 
In this section, I provide statistical tests of several predictions using regression analysis.  
 
4.5.2.1: Test of the Relationship Between Discretionary Accruals and Prior 
Insider Trading. 
My main hypothesis investigates if the regulatory intervention has suppressed earnings 
manipulation motivated by a desire to profit from prior insider trading. In this section, I 
examine the relationship between current period discretionary accruals and prior insider 
trading (as determined by the net shares traded) after controlling for other relevant factors 
that might influence discretionary accruals. My main focus is to investigate whether 
incentives to manage earnings have declined following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. Drawing on prior literature, the relationship between discretionary management 
of earnings and prior insider trading can be explained in two ways. Firstly, managers actively 
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involved in trading might be deliberately manipulating future period earnings to benefit from 
prior insider trades46. The second possibility is that they might be motivated to manage 
earnings due to other earnings management incentives. In an effort to investigate the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and prior insider trading, I regress discretionary 
accruals on prior insider trades and other variables based on the following regression 
equation:  
 
DA ti, =α 0 +β1*(NST ti, )+β 2 *(NST ti, *SOX t )+β 3 *(SOX t )+β 4 *(FRET ti, )+β 5*(FRET* 
SOX t )+β 6*( SIZE ti, ) + β 7 *( LEV ti, )+ 8β *( MTB ti, )  + e ti, ....................(3.20). 
 
The variables NST ti, and NST ti, * SOX tmeasures respectively the impact of prior year net 
shares traded on current discretionary accruals and the impact of prior net shares traded in 
the post SOX period on current period discretionary accruals. To control for variables that 
have been identified in previous studies which are likely to affect the reporting of 
discretionary accruals and therefore the observed earnings patterns, I include other variables 
in the regressions. I include the firm’s book-to-market ratios, firm’s size and leverage 
factors. Low book-to-market ratios corporations, for example, are particularly sensitive to 
fluctuations in earnings (see Skinner and Sloan, 2002) while size and leverage are also 
related to earnings management and are habitually related to debt contracting motivations for 
earnings management (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, Klein 2002). Due to manager’s 
interest in avoiding debt covenant violations, there may be a positive association between 
leverage and income increasing accounting choices (Young, 1999). I include the SOX 
variable to control for the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the use of 
discretionary accruals to benefit from trading in their corporations stocks. I additionally 
examine whether executives with incentives to manage earnings do manage earnings more 
before SOX and whether those firms engage in less earnings management after the SOX. 
Cohen et al. (2004) examined earnings management pre and post the SOX period and found 
that earnings management decreased after the implementation of the SOX. However, I 
examined if this change is due to firm specific insider trading incentives. I report the results 
in panel A table 9.   
 
                                                 
46 In a seminal article by Beneish et al., (2004), he argued that managers employ higher discretionary accruals 
to benefit from prior insider trading. 
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The results reported in table 9 Panel A suggest a negative and insignificant relationship 
between the interactive variable NST ti, *SOX t and DA (coefficient of -0.0426 and t-stats of -
0.39) suggesting that in the post SOX period, insiders trade in their corporation’s stocks is 
negatively but insignificantly related to future discretionary accruals. However, the 
interactive variable between future returns and SOX (FRET ti, * SOX t ) is negative with a 
statistical significance (coefficient of -0.4525 and t statistics of -2.09) suggesting that when 
managers employ discretionary accruals to influence future returns, investors are quick to 
recognize this and discount the stocks of these companies leading to negative stock returns. 
The NST variable suggest that insiders trade and manage earnings overall, however the 
result of statistically insignificant (coefficient of 0.0592 and t stats of 0.76). The coefficient 
for the size variable is -1.6730 and the t statistics is -2.09 which suggest that the larger the 
size of a firm, the less likely the firm is going to manage earnings. One reason for this is 
because larger firms are followed more by analysts and other stakeholders including the 
media than smaller firms as such; they are less likely to manage earnings as this can be easily 
picked up leading to stock price declines. The LEV variable has a coefficient of 0.0051 and a 
t stats of 2.85 which suggest that firms with more debts are likely to manage earnings overall 
than those with less debts. This is in line with the debt covenants motivations for earnings 
management (De Fond and Jiambalvo, 1991). The argument by De Fond and Jiambalvo is 
that firms that violate their debt covenant obligations might incur large re-contracting cost, as 
such are motivated to overstate earnings.  The market to book ratio suggest a negative 
coefficient that is statistically significant  (coefficient of -0.0007 and t-stats of -4.06) 
suggesting that the more impressive the growth prospects a firm has, the less likely it is 
going to use discretionary accruals to report favorable earnings. This might be as a result of 
fear that the firm is more likely going to be discounted by the stock market.   
 
4.5.2.2: Test For the Relationship Between Insider Trading and Future 
Discretionary Accruals/Stock Returns. 
Managers might actively employ a timing behavior where they strategically choose where 
and when they trade and manage earnings to either benefit from prior trades or distance 
themselves from their trades. Beneish et al. (2004) in their litigation avoidance hypothesis 
provide evidence that managers manage earnings upwards after they have engaged in 
abnormally high levels of insider selling. If this is true, then insiders might be thought of as 
habitually using income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals to distance 
themselves from a prior net buy (sale) of their corporation’s stocks. In this section, I 
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investigate the relationship between current net shares traded and subsequent discretionary 
accruals. I also control for variables that have been found in prior studies to affect prior 
discretionary accruals. I report the results in panel B Table 9 with the tests based on the 
following regression:  
 
NST ti, =α 0 +β 1*(DA 1, +ti )+β 2 *( DA 1, +ti * SOX t )+β 3 *(FRET 1, +ti )+ 
β 4 *(FRET 1+it *SOX t )+β 5*(SOX t )+ 6β *(SIZE i 1−t )+ 7β *(LEV i 1−t )+ 8β *(MTB i 1−t )+e it ....
........(3.21). 
 
The coefficient on DA 1, +ti  is supposed to be positive if manager’s prior insider purchases 
(sales) are followed by positive (negative) discretionary accruals to distance themselves from 
their prior insider trading. In the discretionary accruals equation (See table 9 Panel B), the 
coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient of 0.0182 and t-statistics of 2.7051) 
indicating that managers time their trade and employ discretionary accruals in the subsequent 
periods to distance themselves from it. However, in the post SOX period, this relationship is 
insignificant though positive as captured by the coefficient on DA 1, +ti *SOX t  (coefficient of 
0.0039 and t-statistics of 0.37). I additionally investigated the timing explanation as 
discussed in prior studies (Ke et al., (2003), Rozeff and Zaman, (1998)) and found that in 
their overall sample period insiders time their trade to benefit from post transaction stock 
returns. This indication is from the fact that the coefficient on FRET t  is positive and 
significant (coefficient of 0.0624 and t-statistics of 2.53). However, I do not find that insider 
can time their trades in the post SOX period to benefit from prior insider trading. The 
coefficient on FRET 1+it *SOX t  is positive and insignificant (coefficient of 0.0543 and t-
statistics of 0.74). The coefficient on SOX is positive and significant (coefficient 0.0046 and 
t stats of 3.67) suggesting that insiders are mostly net buyers of their stock in the post SOX 
period. The coefficient on size is positive but statistically weak and insignificant (coefficient 
of 0.0000 and t stats of 0.85), suggesting that insiders of large firms are more likely to buy 
shares. The coefficient on Leverage is positive and significant  (coefficient of 0.0038 and t 
stats of 2.12) which suggests that insiders of highly levered firms are more likely to buy 
shares. Though this is contrary to my expectation, the implication might be that such insiders 
are trading on the shares to give the impression that despite the firms debt, all is going on 
well with the company. The coefficient on market to book ratio suggest that insiders of firms 
that have more growht prospects are prone to selling their shares. However, this coefficient is 
weak and statistically insinificant (coefficient of -0.0038 and t statistics of -1.18). 
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4.5.2.3: Test for Information Motivated Insider Trading. 
In this section, I investigate information motivated insider trading: (1) without the use of 
discretionary accruals, assuming insiders are mainly employing an opportunistic trading 
strategy (2) with the use of discretionary accruals assuming insiders manage earnings to 
benefit from future insider transactions. I report the results in Panel C table 9. As discussed 
in the literature, some insider trading might be information related and discretionary accruals 
might not be associated with prior net shares traded. Managers who have private information 
relating to their expectations of the firm’s future performance might trade on such a basis 
without necessarily manipulating earnings. Post transactions stock returns, used as a proxy 
for firm’s future prospects might be associated with prior insider trading (See, Ke et al., 
2003, Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). As discussed 
in Seyhun (1998), the stock price reactions after insider transactions might continue for up to 
12 months after the earnings announcements. In an effort to examine the strength of the 
returns/insider trading and earnings management relationship, I regress stock returns on 
insider trading, discretionary accruals and explanatory variables in the following model. The 
regression equation used is: 
 
FRET ti, =α 0 +β1*(DA i 1−t )+β 2 *(DA i 1−t * SOX t )+β 3*(SOX t )+β 4 *(NST ti, )+ 
β 5*( NST ti, * SOX t )+ 6β *(SIZE 1−t )+ 7β *(LEV i 1−t )+ 8β *(MTB i 1−t ) + e.........(3.22). 
 
The results reported in Table 10 Panel C for the coefficient of DA i suggest a positive and 
significant relationship between prior year discretionary accruals and future stock returns 
(coefficient of 0.0241 and t-statistics of 3.16) suggesting that discretionary accruals boost 
earnings and in the sample period, the stock market does not capture this in its valuation of 
companies. This is the same with the net shares traded that predicts future returns quite well 
(coefficient of 0.0585 and t stats of 3.19). However, when this relationship is evaluated in the 
post SOX period, the relationship becomes insignificant as both discretionary accruals 
(coefficient of -0.0033 and t stats of -0.41) and net shares traded (coefficient of -0.0405 and t 
stats of -1.51) are negatively and insignificantly related to future stock returns. The 
coefficient on SOX is positive and significant suggesting that firm returns increases in the 
post SOX period. This might be due to increased confidence in the stock market after stricter 
regulations as a result of the corporate scandals involving Enron and WorldCom (coefficient 
of 0.0034 and t statistics of 3.60). The coefficient on size is weak, negative and statistically 
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insignificant (coefficient of -0.0000 and t stats of -0.20) suggesting that smaller firms are 
more likely to have a positive returns. The LEV variables suggested that the higher a 
company’s debt, the more likely its returns would increase (the coefficient of 0.0036 and t 
statistics of 2.62). This result is surprising and suggests that investors do not monitor the total 
amount of debt in a company’s balance. The coefficient on market to book is very weak and 
statistically insignificant (coefficient of -0.0000 and t statistics of -0.51) which suggest that 
firms with more growth prospects are likely to have negative returns.  
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4.5.2.4: Test for the Causal Relationship between insider trading and Earnings 
Management Using Two-Stage Least Square. 
Theoretical arguments suggest that the relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management might be jointly determined. One strand of literature suggests the pump-and-dump 
hypothesis, where managers might adjust current period discretionary accruals to benefit from 
insider sales (Park and Park, 2004) or manage earnings prior to insider sales (Bolton et al., 
2002). The other strand suggests that managers might manage earnings prior to insider trading, 
trading ahead based on earnings expectations (Ke et al., 2003) or to avoid litigation (Beneish et 
al., 2004). The joint determination between insider trading and earnings management suggests a 
simultaneous equation specification and that they are endogenous variables. The Hausman 
specification error tests can be used to test for simultaneity. It is important to note that, a test for 
simultaneity is essentially a test of whether an endogenous regressor is correlated with the error 
term (Gujarati, 1995). Following these, I regress DA on endogenous variables. I further regress 
net shares traded on estimated DA and the residuals generated from the previous regression. As 
suggested by Hausman (1976), since the error term is statistically significant in the second 
regression (coefficient of -0.0318 and t-stats of -2.8401) I do not reject the hypothesis of 
simultaneity.  
 
As a result of the correlation between the stochastic disturbance term and the endogenous 
variable, the OLS estimation might not be appropriate for the estimation of just one equation in a 
system of simultaneous equation. In the presence of simultaneity problems, the 2 stage least 
squares estimation will give estimators that are consistent and efficient (Gujarati, 1995). As 
discussed above and specified in equations 3.23 and 3.24, both DA it  and NST it  are endogenous 
variables. The variables SOX t , FRET t , SIZE t , LEV t and MTB t  are endogenous variables. After 
having checked and confirmed the presence of simultaneity using the Hausman specification 
error test as discussed in the prior paragraph, we implement the two stage least squares 
technique. Theoretically, we can implement the OLS to equation 3.24, but the obtained estimates 
will be inconsistent as a result of the likely correlation between the explanatory variable DA it   
and the error term in the equation. In such vein, to purify the stochastic explanatory variable 
DA it of the perceived influence of the disturbance (or the error term), the test finds a proxy for 
the explanatory variable DA it  such that, although it resembles DA it , it is uncorrelated with the 
error term.  
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To find this proxy, I first regress DA it  on the endogenous variables specified above. This is 
mainly a reduced form coefficient of equation 3.23 as only the endogenous variables  appear on 
the right hand side of the equation 24. Equation 3.23 can now be effectively expressed as: 
 
DA ti, =α 0
∧
DA ti,  +
∧
e ti, ..................(3.23 Sub). 
 
As in Gujarati (1995), the stochastic DA ti, consists of two parts, which are a linear combination 
of the non-stochastic endogenous variables and random component 
∧
e ti, . According to the OLS 
theory, 
∧
DA ti,  and 
∧
e ti, are uncorrelated.  
 
To illustrate further, in the first step, we regress the endogenous variables on all the 
predetermined variables in the system. In stage 2, we replace the endogenous variables in the 
original equations by their estimated values that were acquired from the preceding two 
regressions and run the OLS regression as in equations 3.23 and 3.24 discussed below.  
 
This study therefore employs the two-stage least square approach of the form:   
 
DA ti, =α 0 +β1*(NST ti, )+β 2 *(NST ti, *SOX ti, )+β 3*(SOX ti, )+β 4 *(FRET ti, )+β 5*(FRET*SOX
ti, )+β 6*( SIZE ti, ) + β 7 *( LEV ti, )+ 8β *( MTB ti, )  + e ti, ..................(3.23). 
 
NST ti, =α 0 +β 1*(DA i 1−t )+β 2 *(DA i 1−t *SOX ti, )+β 3*(FRET 1+it )+ 
β 4 *(FRET 1+it *SOX ti, )+β 5*(SOX)+ 6β *(SIZE i 1−t )+ 7β *(LEV i 1−t )+ 8β *(MTB i 1−t )+ 
e it ................(3.24). 
 
DA it = firms i discretionary accruals at period t immediately after insider transactions in the prior 
period, NST it  is the net shares traded accumulated over the year, NST it *SOX it  is an interactive 
variable that captures the impact of post SOX net shares traded on future discretionary accruals, 
SOX it  is a variable set equal to 1 if the firm year is in the post Sarbanes-Oxley period and zero 
otherwise, FRET it  is the firm’s one year ahead stock returns after the period of insider trading or 
                                                 
24 DA ti, =α 0 +β 1*(SOX)+β 2 *(FRET ti, )+β 3 *(SIZE ti, )+β 4 *(LEV)+β 5 *(MTB)+ + e ti, . 
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discretionary accruals, FRET it *SOX it  is an interactive variable that measures the influences of 
post SOX firms returns on the dependent variable, SIZE it  is the firm’s total assets employed as a 
proxy for firm size, LEV it  which is leverage is the firm’s total liabilities over the total assets, 
MTB it  is the firm’s market to book ratios.  
 
The variable FRET it  is included because prior research has suggested that current period returns 
can be influenced by prior discretionary accruals and that insider trading is associated with the 
firm’s future prospects proxy for post transactions stock returns (Ke et al., 2003). The variable 
MTB it  controls for the impact of growth prospects on the use of discretionary accruals in table 
11 Panel A and on insider trading on table 11 Panel b, the variable LEV it  is leverage that 
controls for debt covenants influence to earnings management, and SIZE it  proxy with total assets 
control for the impact of size on earnings management practices and insider trading.  
 
Table 10 reports the regression results of the 2 stage least squares. As discussed above, the test 
here have look for a proxy for the explanatory variable DA it . After estimating this DA it  proxy 
following the specifications above, I have trimmed the sample for outliers causing the sample to 
reduce slightly from 3212 firm years to 3204 firm years. Outliers here have been defined here 
following the Easton and Harris (1991) study as 1.5 standard deviations to the mean. This 
technique was adopted following Marton (1998) who argued that the test will help existing 
structures in the data to be easily discovered and picked out. In Panel A, the dependent variable 
is the discretionary accruals and in Panel B, the dependent variable is the net shares traded. The 
coefficient of NST it in the discretionary accruals equation is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level (coefficient of 0.6800 and t-stats of 2.89) suggesting that insiders manage earnings 
after insider transactions. However, the coefficient of NST it *SOX itwhich is another key variable 
of interest is negative and significant suggesting that, when insiders manage earnings in the post 
SOX period after prior insider trading, they do so to distance themselves from the trade. The 
coefficient on SIZE it  is positive and significant (coefficient of 0.0391 and t-stats of 2.08). The 
coefficient on LEV it  is positive and significant suggesting that firms with large debts are more 
likely to manage earnings to meet debt covenant obligations than firms with fewer debts 
(coefficient of 0.3120 and t-statistics of 3.58). In the net shares traded equation reported in panel 
b, Table 5 below, the coefficient of DA is positive and significant. This suggests that firms that 
have net buying (selling) firm employ positive (negative) discretionary accruals. However, the 
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coefficient on DA it *SOX it  is positive but insignificant suggesting that managers do not time 
their trades and employ discretionary accruals to benefit from it in the post SOX period. The 
coefficient on FRET it  is positive and significant suggesting that prior insider trading is relating 
to future firm performance as proxy by stock returns (coefficient of 0.1040 and t-statistics 8.02). 
The coefficient of FRET it *SOX it  is negative and significant suggesting that managers are 
unable to time their trades in the post SOX period to benefit from prior insider trading 
(coefficient of -0.0610 and t statistics of -6.64).  
 
Overall, the results using the 2 stage least square follows a similar pattern to that observed in the 
main hypothesis. Specifically, results for the Post SOX era suggest that insider trades does not 
significantly relate to firm performance. Also, discretionary accruals are not employed to boost 
firms earnings post SOX after insider trading. Combining the findings of the main hypothesis 
and the 2 stage least squares, the testable implications are that greater control of financial 
markets through stricter regulations will lead to controlled market behavior and less market 
abuse.  The result for the Post SOX era also amplify the result of previously documented trading 
strategies using samples only in a normal business climate without substantial market abuse and 
changes in regulations (e.g. Ke et al., 2003, Beneish and Vargus, 2002, 2004, Park and Park, 
2004) that investors can exploit knowledge earnings management and insider trading and make 
significant profit. In fact, Beneish and Vargus (2002) show that during periods when accruals are 
high, insiders are more likely to sell unusually high amounts of their shares and that period of 
high accruals accompanied by high insider sales are customarily following by low stock returns. 
However, when the regulations are tightened, this might not be possible as managers would be 
less likely to influence the quality of earnings. 
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4.5.2.5: Robustness Tests: Using Alternative Definition of Earnings 
Management. 
Although the modified Jones model has been quite popular in previous earnings management 
research, the model also has problems separating earnings management from the effects of 
real financial decision and changing economic conditions (e.g. inventory build up). 
Additionally, few firms have sufficiently long time series of data to permit reliable 
estimation of the discretionary component of accruals. In contrast to accruals earnings 
management, real earnings management can be achieved by changing the firms underlying 
operations (cut in prices to improve sales, asset sales to improve profits, reduction in R&D 
expenditures, etc). The implications are that there can be erroneous interpretation of the 
results and due to the interaction of real and discretionary accruals variables used in the 
modified Jones (1991) model, without separation, the results might be of low power. 
 
To check the robustness of my empirical results, I conduct additional tests using alternative 
definitions of earnings management. They include real earnings management through 
changes in discretionary expenses as discussed by Roychowdhury, (2006), and the rank 
variable model using the M-Score (Beneish, 1997, 1999). The use of the M-Score as a proxy 
for earnings management is a slight departure from previous studies. The M-Score (a Rank 
Variable) focuses on financial statement distortions and conditions that suggest earnings 
management. Using these alternative definitions of earnings management facilitates a more 
effective comparison of the results of this study with alternative models that employ other 
earnings management proxies. It also helps the researcher see if the results reported earlier 
are changed using these different definitions of earnings management. Following the 
discussion above, the empirical model is given by:  
 
X ti, =α 0 +β 1*(NST ti, )+β 2 *(NST ti, * SOX t )+β 3 *(SOX t )+β 4 *(FRET ti, )+ 
β 5*( FRET ti, * SOX t )+β 6*(SIZE ti, )+β 7 *(LEV ti, )+ 8β *(MTB ti, )+e ti, ............(3.25). 
 
Where X ti, are alternative proxies for earnings management including the M_SCORE, 
Abnormal discretionary expenses (ADEXP) and abnormal production cost (APROC). Based 
on 8 variables the M-Score is estimated as:  
 
M = -4.84 + .920*DSRI + .528*GMI + .404*AQI + .892*SGI + .115*DEPI -.172*SGAI + 
4.679*TATA - .327 --- (3.26) 
 149  
 
For details of the estimation of M-Score, see section 3.3.2.7.  
  
Table 11 report the results using these alternative real earnings management proxies in the 
OLS regressions. Panel A shows the results for the M_SCORE as the dependent variable; 
Panel B shows the results for abnormal discretionary expenses, while Panel C shows the 
results for abnormal production costs. As the result in Panel A suggest, the intercept for the 
M-Score (-2.9831) and the t-statistics (-2.81) suggests that based on the M-Score results, less 
firms are less likely to manage earnings. The coefficient on NST suggests a negative 
relationship between NST and M-Score though the result is statistically insignificant 
(coefficient of -1.2570 and t statistics of -0.94). The variable SOX suggest that in the post 
SOX period, firms are more likely to have a negative M-Score (coefficient of -0.2111 and t-
statistics of -3.04) while the variable NST*SOX suggest that firms the relationship between 
insider trading and M-Score in the post SOX period is more likely to be positive, though 
statistically insignificant (coefficient of 0.2917 and t statistics of 1.05). The coefficient on 
FRET is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that when firms employ negative 
discretionary accruals to influence reported earnings as prescribed by the M-Score, investors 
are quick to discount it in the valuation of the companies, while the coefficient on 
FRET*SOX is positive, suggesting that when firms use discretionary accruals to influence 
reported earnings in the post SOX period, investors are not quick to discount this in the 
valuation of the companies, however, the result is statistically insignificant (coefficient of 
2.4394 and t statistics of 0.61). The coefficient on SIZE is statistically very weak and 
insignificant suggesting no apparent relationship on SIZE and the M-Score (coefficient of 
0.000 and t statistics of 0.00) and this is the same with the coefficient on LEV implying that 
debt obligations does not have any clear relationship with the M-Score.  
 
The intercept of abnormal discretionary expenses in panel B table 11 though weak suggest 
that firms are more likely to increase discretionary expenses (coefficient of 0.0088 and t 
statistics of 2.72). The result for the NST suggests a negative relationship between earnings 
management using abnormal discretionary expenses and net shares traded. This implies that, 
when insiders buy (sell) shares, they reduce (increase) discretionary earnings to increase 
(decrease) future earnings. However, this result is statistically insignificant (coefficient of -
0.1689 and t statistics of -1.14). In the Post SOX era, insider trades are positively related to 
abnormal discretionary expenses, though the result is statistically insignificant (coefficient of 
0.2244 and t statistics of 1.03). The result for SOX suggests that firms are more likely to 
increase discretionary expenses (coefficient of 0.0057 and t statistics of 0.74). the result for 
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FRET is negative which suggest that firms that increase discretionary expenses are more 
likely to have a negative future returns in the future (coefficient of -0.2725 and t statistics of -
2.19), additionally, in the post SOX period, when firms increase discretionary expenses they 
are more likely to have negative stock returns, but the result if statistically insignificant 
(coefficient of -0.1326 and t statistics of -0.29). the variable SIZE suggest that the larger the 
firm SIZE, the lower the amount of abnormal discretionary expenses that the firm is likely to 
employ (coefficient of -0.0001 and t statistics of -2.30) and the variable leverage suggest that 
a firms debt do not have any clear relationship with the amount of discretionary expenses the 
firm is likely to use (coefficient of 0.00269 and t statistics of 0.26). the coefficient on Market 
to book (MTB) suggests that firms with more growth prospects are less likely to engaged in 
abnormal changes in discretionary expenses (coefficient of 0.0009 and t statistics of 4.47).  
 
The intercept for panel C for abnormal production cost is -0.0271 and the t statistics is -2.12 
which suggest that firms are more likely to reduce production cost. However, a firms trading 
is positively related to its abnormal production cost, though the result is statistically 
insignificant (coefficient of -0.0271 and t statistics of -2.12). However, in the Post SOX 
period, when firms manage earnings using positive (negative) abnormal production cost, 
they are likely to engage in  insider sales (purchases) (coefficient of -0.0025 and t statistics of 
-1.07). The result on abnormal production cost suggest that in the Post SOX period, firms are 
more likely to have a positive abnormal production cost (coefficient of 0.0084 and t statistics 
of 0.89). the coefficient on FRET suggest that production cost is positively related to future 
returns (coefficient of 0.41334 and t statistics of 2.25), however, in the post SOX period, 
though production cost is positively related to future returns, the result if statistically 
insignificant (coefficient of 0.5382 and t statistics of 0.99), suggesting that increased cost of 
production is viewed as a positive signal by investors, though the result if meaningless. The 
coefficient on SIZE (coefficient of -0.0001 and t statistics of -0.37) and LEV (coefficient of 
0.0121 and t statistics of 0.92) produced statistically insignificant results, which imply that 
debt covenant obligations or firm SIZE does not have a clear relationship to the changes in 
production cost. The coefficient on Market to book value (MTB) suggest that the higher the 
growth prospect of a firm, the less likely the firm will employ abnormal production cost to 
influence reported earnings (coefficient of -0.0013 and t statistics of -5.21).  
 
The results of these three earnings management proxies suggest that the statistical 
significance disappears when we repeat the test using other earnings management proxies. 
Thus investors are more vigilant when earnings are managed using discretionary accruals as 
supported by the results of FRET and FRET*SOX in the discretionary accruals model and 
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that insider trade and manage earnings using discretionary accruals is a more likely 
occurrence than insider trades and subsequent earnings management using real earnings 
management techniques. These suggest that there have been no changes on earnings 
management relationship to insider trading as a result of the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (coefficient of NST *SOX are 0.2917, 0.2224 and -0.0025 and t-stats are respectively 
1.15, 1.02 and -1.07). The results overall are not qualitatively affected by other measures of 
earnings management as supported by either the insignificant coefficients or the reduced 
frequency of the observations. Although in retrospect, these results might be partly due to the 
fact that real earnings management variable are customarily captured in discretionary 
earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006), I am otherwise unable to fully explain this 
feature from this research. Additionally, I cannot definitely rule out the possibility that each 
real earnings management technique might capture different issues linked to market abuse 
(e.g. seasoned equity offerings, Initial public offerings) and not necessarily insider trading in 
both the Pre and Post SOX era. However, this can be investigated later.  
 
X ti, =α 0 +β 1*(NST ti, )+β 2 *(NST ti, * SOX t )+β 3 *(SOX t )+β 4 *(FRET ti, )+ 
β 5*( FRET ti, * SOX t )+β 6*(SIZE ti, )+β 7 *(LEV ti, )+ 8β *(MTB ti, )+e ti, ............(3.25). 
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4.6: Conclusion. 
This study has broadly examined the relationship between discretionary accruals and Insider 
trading activity and discusses how this relationship has changed as a result of the introduction of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Additionally, based on prior literature, it robustly tests the 
relationship between insider trading and future earnings realisations post SOX. In order to avoid 
a contamination of the signals conveyed by different kinds of relationship and other earnings 
management proxies, the analysis is conducted using other earnings management proxies. This 
is evaluated with a sample of S&P 500 firms over the period of 1997-2006. Prior literature 
(Trueman, (1990), Beneish and Vargus (2004)) provides a theoretical basis for some empirical 
investigation on whether insider trading is associated to future earnings. In addition, recent 
empirical findings have provided evidence to support the fact that strict insider trading rules may 
have an impact on the way managers do exercise their knowledge of private information about a 
firm’s future prospect. Furthermore, Hope (2003) provided evidence ascertaining that strict 
insider trading laws may prevent managers from manipulating earnings for profit while trading 
in their corporation’s stock. Additional research has examined the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 on earnings management47, but to the best of my knowledge, none of these articles 
have investigated the relationship between earnings management and insider trading in light of 
the recent regulatory intervention. It is in such a context that this empirical essay examines the 
relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light of the recent regulatory 
intervention as prescribed by the SOX of 2002.  
 
After controlling for important factors such as size, growth opportunities, leverage (or debt 
covenant obligations), on insider trading and earnings management relationship, several 
important conclusions emerge. First, consistent with many US studies, the findings show that on 
average companies employ negative discretionary accruals to manage earnings and are also net 
sellers of their stock. After the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the quality of earnings 
have improved as companies use less discretionary accruals to manage reported earnings. 
Contrary to prior studies (See Beneish, 1999), the results do not support the assertion that 
managers employ discretionary accruals to influence reported earnings after prior insider 
trading. As in prior literature (See Park and Park (2004) and Beneish and Vargus (2002)), the 
                                                 
47 Cohen et al., (2004) find evidence that there is a decrease of earnings management after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. 
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results suggest that in the overall sample period, there is a positive relationship between prior 
year discretionary accruals and one-year ahead stock returns. This suggests that discretionary 
accruals are customarily used to boost reported earnings leading to a positive stock returns. 
However, in the post SOX period, investors do not fixate on the earnings figure.  
 
When managers employ discretionary accounting techniques to improve reported earnings post 
SOX, investors discount the stocks of these companies leading to negative stock returns. 
Another way to interpret this is, due to stricter regulations post SOX, when managers employ 
discretionary accruals to influence reported earnings, this triggers immediate market reactions as 
investors discount this through negative stock returns. Another plausible explanation for this 
result that is consistent to the litigation avoidance hypothesis by Beneish et al., (2004), is that 
other stakeholders might follow insider transactions more cautiously post SOX, which causes 
insiders to trade more cautiously and to distance from information related trading. 
 
It is important to distinguish between insider trades that are linked to future reported earnings 
without the use of discretionary accruals and those that are not. With respect to insider trading 
relationship to post-transactions stock returns (without necessarily using discretionary accruals 
to influence reported earnings), this relationship is tested between current period insider trading 
and future returns. Due to stricter market regulations post SOX, it is less likely insider trades 
might motivate earnings management. Ideally, investors with private information about the 
economy, the firm’s future prospects and its effects on its cash flow and earnings might form 
expectations and trade on that basis without necessarily employing discretionary accruals to 
influence the public information (reported earnings). As in prior literature (See Ke et al. 2003, 
Park and Park, 2006), the findings suggest that in the overall sample period, insider trading is 
positively related to post transaction stock returns.  However, in the post SOX period, managers 
are less likely to time their trade based on overall market and economic fundamentals even when 
they are not interested in influencing reported earnings. The result does not support the 
assumption that insiders might switch from real to discretionary earnings management and trade 
to benefit at the expense of other investors.  
 
All in all, the results suggest that SOX has improved the integrity of the US financial market and 
strict insider trading regulations makes it risky for managers to trade and manage earnings to 
benefit from prior insider trading. In normal business conditions, insider’s private information 
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(as disclosed by their trades) plays an important role in forming expectations about their 
earnings projections. However, when regulations are enforced, insiders are less likely to use 
their superior information to distinguish themselves from the “crowd” of other investors.  
 
As an added robustness test, I test for possible simultaneous equation as the literature supposes 
that insider trading might influence earnings management and vice versa. Once this is confirmed 
through the Haussmann specification error test, the causal relationship between insider trading 
and earnings management is investigated using the 2 stage least squares. The results reported in 
section 4.5.2.4 are consistent to those already reported. I additionally test the robustness of the 
results using alternative definitions of earnings management and the results overall are not 
qualitatively affected by other measures of earnings management as supported by either the 
insignificant coefficients or the reduced frequency of the observations. Although in retrospect, 
these results might be partly due to the fact that real earnings management variable are 
customarily captured in discretionary earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006), I am 
otherwise unable to fully explain this feature from this research. Additionally, I cannot definitely 
rule out the possibility that each real earnings management technique might capture different 
issues linked to market abuse (e.g. seasoned equity offerings, Initial public offerings) and not 
necessarily directly related to insider trading in both the Pre and Post SOX era. This can be 
investigated in any future research.  
  
5.0: Earnings Quality and Firm Performance: Examining the Changes in the 
Post Sarbanes- Oxley Era. 
 
5.1: Abstract. 
This Chapter examines the relationship between earnings management and firm performance 
and evaluates how this relationship has changed as a result of the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. The Chapter employs three measures of earnings quality that has been 
employed in the accounting literature using financial statements data: (1) the Beneish (1999) 
M-Score that ranks firms according to their probability of financial statements manipulations 
(Beneish 1997, 1999), (2) the discretionary accruals model by Dechow et al. (1995) (See 
Balsam et al., (2003)) (3) and estimates of real earnings management involving abnormal 
changes in discretionary expenses, abnormal changes in production costs, abnormal changes in 
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receivables, abnormal changes in inventory, and abnormal operating accruals. The result 
suggests that firms are less likely to employ discretionary and real earnings management 
techniques to influence reported earnings after the introduction of SOX. In the post SOX 
period, investors discount earnings management practices through marking down stock 
returns. Finally, the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to real 
earnings management when tighter regulatory scrutiny restrict earnings management via 
accrual manipulations. 
 
5.2: Background. 
The enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 after the high profile business scandals 
brought enormous expectations to the US capital market. This was as a result of the implicit 
assumption in most policy-oriented discussions that the failures of these companies were as a 
result of the ineffectiveness of current regulations relating to earnings management practices. 
The Acts primary objective was to improve the quality of financial reporting. Before this Act, 
news of financial fraud at Enron, WorldCom, Cendant, etc had changed the perception of the 
regulatory environment and has seemingly favoured stricter regulatory control on earnings 
management and other corporate governance practices. This is because the scandals caused 
systemic financial distress and a decline in the stock values in the US and other stock markets. 
According to Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (henceforth SOX), principal 
executives of public firms (primarily the CEO and CFO) have to certify that their company’s 
financial statements do not contain material misstatements or omissions and reflects the firm’s 
financial conditions. The implications were that such executives are to be accountable for 
material misstatements in financial reports.  
 
Graham et al. (2005) argue that managers manage earnings to influence future stock prices. 
Investors extrapolate past trends from accounting information and make decisions on the future 
(Zhang, 2003). These suggest that future performance as measured by the future stock returns is 
important for managers. Due to the cost associated with fraudulent financial reporting, 
heightened attention was needed by investors, analysts and other users of accounting 
information in regard to earnings management practices. They also need to exploit all 
information useful in assessing fraud due to its influence on accounting earnings and subsequent 
stock returns (Beneish and Nichols, 2007). Apart from the strict regulatory attention to penalize 
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companies that manipulate earnings, some investors are capable of unravelling manipulated 
financial statements and undertake investment decisions on this basis.  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to empirically assess the relationship between a comprehensive 
set of earnings management signals and future firm performance. Its prime purpose is to verify 
whether there have been substantial benefits to investors as a result of the enactment of the 
SOX through (i) improvements in earnings quality as a result of the SOX (ii) if as a 
consequence of this, investors price the level of earnings management in the financial 
statements.  
 
The primary motivation for this Chapter is derived from the recent regulation of financial 
reporting practices as prescribed by SOX. The second motivation originates from the 
inconclusive evidence presented in recent research regarding whether investors fixate on 
accounting information (Chan et al., 2006) or are more sophisticated in processing accounting 
information. Public discussions and efforts made by regulators have been aimed at regulating 
earnings management. Considering price declines after public revelations of earnings 
management practices, the presumption is that investors do consider the extent of earnings 
management practices when making investment decisions (Spohr, 2005). As already 
discussed, the Sarbanes Oxley Act is meant to improve the quality of financial reporting. A 
key issue for researchers has been how earnings management influences the performance of 
companies. Since SOX in principle reduces the information uncertainty through the provision 
of high quality financial reports, we expect the stock price reaction to earnings announcement 
post SOX to be positive leading to positive returns. If firms still adopt earnings management 
practices and the stock market is able to discount its negative impact as a result of its low 
earnings quality, then SOX should have brought in substantial benefits to the overall market. 
My prediction is that firms with high earnings management should have negative stock returns 
in the subsequent period.  
 
This chapter differs from the numerous findings that have documented a relationship between 
accounting information and future returns on several dimensions: First, it investigates the policy 
influences on the relationship between managed financial reporting practices and firm 
performance. Second, apart from examining a single predictive earnings management variable, I 
examined a comprehensive set of variables that have been found in the literature to influence 
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reported earnings and future performance. Though more attention has been placed on accounting 
accruals, in the absence of possibilities to manage earnings through accruals, managers are 
exposed to real earnings management techniques. Since the bulk of predictive power of accruals 
originates from changes in inventory, I separate the various components of accruals (like 
accounts receivables, accounts payables and inventories) and real earnings management and 
study their impact on firm performance. This is because, a broader set of financial statement 
information post SOX with strict regulation might enhance predictive power for stock returns 
((see Chan et al., 2007).   
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses prior academic literature 
and explains the motivations for this research. In the process, the research hypothesis is 
developed and explained. Section 3 discusses the research design; section 4 contains the 
descriptive and empirical evidences. Section 5 summarizes the main results of the Chapter, the 
research implications and finally provides suggestions for future research.  
 
5.3.0:Review of the Literature, Test Motivation and Hypothesis Development. 
This section reviews the literature that is specific to the second empirical essay. Specifically, it 
evaluates theory relating to earnings quality relationship to firms performance in light of the 
recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Prior literature 
discussed in detail below provides a theoretical basis to investigate whether a firm’s earnings 
quality is related to its future stock returns. Guay et al. (1996) documented that discretionary 
accruals are positively associated with future stock returns.  Other literature (See 
Roychowdhury, 2006, Gunny, 2006) have provided evidence that other forms of real earnings 
management are positively related to future firm performance. Quite recently, Beneish and 
McNichols (2008) suggested a strong relationship between the probability of earnings 
manipulation and future returns. Additionally, in light of recent regulations, as prescribed by 
SOX, managers might still manage earnings using less detectable earnings management 
techniques (see Cohen et al., (2006)).  
 
Three measures of earnings quality are employed, including (1) the Beneish (1999) M-Score 
(Beneish 1997, 1999), (2) the discretionary accruals models by Dechow et al. (1995) (See 
Balsam et al., (2003)) (3) and estimates of real earnings management involving abnormal 
changes in discretionary expenses, abnormal changes in production costs, abnormal changes in 
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receivables, abnormal changes in inventory, and abnormal operating accruals (Roychowdhury, 
(2006)). Post transaction stock returns are also employed as a proxy for future firm 
performance48 (see Beneish and Vargus 2002 and Ke et al., 2003).  
 
5.3.1: SOX Relationship to Earnings Management. 
It can be argued that when firms are subject to regulatory scrutiny, they might employ measures 
that cannot be easily detected by the regulators. In contrast to accrual earnings management, 
earnings management through real operating decisions such as reductions in discretionary 
expenses (primarily R&D, advertisement, selling, general and administrative expenses), asset 
sales, price discounts to improve sales mostly occur during the course of the year 
(Roychowdhury, (2006)). These actions are costly, in relation to their impact on the cash flow of 
the company. Even though accruals are less costly, they customarily mean-revert and 
overstatements in the current period must be offset by an understatement in the future. The 
indirect and often easily detectable nature of accruals subject firms that report high accruals are 
likely to face SEC enforcement actions (see Dechow et al., (1996), Bradshaw et al. 2001) than 
those that directly employ real earnings management. Moreover, the business judgement rule 
gives firms the flexibility to manage earnings without facing regulatory scrutiny. SEC 
enforcements and prior year accruals might thus limit a firm’s ability to manage earnings using 
discretionary accrual techniques alone.  
 
Since regulators habitually focus on the easy to detect discretionary accruals technique (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2006, Roychowdhury, 2006), unlike real earning management, accrual based 
earnings management is expected to reduce as a result of the passage of regulations aimed at 
improving earnings quality.  Cohen et al., (2006) documented that after the passage of SOX, 
accruals earnings management was reduced giving way to an increase in real earnings 
management.  In a recent study by Chang and Sun (2008), the researchers found that SOX 
regulations on audit committee independence and other corporate governance have improved 
the quality of accounting earnings. Using sample firms' earnings informativeness and earnings 
management to measure the quality of accounting earnings, they found significantly positive 
(negative) relations between earnings informativeness (earnings management), audit 
committee independence and financial experts on audit committee in the post-SOX period and 
no significant relations in the pre-SOX period. Also, the researchers documented that a 
                                                 
48 Details of how post transaction stock returns have been estimated are discussed in section 3.3.3. 
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independent audit committee and a majority independent board are found to complement each 
other in increasing (decreasing) earnings informativeness (earnings management) in the post-
SOX period. Overall, the researchers argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
monitoring managerial behaviours on earnings management has improved after SOX. The 
importance of examining changes in earnings management in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era is 
grounded in the cost and benefits of employing the different methods. Since most market 
participants fixate on discretionary earnings management (e.g. Cohen et al., 2006, Graham et 
al., 2006) that might be subject to regulatory scrutiny, it might negatively influence long-term 
stock prices.  
 
5.3.2: Earnings Quality and Stock Returns.  
The reasons for investigating the influence of earnings quality on future stock returns are two 
fold. First, large bodies of accounting and finance research discussed below have suggested that 
accounting information predicts contemporaneous stock returns. Secondly, managers manage 
earnings to influence future stock returns and post earnings stock returns is a good proxy for a 
firm’s future prospects (Beneish and Vargus, 2002 and Ke et al., 2003). Chan et al. (2001) 
argued that firm accruals are negatively related to stock returns. Sloan (1996) offered another 
explanation similar to the hypothesis above through a behavioural explanation that, investors 
habitually overprice accruals as a result of their failure to recognize their low persistence. 
Similar to the Sloan’s (1996) behavioural explanation, Xie (2001) suggested that the market 
overprices the portion of discretionary accruals that originates from managerial discretion. 
Additionally, a company’s financing and expenditure patterns influence future stock returns. As 
in the prior literature, R&D, advertising expenditures, income generated from asset sales are 
positively related to the stock returns. Beneish and Nichols (2005) suggested a strong relation 
between the probability of manipulation and future returns. They documented that firms with a 
high probability of financial statement manipulation have lower future returns relative to firms 
with a low probability of manipulation and suggested that investors and other users of financial 
statements need to be sceptical when using financial statements. Therefore analyzing the stock 
price behaviour based on different earnings management techniques might be useful in re-
enforcing the empirical results especially post SOX.  
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5.3.4: Hypothesis Development. 
Some events like regulatory changes that do not involve discretionary action by management 
might influence the use of discretionary accruals and future firm performance. For instance, 
SOX might influence the way managers manage earnings. But since investors normally focus on 
earnings management through discretionary accruals (Bradshaw et al., 2001) and this can result 
in discounted share prices for such companies, managers might still be managing using other 
less detectable techniques. Some techniques like real earnings management that is not easily 
detected by auditors and regulators might become more popular especially after the recent 
corporate scandals. As predicted by Zhang (2003), when firms manage earnings to an egregious 
level in prior periods, they are more likely to engage in real earnings management relative to 
accruals in the future. Under normal circumstances, stakeholders might fixate on some form of 
earnings management rather than the others. Even the reversing nature of accruals makes it 
impossible to sometimes manage its shortfall and if they have to rely on discretionary techniques 
alone, they might sometimes be forced to miss earnings target. This is such that income-
increasing (decreasing) choices made in one period will inevitably lead to understated 
(overstated) income in some future periods. It is thus possible managers might focus attention on 
real earnings management to cover the residual shortfall in cases where they are limited by their 
inability to utilize accruals techniques. Legislative actions might also have an influence on the 
techniques they apply. Cohen et al. (2006) provides evidence in support of the suggestion above 
by documenting that after the passage of the SOX, accruals earnings management was reduced, 
on the contrary, there was an increase in earnings management through real operating decisions.  
  
There has been abundant literature (e.g. Chan et al., 2006, Beneish et al., 2004) suggesting that 
investors normally fixate on reporting accounting earnings to evaluate future performance. 
Recent studies have suggested that a majority of investors can unravel earnings management 
especially earnings managed to an egregious level leading to potential damages to shareholder 
value through share price declines (Rajgopal et al., 2007). Operating performance has been 
associated with aspects of real earnings management like discretionary changes in R&D, 
selling, general and administrative expense, overproduction to improve sales through improve 
credit terms, selling of fixed assets  and firms with high accruals in the current period 
customarily experiences future earnings problems (Gunny, 2006). Investors are however not 
customarily fooled by earnings management practices. They look for warning signs from the 
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financial statements and discount the stocks of firms that manage earnings49. If more firms 
manage earnings, there might be market wide effects through a spiky decline in the value of 
several companies50. Expectations for regulatory control leading to higher earnings quality 
would therefore be a rational response to investor demands for favourable financial reporting. 
One way of examining the benefit of legislative control on firm performance is to investigate 
stock price responses following the SOX Act. If the Act actually improves earnings quality, 
the information might be more certain and investors can respond to it by trading on the stocks 
of those companies more conveniently.  
 
Although the above arguments have suggested that the capital market can unravel the extent of 
earnings management, the predictive ability of the different techniques on firm’s performance 
has not been thoroughly investigated. The various components of accruals (notably accounts 
receivables, accounts payable and changes in inventory) have different predictive powers and 
investors might discount their impact on future returns differently. These components of 
accruals are the most popular tools that can be improperly used to fraudulently51 improve the 
company’s revenues and earnings52. Most forced restatements and enforcement actions have 
resulted from abuse of reporting of these key variables. Accounts receivable is one component 
of accruals that is customarily employed to overstate the earnings of most corporations. But 
firms might genuinely offer sales discounts leading to sales growth in a bid to avoid product 
obsolence in periods where they might have mistakenly overproduced. Customers can also be 
genuinely experiencing financial distress leading to rising accounts receivables. Increases in 
accounts payable too can still be connected to managerial intent in lowering current accruals, 
thereby shifting current earnings to the future. Investors can either interpret it as a current 
shock in earnings (bad news) or recognize its impact on future earnings. In this case, despite a 
reduction in earnings through accounts payable increases, future stock price performance can 
still be higher.  
 
                                                 
49 Studies that have examined whether or not market participants identify and react to earnings management 
either through fraudulent accounting or accruals management include the Dechow et al. 1996; 
50 After several high profile business scandals like the Enron, WorldCom cases, there have always been spiky 
declines in the stocks of several companies that have not managed earnings. 
51 It is important to note that my sample cases are not restricted to cases of fraud. It includes estimates of all 
forms of earnings management, whether legal or not. 
52 Chan et al. (2006) discussed the importance of looking at a comprehensive set of earnings management signals 
as they can have different predictive abilities. 
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Another accounting component whose predictive power is uncertain is changes in inventory. 
Managers might manage earnings through the reporting of inventory changes by not writing 
off obsolete items completely or they might be allocating more overheads expenses to 
inventory than to cost of goods sold. Overproduction can also reflect an intention to improve 
sales through the provision of favourable credit terms and or to reduce cost of goods sold. 
When firms overproduce, they might technically spread fixed overhead cost leading to an 
overall reduction in per unit production cost as long as inventory holding cost is not increased 
over the period (Gunny, 2006). As supported by Chan et al., (2006), some items might be 
more susceptible to earnings manipulation than others and changes might influence future 
returns different since investors would have competing interpretations of their effect. Stock 
return evidence also suggests that investors discount “abnormal” accruals relative to “normal” 
accruals, which suggests that investors view abnormal accruals as more likely to reflect 
earnings management (Healy and Whalen, 1999). There is further evidence of significant 
negative stock market responses to allegations of earnings management by the financial press 
or the SEC which is an indication that investors do not always investigate financial reporting 
impropriety. According to Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), firms subject to SEC 
investigation for earnings management show an average stock price decline of 9% at the day 
of the announcement of the earnings management.  Assuming there was a large decline in 
earnings quality before the enactment of the SOX, one significant question might relates to 
how SOX can constrain earnings management practices and how investors can avoid huge 
losses if earnings management is uncovered.  
 
In light of the discussions above, I investigate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: After Sarbanes Oxley, stocks of suspect firms (firms with low earnings quality as 
measured by the probability of manipulation, abnormal changes in the various accruals and 
real earnings management items) will exhibit negative stock price performance while those of 
non-suspect firms (firms with high earnings quality) will exhibit positive stock price 
performance. 
 
Section 5.4 specifies the models and variables to be used in the test.  
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5.4: Research design. 
5.4.1: Data and Sample Selection. 
The original sample for this study is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 and covers data from 
the period of 1996 to 2006. The choice of the S&P 500 Companies is because they are closely 
followed by analysts, actively traded and are the most widely used benchmark employed by 
researchers to investigate different performance related issues. Additionally, it has a 
diversified market weighting and most reports have suggested that it comprises more than 70 
percent of the US market capitalization. Furthermore, these firms are most likely the group of 
companies the US congress had in mind when they debated the SOX legislation. This is 
because they were the largest firms and had many international operations. 
 
As is standard in the literature, financial institutions are eliminated from the sample (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) due to their complex financial reporting practices, leaving the sample with 
411 firms and 4110 firm years. Firms with missing data to estimate the various accounting and 
other performance metrics are also excluded. The final sample reports results for an 
unbalanced sample of 3528 firm years from 1997 to 2006 giving five consecutive years 
relating to the pre and post SOX era. It is important to note that, though the two empirical 
essays uses the S&P 500 firms as the main sample, the final sample in this test is larger than 
the unbalanced sample in the prior test. This is because only accounting and stock price data 
which are highly available have been utilised in the analysis. The final sample which in this 
test is an unbalanced sample of 3528 firm years requires the firms to have the necessary data 
to calculate the different earnings management metric and matching data to estimate the 
various proxies for firm performance. Total accruals, discretionary accruals, abnormal 
production cost, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal accruals, abnormal receivables, 
and abnormal inventory, are estimated for the corresponding industry year regression. In all, 
industrial classification is based on the four-digit SIC codes requiring at least 10 observations 
in each sample year (Jenkins et al, (2006)). To control for outliers, variables have been 
winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. All the data for this study have been 
collected from DATASTREAM. Firms analysed were therefore required to have annual data 
and stock prices for the overall period of the study from the Datastream files. Lastly, firms 
that finally remain in the sample must have the same number of firm year presence in the pre 
and post SOX era to assist comparison of my results for the pre and post SOX period. 
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5.4.2: Measuring Earnings Quality. 
My proxies for earnings quality information are three measures of “earnings management” 
employed in the accounting literature to explain how managers can manage reported earnings. 
They are earnings management through discretionary accruals (see section 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.2, 
3.3.2.3 and 3.3.2.4), real earnings management (see section 3.3.2.6) and the Beneish M-Score 
(see section 3.3.2.7). The discretionary accruals model is a variant-based model that separates 
accruals into its normal and total component. The normal portion is the portion that can be 
explained by past accounting transactions and the discretionary component originates from the 
use of discretionary accounting techniques to report favorable earnings. The real earnings 
management model primarily examines operating decisions that might deviate from standard 
expectations. Though most prior models have examined popular variables disclosed in the 
financial statements that might influence future cash flows like fixed asset (Bartov (1993), Black 
et al., (1998)), R&D expenditures (Bushee (1998), Bange and DeBondt, (1998) Guay et al., 
(1996)), managers might still manage earnings using other operating techniques like abnormal 
changes in receivables through price discounts, overproduction to spread unit inventory 
production cost, etc. in a bid to investigate several items that can be used to manage earnings 
using real operating decisions, I focus on key variables captured by Roychowdhury, (2006)) in 
detecting earnings management using real operating decisions. The model in my opinion, relates 
to a combination of variables that have been employed by prior research to predict real earnings 
management. These proxies include estimates of abnormal discretionary expenses (R&D, 
advertising, selling, general and administrative expenses and capital expenditures), abnormal 
accruals, abnormal production costs, and abnormal change in inventory and abnormal changes in 
net receivables. The M-Score developed by Beneish (1997, 1999) is another earnings 
management model that combines a firm’s operational and financial characteristics to determine 
the probability of manipulation.  
 
5.4.3: Categorising Suspect Versus Non Suspect Firms.  
As discussed above, the research employs three distinct measures that have been employed in 
the accounting literature to measure earnings management. Firms are also categorised as more 
likely to manipulate earnings (Suspect firms) and less likely to manipulate earnings (Non 
Suspect firms) based on a rank scale of their level of earnings management. In an effort to 
correctly identify firms, I used different assumptions that are consistent with prior research. 
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For the M-Score, the model sorts the firms according to their probability of manipulation and 
assumes that firms in the highest decile are more likely to manipulate earnings. This is a 
simpler version from the Beneish (1997, 1999) model that employs specific cut-off points to 
differentiate likely and unlikely manipulators. Beneish and Nichols (2004) recognised that 
though the Beneish model can realistically identify earnings manipulators, there are always 
likely classification errors based on the cut-off points. The model was able to flag only 12 of 
the 20 major companies that manipulated earnings in early 2000 as likely manipulators. For 
the discretionary accruals model, I classify suspect firms as firms in the highest decile of 
discretionary accruals. However, I redo the analysis classifying firms based on their absolute 
values of discretionary accruals (Balsam et al., 2002) and negative discretionary accruals 
(Jenkins et al., 2006). For the real earnings management variables, I employ different 
assumptions to classify firms based on prior assumptions that are linked to earnings 
management using real operating decisions. Firms in the lowest abnormal discretionary 
expenses decile are classified as suspect firms as these firms might have reduced expenses to 
improve current earnings. For the production cost and changes in inventory, I assume that 
abnormal levels of production cost might indicate current over production to reduce the 
resulting cost of goods sold (Dechow et al., 1996). Firms thus in the highest decile of 
production cost and changes in inventory are classified as suspect firms that have attempted to 
decrease current period cost of goods sold, thereby improving earnings. Since receivables are 
customarily employed to improve current period earnings, I assume that firms in the highest 
decile engaged in earnings manipulation (suspect firms). The classifications based on these 
three models increases the power of my tests and provides a basis of testing the predictability 
of stock returns drawing upon a broader set of financial statements information and earnings 
management models.  
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5.5: Descriptive and Empirical Evidences. 
This section begins by presenting the descriptive evidence, which is followed by formal 
statistical tests of my predictions using regression analysis. The research investigates the 
returns/earnings relationship, using stock returns as a measure of firm performance and 
contrasts the influence of stock returns on different measures of earnings management. The 
research extends prior models by categorising different levels of earnings management as 
suspect versus non-suspect firm years.  
 
 
5.5.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Between Variables. 
Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for variables of interest. The full sample consists of the 
S&P 500 firms over the period 1997 to 2006. The Table presents results for the pre and post 
Sarbanes Oxley era. Mean results are reported for the overall sample, the non-suspect and 
suspect firm years. Suspect firm-years are classified as the firm years with an M-Score that is in 
the highest decile of the probability of financial statements manipulation. This is 2.9 standard 
deviations from the mean. According to Beneish (1997, 1999), there is a high probability of 
financial statements manipulation by firms with a probability of financial statement 
manipulation that is greater than -2.22. Suspect firms years are generally thought of as firm 
years with low earnings quality. See below for variables descriptions.  
 
Across all companies and across all years, the results of the descriptive statistics of the main 
sample suggest that it is less likely that a firm distorts its financial statements. This is as a result 
of the mean M-Score that stands at –3.07 (less and –2.22). As in prior literatures, more firms 
manage earning using negative discretionary and total accruals with a mean respectively of –
0.01 and –0.05. The descriptive statistics for the net income suggest that for the main sample, the 
average profitability for the S&P 500 firms is around 6 percent of total assets. It is important to 
note that, this ratio is much higher than in prior research (see Gupta et al. 2005), report an 
average profitability of firms in their sample (that included all COMPUSTAT firms from 1975 
to 2003) of around 2 percent.  
 
On a general note, it is less likely that firms are distorting their financial statements as the mean 
M-Scores in both the pre and post SOX periods are –2.95 and –3.18 respectively. For the 
suspect firms, the mean M-Score is respectively 0.96 and –0.59 in the pre and post SOX period. 
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The Sales growth index is 1.15 for non-suspect firms and 2.59 for suspect firms in the pre SOX 
period indicating an increase of more than 100 percent. However, in the post SOX period, there 
are no significant changes in sales growth for suspect and non-suspect firms as the ratio is 1.10 
and 1.36 respectively. However, it is important to recall that suspect firms have a marginally 
greater increase in sales growth. No significant changes are also recognized for debt contracting 
obligations of the firms in the respective periods, as the leverage index ratio is significantly 
similar in most classifications.  
 
As in prior research, discretionary and total accruals are primarily income decreasing. The total 
accruals for the overall pre SOX period are –6 percent of total assets. The Non-suspect firms 
have a total accruals decrease of 5 percent of total assets while suspect firms have total accruals 
decrease of 7 percent of total assets in the pre SOX period. However, in the post SOX period, 
the total accruals are –4 percent of total assets. The Non-Suspect firms realized a total accruals 
decrease of 3 percent while the suspect firms realized a decrease of 5 percent. Additionally, 
discretionary accruals for non-suspect firms are –1 percent of total assets while for suspect firms 
it is –5 percent of total assets in the pre SOX period. In the post SOX period, the ratio is –0.5 
percent for non-suspect firms while for suspect firms, the ratio is –3 percent. Returns estimated 
on an annual basis suggest that in the pre SOX period, firms have overall returns of 24 percent 
while in the post SOX period, returns drop to 14 percent. However, in the Pre SOX period, non-
suspect firms have realized returns of about 22 percent while suspect firms have returns of about 
53 percent. However, in the post SOX period, non-suspect and suspect firms have returns of 
approximately 14 percent. Taken together, the descriptive results suggest that suspect firms 
manage earnings extensively to influence reported earnings and that trend is mitigated in the 
post SOX period. This suggests improvement in earnings quality in the post SOX period. 
Additionally, the drop in returns in the pre and post period for suspect and non suspect firms and 
the similarities between returns of suspect and non-suspect firms in the post SOX period can be 
thought of as being influenced by financial analysts and investors suspecting earnings quality 
decreases in specific periods and discounting it in their judgment of such companies.
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s 
th
e 
fi
rm
s 
re
tu
rn
s 
w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
th
e 
p
ri
ce
 
o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
s 
st
o
ck
 c
o
ll
ec
te
d
 t
h
re
e 
m
o
n
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
le
ss
 t
h
e 
p
ri
o
r 
y
ea
r 
p
ri
ce
 s
ca
le
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
p
ri
o
r 
y
ea
r 
p
ri
ce
. 
re
t 
(a
n
n
) 
an
d
 R
et
 (
fu
t)
 a
re
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
(3
 m
o
n
th
s 
af
te
r 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
ts
) 
an
d
 o
n
e 
y
ea
r 
ah
ea
d
 s
to
ck
 r
et
u
rn
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
ts
. 
L
ev
 i
s 
th
e 
le
v
er
ag
e 
le
v
el
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
, 
w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
li
ab
il
it
ie
s 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
M
T
B
 i
s 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 m
ar
k
et
-t
o
-b
o
o
k
 r
at
io
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
th
e 
y
ea
r,
 s
iz
e 
is
 a
 p
ro
x
y
 b
y
 t
h
e 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
. 
  D
_
E
X
P
 i
s 
th
e 
d
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
 e
x
p
en
se
s,
 A
_
D
E
X
P
 i
s 
th
e 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 d
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
 e
x
p
en
se
s,
 A
_
P
R
O
C
 i
s 
th
e 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 c
o
st
s,
 A
_
IN
V
E
N
 i
s 
th
e 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 i
n
v
en
to
ry
, 
A
_
R
E
C
 i
s 
th
e 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 r
ec
ei
v
ab
le
s,
 A
_
O
A
C
 i
s 
th
e 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 o
p
er
at
in
g
 a
cc
ru
al
s,
 D
_
E
X
P
 i
s 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 d
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
 e
x
p
en
se
s,
 T
A
 i
s 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
P
R
O
D
_
C
 i
s 
th
e 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
co
st
s,
 S
O
X
_
D
 i
s 
th
e 
S
O
X
 d
u
m
m
y
 t
h
at
 i
s 
se
t 
eq
u
al
 t
o
 1
 f
o
r 
fi
rm
 y
ea
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
o
st
 S
O
X
 p
er
io
d
 a
n
d
 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 D
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
ar
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 u
si
n
g
 t
h
e 
m
o
d
if
ie
d
 J
o
n
es
 
M
o
d
el
; 
A
b
n
o
rm
al
 c
as
h
 f
lo
w
 f
ro
m
 o
p
er
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
p
re
d
ic
te
d
 v
al
u
es
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
-y
ea
r 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
: 
 
 C
F
O
t
/ 
A
1
−t
 =
 α
*
(1
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
1
*
(S
t
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
2
*
(S
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 ε
t
, 
--
--
--
--
--
--
- 
(5
.1
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 W
h
er
e 
A
t
 =
 a
ss
et
s 
at
 e
n
d
 o
f 
y
ea
r 
t,
 S
t
 =
 s
al
es
 d
u
ri
n
g
 y
ea
r 
t,
 ∆
S
t
 =
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 s
al
es
 d
u
ri
n
g
 y
ea
r 
t.
  
A
b
n
o
rm
al
 p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
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o
st
s:
 i
s 
th
e 
re
si
d
u
al
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
-y
ea
r 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
  
 P
R
O
D
t
/A
1
−t
 =
 α
 *
(1
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
1
*
(S
t
/A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
2
*
(∆
S
t
/A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
3
*
(∆
S
t
/A
1
−t
) 
+
 ε
t,
 -
--
--
- 
(5
.2
) 
 w
h
er
e 
A
t 
=
 a
ss
et
s 
at
 e
n
d
 o
f 
y
ea
r 
t,
 S
t
=
 s
al
es
 d
u
ri
n
g
 y
ea
r 
t,
 ∆
S
t
 =
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 s
al
es
 d
u
ri
n
g
 y
ea
r 
t.
  
 
1
7
7
 
1
7
7
 
 
A
b
n
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io
n
ar
y
 e
x
p
en
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n
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 D
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X
P
t
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1
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 =
 α
*
(1
/ 
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1
−t
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 β
1
 *
(S
t
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 ε
t
, 
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
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ri
n
g
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t,
 ∆
S
t
 =
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h
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g
e 
in
 s
al
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n
g
 y
ea
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A
b
n
o
rm
al
 a
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ru
al
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rr
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o
n
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 A
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 =
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*
(1
/ 
A
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1
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(∆
S
t
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
2
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P
E
t
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A
1
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+
 ε
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--
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 =
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n
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P
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p
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q
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n
d
 o
f 
y
ea
r 
t.
  
A
b
n
o
rm
al
 R
ec
ei
v
ab
le
s:
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s 
th
e 
re
si
d
u
al
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
co
rr
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p
o
n
d
in
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
-y
ea
r 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
: 
 ∆
N
R
t
/ 
A
1
−t
 =
 α
*
(1
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
1
*
(∆
S
t
/ 
A
1
−t
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+
 ε
t
,-
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
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n
v
en
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ry
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h
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n
d
in
g
 i
n
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st
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ea
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g
re
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io
n
  
 ∆
IN
V
E
N
t
/ 
A
1
−t
 =
 α
*
(1
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
1
*
(∆
S
t
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 β
2
*
( 
∆
S
1
−t
/ 
A
1
−t
) 
+
 ε
t
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
- 
(5
.6
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1
7
8
 
1
7
8
 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
3
: 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 B
e
tw
e
e
n
 V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 f
o
r 
E
s
s
a
y
 2
(P
e
a
rs
o
n
 C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 a
re
 S
h
o
w
n
 A
b
o
v
e
 t
h
e
 D
ia
g
o
n
a
l 
w
it
h
 S
p
e
a
rm
a
n
 B
e
lo
w
).
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at
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n
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p
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rm
an
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 a
b
o
v
e 
th
e 
d
ia
g
o
n
al
 a
n
d
 P
ea
rs
o
n
 b
el
o
w
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b
et
w
ee
n
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
o
v
er
al
l 
sa
m
p
le
 p
er
io
d
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N
_
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is
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h
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en
d
 o
f 
y
ea
r 
n
et
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n
co
m
e.
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E
 i
s 
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fo
re
ca
st
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rr
o
rs
 m
ea
su
re
d
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ac
tu
al
 m
in
u
s 
th
e 
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re
ca
st
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ar
n
in
g
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p
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h
ar
e 
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al
ed
 b
y
 t
h
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ar
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ri
ce
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et
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n
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tu
rn
s 
w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
th
e 
p
ri
ce
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 c
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u
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 b
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o
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n
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en
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 m
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rn
in
g
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n
o
u
n
ce
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en
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 o
n
e 
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ck
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tu
rn
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te
r 
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rn
in
g
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n
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u
n
ce
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en
ts
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 b
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ts
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 m
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at
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 b
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 b
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d
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 t
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 m
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 l
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 f
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d
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 .
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+
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+
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+
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d
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d
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p
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Table 14 presents the Pearson (spearman) correlation coefficients with the p values in 
parenthesis for the sample between the periods 1997 to 2006. The correlations are pooled for 
the entire sample (Pearson Correlation are Shown above the diagonal with Spearman below). 
Correlations significant at the 5 percent levels are marked in bold. This gives a balanced 
sample of five years before and after the SOX period. The intervening year is the year 2002 
when SOX was enacted. Lagged total assets are used to scale several variables, as specified 
and total assets are a proxy for size. Correlations that are significant have been marked in bold. 
The most significant correlation is the correlation between production cost and sales. They 
have a Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 90 (71) percent. This suggests that firms 
with higher production costs also have a high amount of total sales. This is however true as 
most often, firms increase their production cost when they think the demand for their products 
are high and they also attempt to reduce unit production cost when they have contrary market 
expectations. We also observe marginally positive but significant correlations between net 
income and variables that drives income. Sales and net income are positively correlated and 
significant at the 5 percent level, with a Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 17 (13) 
percent respectively. Likewise discretionary expenses, abnormal operating accruals and total 
accruals are positively correlated with net income respectively for both Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation at 14 (14) percent, 11 (22) and 13 (31) percent. All the reported results are all 
significant. This is consistent with prior research (Sloan 1996, Roychowdhury, 2007) that 
found a positively correlated relationship between accruals and sales with net income.  
 
As in Roychowdhury (2007), the correlations between the total and abnormal levels of various 
items are positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
between operating accruals and total accruals is the highest at 57 (72) percent. Discretionary 
expenses and abnormal discretionary expenses are correlated positively for both Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation at 33 (4) percent, and production cost and abnormal production cost 
are positively correlated for both the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient at 17 (2) 
percent. Recall that, actual production costs refer to cost for real transactions while 
discretionary costs are generic to management’s intent. A reason for the positive correlation 
might be as a result of manager simultaneously increasing the discretionary items as they 
disburse for these items. Abnormal inventory and production costs are positively correlated 
with a Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 26 (27) percent. One reason for this 
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might be as a result of the relationship between inventory production and related expenses. 
Abnormal inventory build-ups are possibly as a result of earnings manipulation. Prior research 
(e.g. Gunny, 2006, Chan et al., 1996) has argued that most managers build up inventory and 
when they realize that sales are not matching the amounts of goods produced; they provide 
price discounts to dispose of their unwanted inventory. Their cost needs to be discretionary by 
management, as the normal inventory levels cannot account for them.  
 
Consistent with prior research, there is a marginally negative correlation between abnormal 
inventory and stock returns. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation is –3 (-7) percent and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. Recall that abnormal inventory level reflects excess annual 
inventory growth whose production is customarily discretionary by management (e.g. 
Roychowdhury, 2003). One reason for the negative correlation might relate to the stock 
market’s perception on abnormal inventory levels. In most cases, they are viewed as signals of 
problems with overproduction leading to high costs, turnover problems and inventory 
obsolescence. This has been supported by Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) who provided 
evidence of a negative relationship between excess inventory growth and future earnings. 
 
It is important to recognize the highly negative Pearson (Spearman) correlation with abnormal 
production cost and abnormal discretionary expenses of about –63 (-74) percent. I interpret the 
reason for this as discussed in Roychowdhury, (2003). When firms normally provide price 
discounts that lead to an increase in sales volume, discretionary expenses would appear low 
relative to sales. Normally, price discounts increase a unit cost of production relative to sale 
price. Such price discounts can also be engineered by over production to reduce unit cost of 
goods sold, as long as inventory pile-up does not lead to excess unit holding cost. One 
therefore has to expect a negative relationship between abnormal production cost and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. The marginal, but significantly negative relationship 
(Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of –5 (-4) percent) between abnormal production 
cost and net income is a signal that overproduction by firms increases the cost of production 
thereby reducing end of period net income. 
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5.5.2:Returns/Earnings Quality Relationships. 
The main regression model for the second main research hypothesis, (defined as earnings 
quality and firm performance hypothesis) postulates that investors discount those firms that 
manage earnings highly through a negative stock return. Our empirical investigation 
distinguishes between five main categories of earnings management: the probability of 
financial statements distortions as measured by the Beneish M-Score (Beneish 1997,1999), 
earnings management through discretionary accruals, real earnings management through 
abnormal changes in discretionary expenses, earnings management through abnormal 
changes in receivables, and finally earnings management through abnormal changes in 
receivables. However, the first three categories are the main earnings management models, 
with respect to their superiority to the degree of information linked to earnings management 
that they are supposed to possess.  
 
In the main regression models, the returns/earnings management relationship is examined. 
Stock returns (3.3.4) is used as a proxy for firm performance and is controlled for other 
variables that are likely to affect firm performance like firm size (Collins and Kothari, 1989, 
Collins et al., 1997), growth opportunities (Collins and Kothari, 1989), Leverage 
(Subramanyam, 1996, Reynolds and Francis, 2000). The observed relationship between 
stock returns and prior earnings management can be explained by the argument that, 
managers may have employed earnings management techniques to influence reported 
earnings. This would either increase stock prices in the future if investors are passive and 
cannot differentiate managed from unmanaged earnings or might have negative effect on 
future stock prices if investors discount earnings management practices in the valuation of 
companies. As discussed above, during strict regulatory regimes as prescribed by the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, managers might still be managing earnings using less 
scrutinised techniques. (Details of the relationship between earnings quality and stock returns 
are discussed in section 5.4.2). 
 
The relationship between the firm’s earnings quality and their future performance as 
measured by their future returns is therefore examined using the following regression model: 
 
FRET ti, =α 0 +β 1*(X i 1−t )+β 2 *(SOX ti, )+β 3*(X i 1−t *SOX)+β 4 *(Lev)+β 5 *(MTB 1−t )+
6β *(SIZE 1−t )+ 7β *(SUS_FIRM i 1−t )+ 8β *(SUS_FIRM*SOX i 1−t )+ ................(5.13). 
Where FRET it  is the 12-month stock return that ends 3 months after the fiscal year in year 
t (see 3.3.4). 
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X i is the proxy for earnings quality (see 3.3.2). 
SOX is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 for firm years in the SOX period and zero 
otherwise.  
X i *SOX is an interaction variable between the earnings management proxy and the SOX 
period. 
SUS_FIRM*SOX i is an interaction variable of the relationship between suspect firm years 
(years where the firm is judged to have most likely manipulated their earnings) and the 
SOX period. 
Lev it  is the proxy for leverage measured as the total liabilities over the total assets. 
MTB it  is the market to book value. 
SIZE it  is the total assets used as a proxy for firm size 
SUS_FIRM is a dummy set equal to 1 if the firm year is at the highest decile of the 
Probability of manipulation, and at the highest decile for the absolute values for the 
estimated real earnings management and discretionary accruals values.  
Table 16 below discuss the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable.  
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Table 17 below presents the results of the model 5.13 above for the returns earnings quality 
relationship. Panels a, b, c, d and e provide the results for the different proxies for earnings 
quality. The coefficient on β 1  is to pick out the effect of earnings management as measured 
by the probability of financial statements distortion on firms performance. In panel A the 
relationship is positive and significant indicating that firms with a high probability of 
manipulation as measured by the Beneish M-Score performed better as documented by 
their positive stock returns. However, in the post SOX period, when firms have a high 
probability of financial statements distortions, they are less likely to perform better as 
supported by the insignificant results of the interaction variable between the probability of 
manipulation and the Sarbanes Oxley period (β 3  coefficient is 0.0008 and t stats is 0.75). 
Also the coefficient of 7β is positive but insignificant suggesting that firms that manage 
earnings overall based on the probability of manipulation as measured by the M-Score, are 
less likely to influence stock returns. In the post SOX period, firms that are more likely to 
manage earnings have a negative stock returns (coefficient of -0.004 and t-stats of -1.87).  
 
The results reported in panel b aims to capture the impact of earnings management using 
discretionary accruals techniques on firm performance. The findings as in Panel b suggest 
that when firms manage earnings using discretionary accruals, the market reaction is 
always positive (coefficient of β 1  0.0067 and t-stats of 2.29). Nonetheless, when 
discretionary accruals are employed to manage earnings in the post SOX period, there is a 
negative market reaction as reported by the coefficient of –0.003 and t-stats of –2.39. 
Firms that are more likely to manage earnings have negative returns; however, the 
relationship is insignificant (coefficient of -0.0016 and t stats of -0.83). In the post SOX 
era, firms that are more likely to manage earnings have a marginally positive stock returns 
though the relationship is insignificant (coefficient of 0.0009 and t stats of 0.31). The 
implication of the result above is that during periods of greater market regulations, 
investors are also very vigilant and discount stocks of firms that employ the more visible 
discretionary accruals technique to manage earnings. This is an indication that SOX 
influence greater monitoring of earnings management by investors.  
 
Another key variable of interest is the discretionary expenses variable. This is a key 
variable of interest because it captures the impact of real earnings management. The 
indication is that an increase in discretionary expenses to reduce reported earnings leads to 
a reduction of stock returns (coefficient of -0.006 and t stats of -2.974).  However, when 
firms manage earnings in the post SOX period using discretionary expenses, the results are 
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statistically insignificant (coefficient of 0.0044 and t stats of 1.03). Suspect firms (defined 
as those that are most likely to manage earnings using discretionary expenses) are more 
likely to have positive returns, though the relationship is insignificant (coefficient of 
0.0008 and t stats of 0.45). However, suspect firms in the post SOX period have a negative 
but significant coefficient (coefficient is -0.0001 and t stats of -3.23) which suggests that 
firms that attempt to manage earnings have negative stock returns.  
 
Since accruals involve a combination of other accounting constructs and they might be 
influenced by other items like changes in receivables, payables and inventory, I investigate 
the predictive power of other items like changes in inventory and receivables. The results 
suggest that firms that manage earnings through increases in abnormal changes in 
receivables normally have positive returns (coefficient of 0.0076 and t-stats of 2.67). But in 
the post SOX era, the relationship is insignificant (coefficient of -0.014 and t-stats of -
0.54). While firms that are more likely to manage earnings as measured by abnormal 
changes in receivables have a negative returns (coefficient of -0.004 and t states of -2.12), 
in the Post SOX era, this relationship is positive and insignificant (coefficient of 0.00522 
and t stats of 1.31). When firms stockpile inventory, there is always negative returns 
(coefficient of -0.013 and t-stats of -2.44). When firms are more likely to manage earnings 
in the overall sample period, they are more likely to have positive returns (coefficient of 
0.0021 and t stats of 2.14). In the post SOX Era firms that are more likely to manage 
earnings using abnormal changes in inventory always have disappointing future returns 
(coefficient of -0.002and t-stats of -2.74).  
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5.6: Conclusion. 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate if investors discount earnings management 
practices (especially after the post SOX era). The major contribution of this study to the 
broader literature is to investigate the influence of earnings management on firm 
performance post SOX using a wider set of earnings management proxies. Giving that the 
objective of the SOX was to improve the quality of financial reporting after the high 
profile business failures that led to significant losses by investors, one would expect 
investors post SOX to scrutinise a wider set of financial statement information, to be able 
to discount earnings management practices.  
 
The proxies for earnings quality employed are three measures of earnings management that 
have been employed in the accounting literature to investigate how managers can manage 
reported earnings. This includes the discretionary accruals model by Dechow et al., (1995), 
earnings management using real operating decisions (See Roychowdhury, 2006, Gunny, 
2006, Graham et al. 2006) and the Beneish M-Score (Beneish 1997, 1999) model that 
estimates the probability of financial statement distortions. These different measures of 
earnings management have been employed in order to avoid a contamination of the 
research results on the influence of earnings management on firm performance. As in Chan 
et al., (2006), post transaction stock returns are employed as a measure of firm 
performance. 
 
Overall, the results support my prediction of the main hypothesis and provide evidence of 
greater monitoring of financial statements in the post SOX era. On average, when firm’s 
attempt to manage earnings post SOX, investors discount this through poor stock returns. 
One major contribution of this study to the literature on earnings quality and firm 
performance in light of the recent regulatory intervention relates to the investigation of a 
comprehensive set of earnings management signals. Accrual components customarily 
include accounts receivables, accounts payables, changes in inventory, and so on. One 
interesting result relates to the greater predictive power of abnormal changes in inventory. 
Increases in inventory are negatively related to future stock returns both in the overall 
sample period and in the post SOX period. This suggests that investors discount firms that 
stockpile inventory even before the greater monitoring of financial statements. Consistent 
to Guay et al., (1996), in the overall sample period, discretionary accruals are positively 
related to firm returns. However, in the post SOX period, the relationship between 
discretionary accruals and firm returns is negative.  
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All in all, the results provides strong evidence that there need to be a broad based approach 
in analysing financial statement information’s through an evaluation of different sets of 
information. It is important to note that, different earnings management metrics are 
employed to investigate the influence of earnings management in the post SOX period. 
Further, investigations embrace the policy implications which constitute a stronger signal 
to the financial markets. That is, in periods of strict regulation of financial markets, firms 
are less likely to manipulate earnings to influence their performance. Even when firms 
manage earnings, investors quickly discount earnings management practices in their 
valuation of these companies. From an investor’s point of view, there have been greater 
benefits to the public as a result of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
through increased accountability and monitoring by the investing community and 
presumably other stakeholders like the media. One important motive for this research was 
to investigate whether managers substitute real versus accrual management techniques in 
period of stricter financial statement regulations. What follows is that there is no clear 
evidence to support this assertion. 
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6.0:Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations. 
6.1: Introduction. 
The first section is a summary of the two key empirical chapters that forms the main results 
of the study; a second section where the main contributions and limitations of the essays 
are discussed follows this. The third sections addresses the implications of the results for 
policy makers, investors, corporate managers and academics, and a final section, section 
four presents the recommendations for future research.  
 
6.2: Summary of the Chapters. 
The notes below summarises the two main empirical essays around several characteristics 
that include: 1) aim of the essays 2) dependent variables in focus, independent variables 
and control variables, 3) research design issues 4) main empirical results. The reason for 
summarising the essays in this way was to assist in structuring the findings of the 
individual essays and provides an overview of the overall objective of the dissertation.  
  
6.2.1: Empirical Essay 1. 
The objective of Chapter 1 is to examine the relationship between discretionary accruals 
and Insider trading and discusses how this relationship has changed as a result of the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The research specifically aims to 
provide answers to the following research questions:  
1-Has the regulatory intervention (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), provided the desired effects which 
are: 
• To suppress earnings manipulation thereby improving the quality of earnings? 
• To suppress earnings manipulation motivated by prior insider trades. 
2- Does insiders trading in their corporations stocks provide information about future 
earnings performance? 
 
The original sample is the S&P 500 firms as of March 2007 and includes all firms in the 
sample from the period 1997 to 2007. Results are reported for an unbalanced sample of 
firms covering the period of analysis. As discussed, there are two key dependent variables, 
which are the discretionary accruals, and the net shares traded that define whether a firm’s 
insiders are net buyers or sellers of their corporations stock. From the theoretical constructs 
underlying research in the area, several independent variables are included in the thesis that 
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includes forecast errors (FE), future returns (FRET), a dummy to capture the inception of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX). Additional independent variables to incorporate the impact 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 include NST*SOX, DA*SOX, FRET*SOX. The 
analysis also controls for size (Park and Park, 2006), growth opportunities (see Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002), debt covenant obligations (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, Klein 2002), 
firm performances ((see Skinner and Sloan, 2002) using respectively the variable SIZE, 
MTB, LEV, NI as independent variables in the regression analysis.  
 
Since theoretical arguments suggest that the relationship between insider trading and 
earnings management might be jointly determined, I provide additional tests for the Causal 
Relationship between insider trading and Earnings Management Using Two-Stage Least 
Squares. To test the robustness of my empirical results, I conduct additional tests using 
other earnings management proxies that have become popular in the literature. They 
include real earnings management through changes in discretionary expenses as discussed 
by Roychowdhury, (2006), and the rank variable model using the M-Score (Beneish, 1997, 
1999). The use of the M-Score as a proxy for earnings management is a slight departure 
from previous studies. The M-Score (a Rank Variable) focuses on financial statements 
distortions and conditions that suggest earnings Manipulations. Using these alternative 
definitions of earnings management facilitates a more effective comparison of the results 
of this study and other alternative models that employ other earnings management proxies. 
It also helps the researcher see if the results reported earlier are changed using these 
different earnings management proxies. 
 
I document that on average, companies employ negative discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings and are also net sellers of their stock. After the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the quality of earnings have improved as companies use less discretionary 
accruals to manage reported earnings. In the overall sample period, there is a positive 
relationship between prior year discretionary accruals and one-year ahead stock returns.   
This suggests that discretionary accruals are customarily used to boost reported earnings 
leading to a positive stock return. However, in the post SOX period, investors do not fixate 
on the earnings figure. When managers employ discretionary accounting techniques to 
improve reported earnings post SOX, investors discount the stocks of these companies 
leading to negative stock returns. I also test the relationship between current period insider 
trading and future returns. Ideally, insiders with private information about the economy, 
the firm’s future prospects and its effects on its cash flow and earnings, might form 
expectations and trade on that basis without necessarily employi
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to influence the public information (reported earnings). The findings suggest that in the 
overall sample period, insider trading is positively related to post transaction stock returns.  
However, in the post SOX period, managers are less likely to time their trade based on 
overall market and economic fundamentals even when they are not interested in 
influencing reported earnings. These suggest that SOX has improved the integrity of the 
US financial market. Overall, the results suggest that market participants detect and react 
to insider trading and earnings management practices under conditions of stricter 
regulations. 
  
6.2.2: Empirical Essay 2. 
The purpose of this essay is to empirically assess the relationship between a 
comprehensive set of earnings management signals and future firm performance. Its 
primary purpose is to verify whether there have been substantial benefits to the public as a 
result of the enactment of the SOX through (i) improvements in earnings quality as a result 
of the SOX (ii) if investors price the level of earnings management present in the financial 
statements. The research aims to answer the following question as to whether: After 
Sarbanes Oxley, stocks of suspect firms (firms with low earnings quality as measured by 
the Probability of manipulation, abnormal changes in the various accruals and real earnings 
management items) exhibit negative stock price performance while those of non-suspect 
firms (firms with high earnings quality) exhibit positive stock price performance? 
 
The original sample for this study is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 and covers data 
from the period of 1997 to 2006. Results are reported for an unbalanced sample of firms 
from 1997 to 2006 giving five consecutive years for analysis of the pre and post SOX 
studies. The Beneish (1997, 1999) M-Score is to used to detect probability of financial 
statements fraud, the Modified Jones (1995) model by Dechow et al., (1995) is used to 
measure discretionary accruals and finally the Roychowdhury, (2007) model used to 
measure real earnings management as defined by abnormal changes in discretionary 
expenses, abnormal production cost, abnormal changes in inventory, abnormal changes in 
receivables, abnormal accruals as measures of earnings quality. In the main 
returns/earnings relationship that forms the basis of these tests, the dependent variable is 
the FRET that is used as a proxy for firm performance.  Independent variables includes X 
which is the proxy for earnings quality, as employed by the researcher, SOX is a 
dichotomous variable set equal to 1 for firm years in the SOX period and zero otherwise. 
Other independent variables included as control variables that have been found to influence 
firm performance include LEV measures debt covenant obligations (Reynolds and Francis, 
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2000), SIZE (Collins and Kothari, 1989, Collins et al., 1997) growth opportunities as in 
MTB (Collins and Kothari, 1989). Other variables included are SUS_FIRM which is a 
dummy set equal to 1 if the firm year is at the highest decile of the Probability of 
manipulation, and at the highest decile for the absolute values for the estimated real 
earnings management and discretionary accruals values. To capture the impact of the SOX, 
two interactive variables are included in the regression like X*SOX (which captures the 
impact of the earnings management proxy in the post SOX era) and SUS_FIRM*SOX 
(captures the impact of high earnings management in the post SOX era). 
 
Overall, the test provides evidence of greater monitoring of financial statements in the post 
SOX era. On average, when firm’s attempt to manage earnings post SOX, investors 
discount this through disappointing stock returns. One interesting result relates to the 
greater predictive power of abnormal changes in inventory. Increases in inventory are 
negatively related to future stock returns both in the overall sample period and in the post 
SOX period. This suggests that investors discount firms that stockpile inventory even 
before the greater monitoring of financial statements. Overall, the results suggest a broad 
based approach in analysing financial statement information’s through an evaluation of 
different sets of financial information. The implications point to the fact that there have 
been greater benefits to the public as a result of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 through increased accountability and monitoring of financial statements. However, 
the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to real earnings 
management when tighter regulatory control restrict accrual earnings management. 
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6.3: Contributions and Limitations.  
6.3.1: Research Contributions. 
6.3.1.1: New Research Focus:  
Empirical Essay 1- Prior research has provided evidence in support of large market value 
losses in the event of a revelation of regulatory violation involving accounting fraud 
(Karpoff et al., 2007). In such vein, the avoidance of such losses should become the 
primary responsibility of the regulators and investors alike. However, there is little 
evidence in the literature to suggest that regulators and investors can conveniently see 
through earnings management practices for regulatory purposes (Healy and Whalen, 1999). 
This research provides a new focus in that; it introduces a new variable that embraces the 
policy implications, in the context of research relating to the relationship between insider 
trading and earnings management on the one hand and earnings management and firm 
performance on the other hand. The SOX variable is used in Essay 1 specifically to 
evaluate the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the use of discretionary accruals to 
benefit from insider trading in their corporations stocks. In essay 2, the SOX variable is 
used to analyse the stock price behaviour base on different earnings management 
techniques in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Era. 
  
Essay 2- In essay 2, the researcher examines the relationship between earnings quality and 
firm performance in the light of the regulatory intervention (SOX). This is because due the 
effect of financial market regulations, different forms of earnings management might be 
discounted differently by investors. Although prior research has addressed the issues of 
earnings quality and stock returns (proxy for firm performance) using a comprehensive set 
of earnings management proxy, this is the literature to discuss this issues in the light of the 
regulatory intervention.  
 
The thesis aim is to analyse and test the presumption that the stock market is sensitive to 
specific earnings management proxies that have become popular in the academic literature 
(discretionary accruals) and that a wider set of information from financial statements might 
have rich predictive power. This is specifically true when stringent measures are put in 
place like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The researcher therefore examines the 
relationship between earnings management (using different proxies) and firm performance 
and evaluates how this relationship has changed as a result of the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Specifically, the researcher employed three measures of 
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earnings quality that is popular in the accounting literature using financial statements data: 
(1) the Beneish (1999) M-Score that rank firms according to their probability of financial 
statements manipulations (2) the discretionary accruals models by Dechow et al. (1995) (3) 
and estimates of real earnings management involving abnormal changes in discretionary 
expenses, abnormal changes in production costs, abnormal changes in receivables, 
abnormal changes in inventory, and abnormal operating accruals. Results point to the fact 
that firms are less likely to employ discretionary and real earnings management techniques 
to influence reported earnings after the introduction of SOX. In the post SOX period, 
investors discount myopic earnings management practices through disappointing stock 
returns. Finally, the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to 
real earnings management when tighter regulatory scrutiny restrict earnings management 
via accrual manipulations. 
 
6.3.1.2: Refinement of Statistical Technique.  
Essay 1-The literature suggests a causal relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management hence problems with endogeneity. The Hausman (1976) specification error 
tests can be used to test for simultaneity. It is important to note that, a test for simultaneity 
is essentially a test of whether an endogenous regressor is correlated with the error term 
(Gujarati, 1995). As a result of the correlation between the stochastic disturbance term and 
the endogenous variable, the OLS estimation might not be appropriate for the estimation of 
an equation in a system of simultaneous equation. In the presence of simultaneity 
problems, the 2 stage least squares will give estimators that are consistent and efficient 
(Gujarati, 1995).  To obtain consistent estimates on the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and insider trading, the Thesis employs a 2-stage least squares to solve the 
implicit endogeneity problem.  
Essay 1- in essay 1, there is a robustness check carried out with different types of earnings 
management proxy. For example, there is not a single research that has controlled for the 
impact of real earnings management or used the rank variable model to examine the 
relationship between insider trading and earnings management. It has been documented 
that strong regulatory regimes influences the use of real earnings management techniques 
at the expense of the more visible discretionary accruals techniques (Cohen et al., 2004). 
More recent models like the Rank variable model are more sophisticated, combining 
operating and financial characteristics to assess the likelihood of a firm’s probability of 
manipulation (Beneish and Nichols, 2005). It is likely that the use of these different models 
provides an opportunity to test their strengths and weaknesses. This might help different 
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stakeholders interested in earnings management information to evaluate whether egregious 
levels of earnings management lead to significant losses to the market like Enron. 
 
6.4.: Limitations of the Research. 
This section discusses a number of general limitations of the study. 
 
6.4.1: US Study. 
The Thesis is limited in terms of the scope of the countries that its results can be applicable 
to. The Thesis samples only US companies thus care need to be taken in generalising its 
results to other markets.  
 
6.4.2: Time Period of Study. 
The time period of the study is the period after the recent corporate scandals that brought 
enormous wealth loss to the US capital market. These failures preceded the stock market 
bubble with significant changes in corporate structures like mergers and acquisitions of 
major US companies. Like previous corporate scandals, the SOX were greatly needed to 
the US market to ease the pressure on regulators and promote the integrity of our capital 
markets. It is normal that several stakeholders including investors, regulators and managers 
ought to restructure their beliefs and values to avoid causing another embarrassment to the 
entire market. It may not be possible to generalise the results to other time periods. 
 
6.4.3: Industry Analysis. 
Though the research employed a cross sectional and time series analysis to calculate 
several metrics, the results reported are generalised for the entire sample. They are not 
reported on a cross sectional basis. This suggests that, they might reflect the entire S&P 
500 companies and not specific industries. 
 
6.4.4: Limitation of Scope. 
The statistical studies employed measures the relationship between a selected numbers of 
variables for the S&P 500 firms over a specified period. As in most market based 
accounting and finance research, all the variables employed have been well defined and 
quantified with mostly averages used. However, in order to quantify the variables above, 
the researcher must make simplifying assumptions linked to practical realities and to 
formalize the empirical reality that is to be studied. This suggests that what is being proven 
must somewhat be limited in scope. Moreover, many valued logic has been employed 
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based on the researchers own investigation of what prior research has found. Though the 
fundamental differences with prior research have been made explicit, to make clear the 
thesis’ contribution, it is important to investigate this same research using other techniques.  
 
6.4.5: Survivorship Bias.  
The study compares firms in the pre and post SOX period. The implications are that there 
is need for an automatic requirement for a constant sample of firms for the entire 10-year 
period of the study in order to eliminate the effect of differences in firms that initially 
appear in the latter period. As in Jenkins et al., (2006), the research believes while this 
sample restriction technique may somewhat induce a survivorship bias, the believe is that 
any resulting detrimental effect has been eclipsed by the benefit of eliminating potential 
volatility in the data that may be caused by the introduction of certain firms in specific 
periods. 
 
 
6.5: Implications of the Results. 
This section presents the implications of the results of the essays for policy makers, 
investors, corporate managers and academics.   
 
6.5.1: Implications for Policy Makers. 
Since many executives are customarily fascinated by reported earnings figure and this 
affects stock prices, managers might be concerned about their inability to manage earnings 
as a result of responsive new and stringent regulations. In Essay 1, the result suggests that 
market participants detect and react to insider trading and earnings management practices 
under conditions of stricter regulations. As documented by Cohen (2007), firms might 
switch from accrual based to real earnings management as a result of the introduction of 
the SOX. My point of departure with regards to the implications for policy makers are 
based on the assumptions that mandatory regulations might influence the trade-off between 
real and discretionary earnings management and their impact on firm performances and 
insider trading still needs to be investigated. Policy makers should focus their attention on 
a comprehensive set of earnings management signals and not just discretionary accruals. 
Tests in Essay 2 provide evidence of greater monitoring of financial statements in the post 
SOX era. On average, when firm’s attempt to manage earnings post SOX, investors 
discount this through disappointing stock returns. The results point to the fact that there 
have been greater benefits to the public as a result of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
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Act of 2002 through increased accountability and monitoring as a result of SEC decisions. 
However, the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to real 
earnings management when tighter regulatory controls restrict accruals earnings 
management. 
 
6.5.2: Implications for Investors. 
The empirical results in both essays reveal that a broader set of information from financial 
statements might guide investors about the types of ways firms manage earnings and warn 
that they should not just fixate on reported earnings alone and accruals techniques alone. It 
further suggests that investors should not rely only on annual report disclosures alone, but 
should monitor and evaluate the firms’ report to be able to ascertain if the firm has 
managed its earnings or not. In Essay 1, the evidence point to the importance of stricter 
regulations. The results suggest that, overall market participants detect and react to insider 
trading and earnings management practices under conditions of stricter regulations. In 
Essay 2 for example, the results points to the fact that, when firm’s attempt to manage 
earnings post SOX, investors readily unravel their valuation effects as envisaged through 
disappointing stock returns. One interesting result relates to the greater predictive power of 
abnormal changes in inventory. Increases in inventory are negatively related to future stock 
returns both in the overall sample period and in the post SOX period. This suggests that 
investors discount firms that stockpile inventory even before the greater monitoring of 
financial statements following SOX. Overall, the results suggest a broad based approach in 
analysing financial statement information’s through an evaluation of different sets of 
financial information’s. Furthermore, insider trading is positively related to post 
transaction stock returns.  However, in the post SOX period, managers are ideally less 
likely to time their trade based on overall market and economic fundamentals even when 
they are not interested in influencing reported earnings. 
 
6.5.3: Implications for Corporate Managers. 
The implications for corporate manager’s point to the fact that there have been greater 
monitoring of financial reports of recent and that a comprehensive set of earnings 
management practices have recently gained attention. There is no need to consider 
switching techniques under stricter regulations as suggested by Cohen et al., (2007), as this 
can still be unravelled by all stakeholders leading to large wealth losses by external 
investors and resulting criminal penalties to the managers. The conclusion in essay one 
points to the fact that SOX has improved the integrity of the US financial market and that 
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market participants detect and react to insider trading and earnings management practices 
under conditions of stricter regulations. In Essay 2, the results argue that, when firm’s 
attempt to manage earnings post SOX, investors discount their stocks through 
disappointing stock returns. This suggests greater vigilance of financial reports as investors 
strive to gain a clearer picture of financial statements. 
 
6.6: Suggestions for Future Research. 
This section proposes a number of suggestions for future research arising from the two 
independent essays. 
 
6.6.1: Studies of International Influences of SOX. 
The author believes that future research should investigate the impact of SOX 
internationally. The scandals affected not only US companies but were spread 
internationally. In such vein, even non-US companies might be affected by the SOX 
regulations and researchers need to investigate how other capital markets are reacting to 
SOX regulations. Moreover, other countries followed the US to impose responsive new 
regulations to their capital markets. Additional work need to be done to ascertain if these 
regulations have been cost efficient to their respective capital markets.  
 
6.6.2: Research on Earnings Management. 
The results of the two essays clearly demonstrate the usefulness of distinguishing between 
real and discretionary earnings management by academic research. The traditional starting 
point in the measuring of earnings management in the popular accounting literature has 
been the use of discretionary accruals. The author believes that it is important for future 
academic research to continue the refinement of the statistical properties involved and the 
techniques used to measure these two strands of earnings management practices. In a bid to 
avoid erroneous interpretation and see if results reported earlier are changed, the author 
suggests that when researchers utilize one technique, they should robustly test for the other 
to avoid confusing a reduction in earnings management for a change in the style of 
earnings management.  
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